Richard Campbell

The plaintiffs sued the defendant patron and the defendant bar owner for damages arising from an assault at the bar.

The plaintiff husband suffered a spiral fracture of his tibia when the intoxicated defendant patron jumped on him, and the plaintiff wife alleged she was assaulted and her breasts exposed during the altercation.

The court found the defendant patron liable for battery, as his criminal conviction for the assault was prima facie evidence and he failed to prove consent or lack of intent.

However, the court dismissed the action against the bar owner.

Although the bar over-served the patron, the court applied the test from Stewart v. Pettie and found that the patron's sudden violent outburst was not reasonably foreseeable, precluding liability in both common law negligence and under s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

The plaintiff husband was awarded $50,000 in general damages and $4,600 for past income loss, while the plaintiff wife was awarded $2,000 in general damages.

The defendant movie theatre brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the plaintiff and his litigation guardian from picketing outside the theatre and publishing allegedly defamatory statements on social media.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim where the plaintiff allegedly suffered catastrophic injuries after choking on popcorn.

The court dismissed the motion on procedural grounds, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction because the defendant had not claimed a permanent injunction in the existing or any intended proceeding.

The court also noted that the defendant's evidentiary record was insufficient to meet the substantive requirements of the RJR-MacDonald test.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in Minnesota and settled their claims there for $600,000.

They subsequently sued their Ontario insurer under the OPCF-44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement for under-insurance.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their pleadings and to determine questions of law under Rule 21 regarding whether the Minnesota defendants were underinsured and whether legal fees from the Minnesota action could be claimed as special damages.

The court held that the Minnesota defendants were underinsured with respect to one plaintiff whose settlement reached the foreign statutory limit, but not for the other plaintiff who settled below the limit.

The court further held that the legal fees incurred in the foreign action could be claimed as special damages by the eligible plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The court considered the factors governing such relief, including explanation for the delay, inadvertence in missing the set‑down deadline, delay in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although the motion to set aside was not brought promptly, the court accepted that the missed deadline resulted from inadvertence and that the plaintiff always intended to pursue the claim.

Discoveries and production were complete and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting the ability to defend the action.

Balancing the factors contextually, the court concluded that it was just to set aside the dismissal and permit the action to proceed to trial.

Following the dismissal of a bailiff’s motion for summary judgment, several co-defendants sought costs for their participation in the motion.

They argued that the moving party’s record relied on allegations involving them, requiring broader participation than suggested.

The moving party contended that the issues affecting these defendants were narrow and that any costs should be deferred to the trial judge.

The court held that the defendants’ participation was justified and declined to defer the matter.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 all-inclusive, payable forthwith by the moving party.

A licensed bailiff sought summary judgment relying on statutory immunity under s. 142 of the Courts of Justice Act after seizing a hydraulic truck crane pursuant to a writ of seizure.

The responding party alleged the bailiff seized the property from a person and location not identified in the writ and therefore did not act in good faith in accordance with the court process.

The court held that statutory immunity requires compliance with the court order and that seizing property from a person and place not named in the writ could not constitute good faith execution of the order.

The motion judge rejected the argument that immunity could only be defeated by evidence of bad faith and held that the evidentiary record did not establish good faith conduct.

Summary judgment was refused and the bailiff remained a party to the litigation.

A creditor brought an application for a bankruptcy order alleging acts of bankruptcy and sought a stay of the proceeding pending the debtor’s criminal fraud trial.

The creditor acknowledged that he could not prove the alleged debt without relying on findings from the criminal prosecution.

The court held that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act requires a bona fide allegation of a debt capable of proof at the time a bankruptcy application is commenced.

Applying both that principle and the RJR‑MacDonald stay test, the court found the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the debtor due to reputational and credit harm caused by an outstanding bankruptcy application.

The motion for a stay was denied and the applicant was granted leave to withdraw the bankruptcy application subject to costs submissions.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order refusing to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte.

The motion raised whether the moving party had failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, including prior sworn testimony inconsistent with the position advanced in the current litigation.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s approach to materiality, which focused on whether disclosure would have changed the outcome rather than whether the information should have been disclosed to provide a complete picture.

The court found the withheld information—particularly prior sworn testimony directly contradicting the current claim—was arguably material and significant.

Leave to appeal was granted and the prior costs order was stayed pending the appeal.