Gary W. Tranmer

The plaintiff son brought an action to set aside an agreement to transfer his house to his defendant father and stepmother, claiming he signed it under duress.

The defendants counterclaimed for specific performance of the agreement.

The court found the plaintiff was not a credible witness and dismissed the claim of duress, holding the agreement was valid and enforceable.

However, the court declined to order specific performance, finding the property was not unique to the defendants and damages were an adequate remedy.

The defendants were awarded $48,384.72 in damages for loans, rent, and property expenses, and were ordered to vacate the premises within six months.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a motion where the defendants successfully obtained a reduction in the quantum of a lien claim, though the lien itself was not discharged.

Both the plaintiff and the defendants sought costs, claiming success.

The court found that there was divided success on the underlying motion and noted the parties' failure to make bona fide efforts to settle costs.

Considering the proportionality, complexity, and importance of the issues, as well as the excessive hours and rates claimed by both parties, the court determined that a fit and just costs order was for each side to bear its own costs.

The respondents (Xus) brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the applicant's (Morven Construction) defamation application.

Morven sought an interim and permanent injunction against the Xus for defaming their quarry operation through signs, social media, and flyers.

The court found that Morven successfully met both the "substantial merit" and "no valid defence" hurdles, and that the public interest in allowing the defamation proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the Xus' expression, which was based on minimal investigation and characterized as strongly held personal opinion presented as fact.

The motion to dismiss was denied, allowing Morven's defamation lawsuit to proceed to trial.

This is a construction lien action where the Defendants/Moving Parties sought an order discharging the lien or, in the alternative, reducing the security posted by Greatwise Developments Ltd. The Plaintiff agreed to a reduction of $250,000 due to an overlooked payment.

The court found significant factual disputes regarding whether the contract was fixed-price or cost-plus, and whether the Plaintiff abandoned the project, deeming these triable issues.

However, based on admitted errors and non-lienable items identified by the Defendants, the court ordered a further reduction of the security posted.

The motion to discharge the lien was dismissed, but the security was reduced from an initial $8,058,101.79 to $6,551,681.65.

This costs endorsement arises from a property boundary dispute between neighbours concerning a minor encroachment.

The court found that the litigation was unnecessary and driven primarily by the applicants, as the respondents had already taken steps to remediate the issue in a timely manner, funded by their title insurer.

The remediation work was completed to the satisfaction of both parties before the application's merits were heard.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that the applicants pursued excessive litigation steps and that the respondents, while perhaps lacking initial sensitivity, had resolved the substantive issue.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, unlawful confinement, choking with intent, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault against his former girlfriend.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the core details of the assault and sexual assault to be credible and reliable, despite some inconsistencies and delayed disclosure.

The accused was found guilty of unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault, but not guilty of attempted murder and choking with intent, as the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for attempted murder and the choking was considered part of the assault.

The plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction was previously dismissed.

The successful defendant, Carleton Condominium Corporation 339, sought costs on an enhanced basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court considered the principles of indemnity, fairness, and reasonableness, noting the defendant's claimed hours seemed excessive compared to the plaintiff's.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $22,000.

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault after allegedly touching a client's vaginal area during a treatment session.

The Crown argued the touching was sexual and non-consensual, while the accused claimed he was performing a legitimate therapeutic adjustment of the pubic symphysis.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the touching was sexual in nature, leading to an acquittal on the sexual assault charge.

However, the court found that the accused failed to obtain informed consent to touch the complainant's pubic bone area, resulting in a conviction for common assault.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The respondent was initially arrested for driving while prohibited, but the officer subsequently began an impaired driving investigation without informing the respondent of the change in focus and delayed providing rights to counsel for four and a half minutes while asking incriminating questions.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error of law in the trial judge's findings of Charter breaches and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer to a medium-security institution.

The transfer was based on his inappropriate interactions with administrative staff, accessing restricted areas, and possession of a contraband cell phone.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review from Vavilov and found the Warden's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The court also reviewed a sealed affidavit and concluded the respondent met its procedural fairness and disclosure obligations under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, who commenced the action while residing in Ontario, were subsequently posted to Colorado due to the husband's military service.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' move was not a free choice to avoid a costs order, and they retained exigible assets in Ontario, including an RRSP and federal wages.

The court also found the action was not frivolous or vexatious.

The appellant, convicted of offences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, applied to adduce fresh evidence on his summary conviction appeal.

The proposed evidence included various documents and correspondence related to his bankruptcy proceedings.

The court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence either did not meet the criteria for admission, was not fresh, or raised new Charter issues that should have been litigated at trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, sought to confirm his right to a trial by judge and jury.

The Crown argued that the accused must be tried by judge alone because the Crown had not expressly consented to the accused's re-election to a jury trial at the assignment court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the Crown's conduct at the assignment court, where the Crown Attorney actively participated in scheduling a jury trial without objection, constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural requirement for express consent.

The court confirmed the accused's right to a trial by judge and jury.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant for personal injuries sustained during an assault in the plaintiff's apartment building.

The defendant, who was noted in default, pushed the plaintiff down a flight of stairs, resulting in a severely fractured ankle and lacerations from broken glass.

The court found the defendant liable and assessed general damages at $85,000, deducting $15,000 from a prior settlement with the property managers.

The plaintiff was awarded $70,000 in general damages, recovery of the OHIP subrogated claim, and partial indemnity costs.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer.

He argued that the decision was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically regarding the withholding of information.

The court, applying the principles from Mission Institution v. Khela, found that the prison authorities had met their onus to prove that the decision was procedurally fair and reasonable.

The authorities had reasonable grounds to withhold certain information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to protect safety and security, and the disclosed information, along with the sealed affidavit, supported the reliability of sources and the lawfulness of the decision.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim and add parties.

The defendants consented to the amendments but sought costs thrown away for steps already taken, including preparing the original statement of defence and securing productions.

The court dismissed the claim for costs thrown away, finding that the motion was not a last-minute application and the steps taken were not redundant or useless.

The court noted that the defendants could claim these costs at trial if successful.

The appellant appealed his conviction for wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by placing the burden on the accused to prove lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the error engaged fundamental principles of criminal law and that the case against the accused was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would have inevitably convicted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court addressed a jurisdictional question regarding whether a judge sitting alone could hear and decide the issue of not criminally responsible (NCR) after a jury had returned a verdict of manslaughter and been discharged.

Both Crown and defence counsel jointly submitted that the judge had such jurisdiction, arguing it was supported by inherent court powers, trial fairness, and fundamental justice principles, and would avoid further delays and appeals.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it was supported in law and consistent with public interest and the principles of fundamental justice.

The accused, a professional truck driver, was charged with four counts of criminal negligence causing death and three counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The accused's tractor-trailer, travelling at 100 km/h on cruise control, failed to slow down for a line of stop-and-go traffic, striking a car and causing a chain reaction.

The court found that the accused was distracted, likely reaching down for an extended period, and failed to perceive or react to the obvious hazard ahead.

The court concluded that the accused's conduct was a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The applicant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was granted three unescorted temporary absences (UTAs) by the Parole Board of Canada.

After completing two, his third UTA was cancelled because the designated halfway house withdrew its support.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus to compel the third UTA.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not suffered a deprivation of liberty because the prerequisite condition for his release was never fulfilled.

Furthermore, the court declined jurisdiction because the Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides a complete and comprehensive statutory regime for reviewing such administrative decisions.