Jane Margaret Bachynski

The plaintiff brought a motion for refusals against the defendants, seeking answers and productions refused during 2012 examinations for discovery.

The defendants resisted, arguing the motion was brought past a court-ordered deadline of November 30, 2015, and that the information sought was irrelevant or res judicata.

The court found the motion was barred due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with the firm timetable set by Master Roger, which required all refusals motions to be filed by the specified deadline.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to examine two non-party witnesses and to amend the claim to remove one of the plaintiffs in his personal capacity.

The court dismissed the request to examine the non-parties, finding it premature as the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted the discovery process through a refusals motion.

The court granted the request to remove the individual plaintiff on terms, including that he pay $2,000 in costs to one of the defendants and remain liable for costs awarded against the unincorporated plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs sought clarification of a prior costs endorsement issued following an adjournment request on a motion.

The court reviewed the earlier endorsement and clarified that the costs award of $1,250 plus HST was intended to cover both the costs thrown away and the disposition of relief sought in specific paragraphs of the notice of motion.

The judge confirmed that the order was not intended to award $1,250 plus an additional amount for costs thrown away.

No further appointment was required to resolve the issue.

The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.

The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.

Following a successful appeal that dismissed the respondent's summary judgment motion, the court determined the costs of the proceedings.

The appellants were awarded fixed costs for the appeal and partial indemnity costs in the cause for the motion.

The fourth parties were also awarded fixed costs for the appeal, while no costs were ordered for or against the third parties.

The liquidator of a credit union made a claim under a fidelity insurance bond for losses caused by the dishonest conduct of its general manager and other employees.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the credit union.

The insurers appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the uncontested facts supported a finding of direct loss resulting from dishonest acts, there were genuine issues for trial regarding whether the acts constituted a single scheme, and whether the bond's termination and notice conditions applied.

Four of the fourth parties brought a motion to intervene on an appeal of a summary judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants.

The moving parties argued that the motion judge made unanticipated and impermissible findings of credibility and fact against them, which could prejudice their position in the forthcoming trial.

The court granted the motion to intervene on conditions, finding that the moving parties had a similar interest to the appellants on some issues and that their intervention could be structured so as not to unfairly prejudice the respondent.

The City of Ottawa appealed a decision dismissing its appeal of the Chief Building Official's issuance of a building permit for a proposed intensive hog farm operation.

The Intervenor cross-appealed the application judge's finding that it did not have a legal non-conforming use to operate the hog farm.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The Court held that the environmental statutes (OWRA, Fisheries Act, EPA) were not 'other applicable law' under s. 8(2) of the Building Code Act because they lacked a real and logical nexus to the construction and demolition of buildings.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the application judge's finding that the proposed hog farm was a change in use from the pre-existing dairy farm, meaning the Intervenor did not have a legal non-conforming use right under the Planning Act.

The appellant auditor appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for professional negligence, challenging the scope of duty, causation, contributory negligence, and damages calculation.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding dividends, prejudgment interest, and inevitable losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable error in the trial judge's findings of fact and concluding that the trial judge correctly determined the scope of the auditor's duty to warn the respondent of significant weaknesses in its Loans Department.