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Fine for civil contempt must be paid to the Crown, not the opposing party.
The appellants appealed a motion judge's order finding them in contempt of court for breaching a Mareva injunction and imposing a $150,000 fine payable to the respondent.
The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding and the substantial indemnity costs award of $57,000.
However, the Court held that a fine for civil contempt is an offence against the administration of justice and must be paid to the Crown, not the opposing party.
The fine was reduced to $10,000 and ordered payable to the Provincial Treasurer.
Leave to appeal denied; motions judge correctly balanced factors in refusing to disqualify solicitors who received hacked documents.
The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order declining to disqualify the defendants' solicitors.
The solicitors had received documents hacked from the plaintiff's computers by a third party.
The motions judge found that the solicitors disclosed the documents the day after receipt and did not realize they were obtained in breach of privacy until months later.
The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the balancing test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin and that there was no conflicting case law.
Appeal allowed; offer to lease was an agreement to agree, not a prior contract supporting rectification.
The landlord applied for rectification of a commercial lease to include a clause from the offer to lease requiring the tenant to restore the premises to their original condition.
The application judge granted the application.
The tenant appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by making findings on disputed evidence and by finding that the offer to lease was a prior contract.
The Court held that the offer to lease was merely an agreement to agree, as it contained a clause rendering it void if a formal lease was not agreed upon.
Therefore, the landlord could not establish the elements of rectification.
Late negligence and bad faith amendments were properly refused.
The appellant challenged a motion judge's refusal to permit amendments to plead negligence and insurer bad faith in an insurance action.
The Court of Appeal held that, to the extent the proposed negligence claim advanced an independent cause of action not governed by the policy's one-year statutory limitation period, it was subject to the six-year negligence limitation period and was sought too late absent special circumstances.
The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding that no such special circumstances existed.
The proposed bad faith amendments were also deficient because they either related to costs or failed to disclose a proper legal basis.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.