Steven J. O’Melia

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the parties' costs submissions following an appeal.

The court determined that it was not an appropriate case for costs and, accordingly, made no order for costs of the appeal.

The appellants, Fredrick and Patricia Kentner, appealed the summary dismissal of their first appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, which concerned convictions and a sentence for environmental offences related to unlawful fill operations.

The appeal was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by their paralegal and errors in the original conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ineffective assistance as the appellants' failure to pay fines (a mandatory condition for appeal) was a deliberate choice unrelated to the paralegal's conduct, and a waiver application would have had no prospect of success.

The court also found no merit in the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's reliance on regulatory maps for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with the sentence, which included a $25,000 fine and a property rehabilitation order.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1975 cost-sharing provision in a Subdivision Agreement between a developer's assignee (appellant) and a municipality (respondent).

The appellant sought payment for infrastructure costs from the municipality, arguing that the provision was triggered by a new subdivision on adjacent lands.

The application judge found that the cost-sharing obligation was only triggered if the adjacent lands derived a benefit from the appellant's infrastructure, and no such benefit was proven.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, agreeing that the agreement, when read holistically and with commercial sense, required a benefit to be conferred for the cost-sharing to apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants, Jason Geil and Geil Style Enterprises Inc., appealed a finding of contempt for violating a consent order by dumping fill on wetlands.

They argued the motion judge erred by relying on hearsay, making a finding without evidence of the precise timing of the fill, and accepting a late-filed affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the submissions.

The court held that the motion judge relied on firsthand evidence, the precise date of the fill deposit was not material as it occurred after the order, and accepting the late affidavit was within the judge's discretion.

The finding of contempt was entitled to deference.

The court issued an amended case management endorsement addressing procedural issues for a judicial review application sought by the appellant.

The endorsement struck the March 3, 2017 proceedings related to setting a date for the judicial review application and vacated the April 18, 2017 return date.

The parties were directed to contact the trial coordinator to set a new hearing date before another judge to consider the procedural issues.

The court emphasized the principle of finality and the remediation order from September 30, 2016, which was determinative of the underlying appeal.

An elector applied for a declaration that a municipal mayor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council closed-session discussion concerning potential defamation litigation related to online blog posts.

The applicant sought disqualification from office and restitution of municipal legal fees allegedly incurred for the mayor’s benefit.

The court first considered the six‑week limitation period under s. 9 of the Act and held that the applicant had sufficient knowledge of a potential breach when a newspaper article reported the litigation and municipal funding of legal costs.

Because the application was commenced well after the limitation period expired, it was statute‑barred.

In obiter, the court held that even if the limitation period had not expired, the evidence did not establish that the mayor had a pecuniary interest at the time of the council meeting or that litigation in her personal name had been decided.