Gary W. Tranmer

Following an appeal, the successful respondent sought costs.

The court considered the respondent's reasonable offers to settle, which were less favourable than the final outcome, alongside the Rule 57 factors.

Finding the claimed amount of $8,218.80 excessive, the court fixed costs at $6,500 for fees plus HST and $386.46 for disbursements.

The appellant, Andrew Wilby, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The conviction arose from an incident where he drove his police cruiser onto a sidewalk, colliding with a fleeing suspect, Cammalleri, during an apprehension attempt.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by using speculation, applying a harsher standard of scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendering an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge was entitled to reject certain defence evidence and draw inferences that logically flowed from the accepted facts, including that the appellant deliberately drove onto the sidewalk to obstruct the suspect's path.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the application of the dangerous driving test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge a correctional decision to transfer him from Millhaven Institution (maximum security, segregation) to Stony Mountain Institution (maximum security, general population).

The applicant argued that the proposed transfer would significantly reduce his residual liberty by impacting family contact, access to support organizations, and likely leading to renewed segregation.

The court found no factual basis for these claims, noting a lack of evidence regarding family visits, the speculative nature of lost support, and mere speculation concerning future segregation.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate a deprivation of residual liberty required for habeas corpus relief, as the transfer was considered a lateral move not amounting to a substantial change in incarceration conditions.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $5,000 in general damages and $3,000 in punitive damages following an altercation at a hockey arena.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he acted out of revenge, in rejecting his claim of self-defence, and in the damages awarded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant was motivated by revenge and was not acting in self-defence, and that the damages awards were appropriate and supported by the evidence.

The appellant, David Simms, appealed a Small Claims Court decision that found him liable for damages.

The appeal raised four issues: whether the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's conduct was motivated by revenge for his son, whether the judge erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence, and appeals against the awards of punitive damages ($3000) and general damages ($5000).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on any of the issues, as they were supported by evidence.

The defendant, Imperial Oil Ltd., moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Valco Instruments Canada Corporation) action for damages in negligence and nuisance due to petroleum hydrocarbon (PHC) migration.

Imperial Oil argued the claim was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, having been discovered in 2001 or 2006, and that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding continuing nuisance.

The court found the claim for initial damages was discovered in 2006, making it statute-barred by October 2008.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding continuing nuisance, specifically whether there has been ongoing migration of PHCs from the defendant's property to the plaintiff's property since November 4, 2009, and the extent of resulting damages.

The motion for summary judgment was granted in part, dismissing the initial claim but allowing the continuing nuisance claim to proceed to trial.

The accused, subject to a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), was arrested on a suspension warrant after being found at an unauthorized location with an unauthorized female.

Upon arrest, a concealed, unauthorized cell phone was found on his person.

Parole officers conducted a cursory search of the phone to check for LTSO compliance.

Later, a parole officer interviewed the accused without informing him that he was also under police investigation for sexual assault and personation.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude his statements and the cell phone evidence.

The court held that the failure to inform the accused of the new criminal jeopardy before the interview violated his s. 10 rights, and excluded those statements under s. 24(2).

However, the court found no s. 8 violation regarding the cell phone search, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the unauthorized phone and the parole officers' search was lawful for compliance purposes.

Following a motion to vary an order concerning their mother's care and estate, the parties made submissions on costs.

The court found that the moving parties (two of the siblings) engaged in unreasonable litigation conduct that unnecessarily lengthened and delayed the proceedings.

Costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee, Section 3 counsel, BMO Trust Company, and the responding siblings.

To sanction the moving parties' conduct while recognizing the estate's ability to pay, the court ordered the costs to be paid from the mother's estate, with 50% of those costs to be set off against the moving parties' future inheritance.

The moving parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Section 3 counsel brought a motion to vary a previous order regarding the guardianship of an elderly mother, after the daughter appointed as guardian of personal care indicated she would seek outside employment and hire full-time professional caregivers unless compensated.

The court found that the daughter's actions escalated the litigation and were money-driven, but recognized that the mother was thriving under her daughter's full-time personal care.

To ensure the mother's best interests were met, the court varied the order to appoint the daughter and one of her brothers as joint guardians of personal care, and ordered that the daughter be compensated for her caregiving services.

Section 3 counsel brought a motion to vary a previous order regarding the guardianship of an incapable person, after the appointed guardian of personal care (the incapable person's daughter) indicated she would seek outside employment and hire professional caregivers instead of providing full-time personal care herself without compensation, contrary to the guardianship plan she had filed.

The court found that the daughter's actions escalated the litigation and that she put her own interests ahead of her mother's.

However, because the mother was thriving under the daughter's full-time care, and the daughter threatened to cease providing care if not appointed guardian and compensated, the court varied its previous order to allow for the daughter's compensation.

To mitigate conflict of interest and ensure the mother's best interests, the court appointed the daughter and one of her brothers as joint guardians of personal care.

The applicant sought a declaration that all of his concurrent sentences for multiple drug trafficking and proceeds offences were eligible for accelerated parole review (APR) despite the repeal of the APR regime on March 28, 2011.

Some offences occurred before the repeal date while others occurred afterward.

The court considered the interaction of s. 11(i) of the Charter with the repeal of APR and the authorities interpreting eligibility for offenders whose conduct straddled the repeal date.

The court held that although APR may theoretically apply to offences committed before the repeal, it could not be extended to later offences simply because they were sentenced together.

On the facts, the repeal did not increase the applicant’s incarceration period because the later offences independently required longer incarceration.

A federal inmate brought an application for habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and transfer to another institution.

The applicant argued that correctional authorities breached procedural fairness by withholding information relied upon in the transfer decision and that the decision was unreasonable.

The court reviewed the disclosure process under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the principles set out in Mission Institution v. Khela.

After reviewing a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld information and the reliability of confidential sources, the court found that the correctional authorities lawfully invoked s. 27(3) and disclosed sufficient summaries to allow the applicant to meet the case against him.

The court further held that the transfer decision fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by the evidentiary record.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a sentence in a maximum security institution, applied for a writ of habeas corpus after his request to transfer to a medium security institution was denied.

The warden maintained his maximum security classification despite a psychological assessment and Security Reclassification Scale indicating medium security.

The court dismissed the application, holding that maintaining an existing security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty, and therefore habeas corpus is not available.

The applicant, Tammy Hilda Amey, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

She was charged jointly with two co-accused in relation to a cocaine trafficking operation.

The total delay was 31 months.

The court found that 11 months of the delay was attributable to the unavailability of a co-accused's counsel, which did not breach the applicant's rights as the Crown was not yet obliged to sever her charges.

The remaining 8.5 months of Crown and institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no actual prejudice, the court dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of making decisions regarding admission to a care facility.

She argued the Board erred in law and fact, including by allegedly applying a best interests test rather than the statutory capacity test.

The court reviewed the Board’s decision under a reasonableness standard and applied the governing principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding capacity to consent.

The court found the Board properly articulated and applied the legal test and that its conclusion that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of leaving the care facility was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

An inmate brought an application for habeas corpus challenging the Correctional Service of Canada's decision to reclassify and transfer him from a medium security institution to a maximum security institution.

The inmate argued the decision lacked legislative authority under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and violated s. 7 of the Charter as arbitrary and grossly disproportionate.

The court reviewed the administrative record and applied the reasonableness framework set out in Mission Institution v. Khela, emphasizing deference to prison authorities in matters affecting institutional security.

The court found the decision was justified by repeated inappropriate conduct toward correctional staff and aggressive behaviour during a segregation escort.

The transfer decision was held to fall within the range of acceptable outcomes supported by the evidence and governing legislation.

The applicants sought a variance of a restraint order under s. 462.34(4)(c) of the Criminal Code to permit the release of restrained funds for reasonable living and legal expenses while facing fraud and proceeds of crime charges.

The court reviewed the statutory criteria requiring proof that the applicants had an interest in the funds, lacked other assets or means, and that no other person appeared entitled to the property.

The Crown challenged the sufficiency and accuracy of the applicants’ financial disclosure, pointing to unexplained withdrawals and assets exceeding $895,000.

The court found the applicants failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that they lacked other available assets or means.

The application to vary the restraint order was dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought costs of $12,026.10 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found that the hourly rates were within the parameters of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but reduced excessive time claimed for preparation of summary judgment motion materials.

The court fixed a fair and reasonable costs award of $10,000 inclusive for the action and the summary judgment motion.

A federal inmate brought a habeas corpus application challenging a decision by prison authorities to reclassify and involuntarily transfer him from medium security to maximum security.

The inmate argued that correctional authorities improperly withheld information relied upon in the transfer decision under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court reviewed sealed materials and compared them with the summaries provided to the inmate.

It found that important information was not disclosed in gist form and that the reliability of sources had not been adequately addressed as required by governing jurisprudence.

The court held that these failures rendered the decision procedurally unfair and unlawful.

Costs decision following applications under the Substitute Decisions Act concerning the care and property of an elderly mother.

The litigation involved two groups of siblings disputing issues including compensation for caregiving.

Most issues settled before the hearing, leaving only a compensation issue which was decided in the earlier merits decision.

The court determined responsibility for legal costs, including those of court-appointed counsel under s. 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court ordered that certain preparation and hearing costs of s. 3 counsel and one group of siblings be paid by the unsuccessful parties, while other costs were borne by each party individually or paid from the incapable person's property.