Richard Campbell

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring her to post security for costs.

She argued the motions judge failed to properly consider her After the Event (ATE) Legal Expense Insurance as an asset in Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the motions judge did consider the ATE insurance as one of several factors and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the ATE insurance on the leave application.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his claim and awarding $48,000 in costs to the respondent.

The dismissal resulted from the appellant's persistent and deliberate failure to comply with court orders regarding disclosure and production obligations.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere, noting the appellant's repeated flouting of court orders and failure to comply with a 'last chance' order.

The court rejected the suggestion that the self-represented appellant was treated unfairly, noting he had threatened opposing counsel with death.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of family status after the respondent housing co-operative denied his membership application and allegedly forced his wife to move to a smaller unit.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of his wife and that his allegations of unfairness and favouritism were not linked to any prohibited ground of discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The court considered the factors governing such relief, including explanation for the delay, inadvertence in missing the set‑down deadline, delay in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although the motion to set aside was not brought promptly, the court accepted that the missed deadline resulted from inadvertence and that the plaintiff always intended to pursue the claim.

Discoveries and production were complete and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting the ability to defend the action.

Balancing the factors contextually, the court concluded that it was just to set aside the dismissal and permit the action to proceed to trial.

Following the dismissal of a bailiff’s motion for summary judgment, several co-defendants sought costs for their participation in the motion.

They argued that the moving party’s record relied on allegations involving them, requiring broader participation than suggested.

The moving party contended that the issues affecting these defendants were narrow and that any costs should be deferred to the trial judge.

The court held that the defendants’ participation was justified and declined to defer the matter.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 all-inclusive, payable forthwith by the moving party.

A licensed bailiff sought summary judgment relying on statutory immunity under s. 142 of the Courts of Justice Act after seizing a hydraulic truck crane pursuant to a writ of seizure.

The responding party alleged the bailiff seized the property from a person and location not identified in the writ and therefore did not act in good faith in accordance with the court process.

The court held that statutory immunity requires compliance with the court order and that seizing property from a person and place not named in the writ could not constitute good faith execution of the order.

The motion judge rejected the argument that immunity could only be defeated by evidence of bad faith and held that the evidentiary record did not establish good faith conduct.

Summary judgment was refused and the bailiff remained a party to the litigation.

A creditor brought an application for a bankruptcy order alleging acts of bankruptcy and sought a stay of the proceeding pending the debtor’s criminal fraud trial.

The creditor acknowledged that he could not prove the alleged debt without relying on findings from the criminal prosecution.

The court held that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act requires a bona fide allegation of a debt capable of proof at the time a bankruptcy application is commenced.

Applying both that principle and the RJR‑MacDonald stay test, the court found the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the debtor due to reputational and credit harm caused by an outstanding bankruptcy application.

The motion for a stay was denied and the applicant was granted leave to withdraw the bankruptcy application subject to costs submissions.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order refusing to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte.

The motion raised whether the moving party had failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, including prior sworn testimony inconsistent with the position advanced in the current litigation.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s approach to materiality, which focused on whether disclosure would have changed the outcome rather than whether the information should have been disclosed to provide a complete picture.

The court found the withheld information—particularly prior sworn testimony directly contradicting the current claim—was arguably material and significant.

Leave to appeal was granted and the prior costs order was stayed pending the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order finding his proposed counterclaim for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misrepresentation was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was aware of the restrictions on his share redemption rights more than two years before issuing the counterclaim.

The Court also rejected the appellant's new argument that a six-year limitation period under the Securities Act applied.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging that the respondents engaged in reprisals against him for participating in a previous human rights case as a representative.

The respondents had reported the applicant to the Law Society of Upper Canada for potentially engaging in unlicensed legal practice, which led to an investigation.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and found no reasonable prospect that the applicant could prove the respondents intended to reprise against him, as opposed to fulfilling their obligations under the Law Society Act.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a former member of the respondent housing co-operative, alleged discrimination in housing on the basis of disability and reprisal after the respondent sought and obtained a court order for her eviction due to rent arrears.

The Tribunal found no evidence that the respondent treated the applicant differently because of a disability or failed to accommodate her, noting that the requirement to pay rent does not inherently discriminate against those financially unable to pay due to disability.

The Tribunal also held that pursuing legal rights in court does not constitute a reprisal under the Code.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Defence Fee Funding Protocol, arguing they should have access to further frozen assets to pay legal costs after their bank account was depleted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the protocol's wording specifically limited access to the bank account and did not extend to assets subject to a proprietary claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the appellants' access to $3,500 per month for living expenses from all frozen assets was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order finding them in contempt of court for breaching a Mareva injunction and imposing a $150,000 fine payable to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding and the substantial indemnity costs award of $57,000.

However, the Court held that a fine for civil contempt is an offence against the administration of justice and must be paid to the Crown, not the opposing party.

The fine was reduced to $10,000 and ordered payable to the Provincial Treasurer.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order declining to disqualify the defendants' solicitors.

The solicitors had received documents hacked from the plaintiff's computers by a third party.

The motions judge found that the solicitors disclosed the documents the day after receipt and did not realize they were obtained in breach of privacy until months later.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the balancing test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin and that there was no conflicting case law.

The landlord applied for rectification of a commercial lease to include a clause from the offer to lease requiring the tenant to restore the premises to their original condition.

The application judge granted the application.

The tenant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by making findings on disputed evidence and by finding that the offer to lease was a prior contract.

The Court held that the offer to lease was merely an agreement to agree, as it contained a clause rendering it void if a formal lease was not agreed upon.

Therefore, the landlord could not establish the elements of rectification.

The appellant challenged a motion judge's refusal to permit amendments to plead negligence and insurer bad faith in an insurance action.

The Court of Appeal held that, to the extent the proposed negligence claim advanced an independent cause of action not governed by the policy's one-year statutory limitation period, it was subject to the six-year negligence limitation period and was sought too late absent special circumstances.

The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding that no such special circumstances existed.

The proposed bad faith amendments were also deficient because they either related to costs or failed to disclose a proper legal basis.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.