Gary W. Tranmer

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that a Mutual Full and Final Release executed by the parties barred the plaintiffs’ subsequent action alleging bad faith, misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty relating to the operation of a salvage yard.

The plaintiffs contended the release should not apply due to unequal bargaining power, intimidation, and undue influence.

The court found no evidence supporting allegations of duress, intimidation, or unequal bargaining power, noting the plaintiffs were represented by counsel and received consideration in exchange for the release.

Applying principles governing unconscionability and contractual releases, the court concluded the release was valid and enforceable.

As a result, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application challenging decisions by correctional authorities to reclassify him from medium to maximum security and to transfer him to a maximum security institution in Saskatchewan.

He argued the evidence relied upon by correctional authorities was insufficient, that disclosure was inadequate, and that Gladue principles and community connections weighed against the decisions.

The court reviewed both public and sealed affidavit evidence pursuant to Mission Institution v. Khela and found the correctional authorities lawfully withheld certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act while providing sufficient summaries for procedural fairness.

The court held that the decisions to reclassify and transfer the inmate were reasonable, transparent, and supported by reliable evidence.

The habeas corpus application was dismissed.

Two competing applications were brought by siblings regarding the guardianship and care of their 88-year-old mother, who suffers from Alzheimer's dementia.

The court appointed the daughter, who had been living with and caring for the mother, as guardian of personal care, and a trust company as guardian of property.

The primary dispute concerned the daughter's claim for $133,000 in compensation for past caregiving and $53,620 annually going forward.

The court awarded a lump sum of $25,000 for past care and $500 per month for future care management, emphasizing the mother's best interests and the equitable recognition of the daughter's contributions.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for $13,000 based on an alleged oral agreement.

The appeal was based on the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge's brief reasons were merely statements of conclusion without analysis of the credibility issues or the evidence, including transcripts of recorded telephone conversations.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and involuntary transfer to a higher security institution.

The court held that correctional authorities complied with the disclosure regime under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and were not required to undertake further investigation into the underlying intelligence.

However, the authorities failed to comply with s. 12(b) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations by not holding the required meeting to explain the reasons for the proposed transfer after allowing time for preparation, and by denying the applicant his elected opportunity to make in person representations.

Those breaches were substantive, not merely technical, and rendered the transfer decision procedurally unfair and unlawful.

Habeas corpus was granted and the reclassification and transfer decision was quashed.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and involuntary transfer to a maximum security penitentiary following an institutional drug investigation.

The court held that prison authorities lawfully relied on s. 27(3)(a) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to withhold only information strictly necessary to protect informant safety, while still providing sufficient disclosure to permit an informed response.

The court further held there was no duty to conduct further investigation, the applicant’s written rebuttal was considered, and the Warden’s reasons were adequate.

Although the mandatory meeting contemplated by s. 12(b) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations did not occur, the breach was technical on these facts and did not cause procedural unfairness.

The transfer and reclassification decisions were found reasonable and lawful, and the application was dismissed.

The moving defendant sought to strike portions of a statement of claim in an employment-related action or, alternatively, obtain particulars.

The court reviewed the principles governing particulars, including the requirement that the requesting party ordinarily establish the requested information is outside that party's knowledge and necessary to plead.

Particulars were ordered for allegations concerning valuable consideration, reported information, impugned words, and defamation particulars, but not for other solicitation allegations that were not shown to be outside the defendant's knowledge.

The motion to strike was dismissed and the result on particulars was mixed, with no costs.

The applicant sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and transfer to a maximum security institution.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's reasonableness framework for inmate transfer decisions, the court held that the respondent had shown the decision was reasonable in light of the applicant's alleged institutional violence, prior incidents, institutional misconduct, and the similarity of that conduct to the index offence.

The court accepted that prison authorities may consider information not resulting in formal charges and emphasized the required deference to prison decision-makers.

The application was dismissed.

In a habeas corpus matter arising from an involuntary transfer from medium to maximum security, the applicant sought appointment of amicus curiae to review sealed material withheld under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court held that the Supreme Court of Canada's direction in Khela assigns that review to the reviewing judge, not to an amicus.

Applying the Criminal Lawyers Association standard, the court found that amicus assistance was not essential for the court to successfully and justly adjudicate the disclosure issue or the merits of the habeas corpus application.

The application for appointment of amicus curiae was dismissed.

In a habeas corpus proceeding arising from involuntary transfer from medium to maximum security, the applicant sought appointment of amicus curiae to review sealed affidavit material withheld under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court applied the Supreme Court's amicus standard and held that such assistance was not essential to the reviewing judge's discharge of judicial functions.

Relying on Khela, the court held that review of the sealed material and assessment of compliance with s. 27 disclosure obligations are tasks assigned to the reviewing judge, not to an amicus.

The application for appointment of amicus curiae was dismissed.

A mother sought leave to appeal an interim order granting temporary access between children and their paternal grandparents in a family law proceeding.

The moving party argued that the motion judge failed to properly consider the children’s views and preferences under s. 64 of the Children's Law Reform Act, declined to interview the children despite their request, and did not wait for a report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court found that the motion judge had already ordered observational visits specifically to obtain independent evidence of the children’s views and preferences, which was available on the motion.

The decision not to personally interview the children was a discretionary choice given the evidence before the court.

The court held that the correctness of the interim order was not open to very serious debate and did not raise a matter of public importance warranting appellate review.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application alleging that federal correctional authorities had miscalculated his sentence following his transfer from Japan to Canada under the International Transfer of Offenders Act.

He argued that 400 days spent in a Japanese prison workhouse for failure to pay a fine should count toward his custodial sentence and that additional credit should be granted for pre-sentence custody.

The court held that Canada must respect the legal nature and duration of the foreign sentence under the continued enforcement method in the Act.

The Japanese court had treated the workhouse detention as serving the fine sentence, not the custodial term, and had expressly determined the amount of pre-sentence credit.

Canadian authorities therefore correctly calculated the enforceable sentence as ten years less 165 days commencing February 19, 2005.

The applicant sought habeas corpus relief arguing that his custodial sentence had been fully satisfied due to an alleged ambiguity in the Warrant of Committal regarding whether one count was consecutive or concurrent.

Correctional Service Canada initially interpreted the sentence as four years but later corrected the calculation to six years after clarification from the sentencing judge.

The court held that the sentencing reasons clearly imposed a six‑year custodial sentence after credit for pre‑sentence custody and that the amended warrant merely clarified the intended sentence.

The correction did not amount to an impermissible reconsideration of sentence and did not violate the applicant’s Charter rights.

The application for habeas corpus was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought habeas corpus challenging an emergency involuntary transfer from a minimum‑security institution to a medium‑security institution.

The court held that correctional authorities failed to disclose key information relied upon in the reclassification decision, including communications with police and details underlying the security reclassification scale.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the conduct of the parole officer and the warden in seeking prejudicial information to support the transfer decision while withholding it from the inmate.

Applying the Supreme Court’s framework in Mission Institution v. Khela, the court concluded that the transfer decision was unreasonable and therefore unlawful.

The transfer decision was quashed and the inmate was ordered returned to minimum security.

Three siblings sought a certificate of pending litigation against their brother’s home and a preservation order over estate assets, alleging that farmland formerly owned by their parents had been transferred to the brother through undervalued transactions and undue influence over their vulnerable mother.

They claimed the brother later sold the farm and used the proceeds to purchase his current residence, thereby depriving the estate of assets that should have been shared equally among the four siblings.

The respondents argued the applicants knew of the earlier transfers for many years and therefore lacked a reasonable claim to an interest in land.

The court held that the applicants had established a reasonable claim that sale proceeds traceable to the parents’ property were used to acquire the new property and that the equities favoured protection of the assets.

A certificate of pending litigation and preservation order were granted.

A federal inmate serving a life sentence applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking to quash a decision that had reclassified him from medium to maximum security and to secure a transfer back to medium security.

By the time of the hearing, the applicant had already been reclassified and transferred back to a medium security institution.

The court held that habeas corpus requires a current deprivation of liberty, which was absent at the time of adjudication.

Applying the mootness framework from Borowski, the court declined to exercise discretion to decide the issue because the dispute was fact-specific, lacked public importance, and any ruling would have no practical effect.

The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to quash the prison authorities’ decision, as such relief falls within the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

An inmate brought a habeas corpus application challenging his reclassification and transfer from a minimum security institution to a medium security institution.

He argued the correctional authorities’ decision was unreasonable and that he had not received adequate disclosure of the information relied upon.

The court reviewed the legal framework governing habeas corpus, including the requirement to show unlawful deprivation of liberty and the administrative nature of prison transfer decisions.

It concluded that even if a reasonableness standard applied, the decision to transfer was supported by information available to correctional authorities and was not arbitrary.

The court further held that procedural fairness requirements were satisfied because the inmate received sufficient information to understand the case against him.

The plaintiff band sought to enforce a judgment debt against the defendant band member by seizing his certificates of possession for lands situated on the reserve.

The defendant argued that section 29 of the Indian Act prohibits the seizure of reserve lands under legal process.

The court held that while section 29 protects the underlying Crown title to reserve lands from seizure by non-Indians, section 89(1) expressly permits an Indian or a band to seize the real or personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve.

The court ordered the defendant to transfer his certificates of possession to the band to satisfy the debt.

The defendants moved to set aside a noting in default in a wrongful dismissal action brought by a former employee of the South African High Commission in Ottawa.

They also sought to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and alternatively to dismiss or stay the action for lack of jurisdiction under the State Immunity Act.

Applying the factors for setting aside default from Nobosoft Corp. v No Borders Inc., the court found a continuing intention by the foreign state to defend on issues of party capacity and sovereign immunity, and determined the delay was not inordinate given the complexity of the issues and the value of the claim.

The court further held that it was not plain and obvious that the defendants lacked capacity to be sued or that the commercial activity exception under the State Immunity Act could not apply to the plaintiff’s employment relationship.

Accordingly, the default was set aside but the motions to strike the claim and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction were refused.

A father sought leave under s. 65.1(4) and (5) of the Child and Family Services Act to bring an application to review the status of his children, who had been crown wards placed for several years with their maternal grandparents.

The court considered the governing criteria for leave, including bona fides, whether unusual circumstances justified reopening a permanent placement, whether the review would advance the purposes of the Act, and whether the applicant established a prima facie case.

The evidence showed the children were thriving in a stable and nurturing home with their grandparents and maintained a positive relationship with their father.

The father failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances or provide a compelling basis to disturb the children’s long‑standing placement.

The motion for leave was dismissed.