Jordan V. Katz

The applicant brought an application for a permanent injunction against the respondents, a plumber and his corporation, for holding themselves out as legal practitioners.

The individual respondent used a fake law firm name to send demand letters to plumbing customers and maintained a website offering legal services.

The court granted the injunction, finding the respondents' actions violated the Law Society Act, and ordered the corporation to change its name to remove any reference to legal services.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a credit agreement and warrant certificate.

The applicant argued that the respondent could only exercise its share purchase warrants upon a liquidity event or additional security issuance.

The respondent argued the warrants could be exercised at any time.

The court applied principles of commercial contract interpretation, finding that the preamble clearly allowed exercise at any time and that restricting exercise to triggering events would lead to a commercial absurdity given the risk the respondent assumed.

The application was dismissed.

The parties attended a case conference to address the implementation of a prior order enforcing Letters of Request from a Florida court.

The court clarified that the prior order only applies to examinations conducted in Ontario, not to depositions held in Florida.

The court also ruled that the respondent's Ontario counsel is entitled to review documents generated by keyword searches for relevancy prior to production, provided they produce a log of all hits indicating their relevancy determinations.

The third parties moved to strike the self-represented defendant's third-party claim.

The defendant had previously alleged mortgage fraud against the plaintiff and the third parties, but a prior summary judgment motion found the mortgage valid and no evidence of fraud.

The defendant sought an adjournment, which the court denied due to a prior peremptory order and insufficient evidence of incapacity.

The court struck the third-party claim, finding it was issued late without leave, constituted an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the prior judgment, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding the enforcement of letters of request, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondents sought costs, with one respondent relying on offers to settle the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered all parties to bear their own costs, noting that the underlying litigation in Florida was ongoing and that Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure generally does not apply to appeals.

The court found this was not a rare occasion where an offer to settle an appeal should be taken into account.

The appellant appealed an order giving effect to two Letters of Request from a Florida court in a defamation and conspiracy action regarding a hate mail campaign.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, argued his evidence was otherwise obtainable, the requests were unduly burdensome, lacked specificity, and resulted from a flawed foreign process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's application of the Friction Division factors and his conclusion that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an application to enforce two Letters of Request from a Florida court, directed at David Smith.

The underlying dispute involved allegations of a hate mail campaign orchestrated by Isaac Perlmutter against Harold Peerenboom, with David Smith allegedly involved.

All parties (Isaac and Laura Perlmutter, Harold Peerenboom, and David Smith) sought costs for the Canadian application.

The court found it impossible to meaningfully decide the issue of costs without knowing the ultimate results of the two related Florida actions, as the success or failure of the allegations would significantly impact the entitlement to costs.

Given the ongoing litigation and the direct interest of all parties in the outcome, the court ruled that each party should bear its own costs.

A case management teleconference was held to provide directions for a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of Faieta J. The court ordered the motion to proceed in writing before a panel of three judges of the Divisional Court and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including the use of a drop box, hyperlinked factums, and factum compendiums.

The applicant, NJS Midtown Portfolio Inc., sought a court order directing the respondent, CMLS Financial Ltd., to consent to the sale of a mortgaged property and provide a partial discharge of the mortgage, or alternatively, a full discharge upon payment of the principal and accrued interest.

NJS had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for one of three properties secured by a closed, 10-year mortgage with CMLS, which was insured by CMHC and part of a Mortgage-Backed Securities program.

CMLS refused consent, citing contractual terms, CMHC policy obligations, and the non-prepayable nature of the mortgage.

The court dismissed NJS's application, finding no contractual, statutory, common law, or equitable basis for the requested discharge, and that CMLS's withholding of consent was reasonable given its commercial interests and obligations to CMHC and MBS investors.

K.S.P. Holdings Inc. (KSP) appealed a Master's decision that dismissed its motions to quash a summons to examine its counsel and to strike an expert affidavit.

KSP's underlying motion sought to stay the action due to Tallman Truck Centre Limited's (Tallman) alleged late disclosure of a litigation agreement with co-defendant Secure Capital Advisors Inc. The court found that the Master erred by allowing the examination of opposing counsel and admitting expert evidence on issues irrelevant to the abuse of process analysis, which, according to Handley Estate, focuses on immediate disclosure and does not require proof of prejudice.

The appeal was granted, quashing the summons and striking the affidavit.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order requiring him to attend an examination for discovery with accommodations, arguing his medical condition (vascular malformation and conversion disorder) made him physically unable to attend without serious risk of harm.

The plaintiff also appealed the Master's costs award, arguing the Master was functus officio when extending the time for the defendant's costs submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the medical evidence and had the discretion to extend the time for costs submissions before a formal order was entered.

The applicant brought a motion to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's report assessing his former lawyers' accounts at $855,268.73.

The applicant argued the Assessment Officer lacked jurisdiction due to a contingency fee arrangement and disputed retainer terms, and alleged procedural unfairness, misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant had consented to the Assessment Officer's jurisdiction, the retainer disputes were not legitimate, and the assessment process was fair and unbiased.

The report and certificate of assessment were confirmed.

Galleria Centre Inc. ("Galleria") applied for an order under s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act ("OBCA") to wind up a co-tenancy agreement or compel Terracap Galleria Centre Inc. ("Terracap") to purchase its interest in a condominium development project.

Terracap cross-applied for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the OBCA, alleging Galleria's refusal to participate was oppressive, and sought to purchase the property on just terms, with proceeds distributed according to the co-tenancy agreement.

The court dismissed Galleria's application, finding its "expectations" were not reasonable and that the co-tenancy agreement provided a mechanism for ending the relationship, rendering s. 207 unnecessary.

Terracap's claim for an oppression remedy was also dismissed, as Galleria's conduct, while potentially a breach of contract, was not oppressive given that contractual remedies were available.

However, Terracap's cross-application was allowed in part, with the court ordering the parties' disengagement to occur in accordance with Article 18 of the Co-Tenancy Agreement, which included the liquidation of assets and the application of Terracap's preferential distribution right.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to dismiss its former client's application to void a contingency fee agreement, arguing the application was commenced without her informed consent and constituted an abuse of process.

The former client, who suffered from a cognitive disorder following a motor vehicle accident, admitted during cross-examination that she did not understand portions of her affidavits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that her inability to articulate detailed reasons did not vitiate her informed consent to commence the proceeding, and her evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case where the trial judge admitted liability just before trial and the matter proceeded as a damages assessment before a jury.

The appellants contended that the trial judge failed to address transgressions by respondent's counsel, unfairly summarized evidence in jury instructions, and displayed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's conduct was fair and balanced, that many complaints were not objected to at trial, and that the allegations of bias did not meet the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion brought by defendant Atif Kamran to remove Siskinds LLP as counsel for plaintiffs Dan Andersson and LEO Canada Inc., and to compel document production.

The court awarded costs to Mr. Kamran, payable by Mr. Andersson alone, fixed at $17,000.00 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by Mr. Andersson and noting that the defendants' settlement offer was technically deficient and lacked clarity, thus not engaging the presumptive consequences of Rule 49.10.

The court also considered the broader context of the litigation and the inflammatory nature of some allegations made by Mr. Kamran.

The accused, a family physician, was charged with six counts of sexual assault relating to physical examinations (breast and pelvic) performed on six female patients.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the patients' clitorises and squeezed/twisted their nipples for a sexual purpose.

The defence argued that the touching was clinically justified, medically appropriate, and any clitoral contact was inadvertent.

The court considered expert evidence on standard medical practices for breast and bimanual pelvic examinations.

The court found significant reliability issues with the complainants' evidence, noting that media reports of the accused's arrest likely influenced their recollections.

The court also ruled that the proposed similar fact evidence was too weak to be admitted or to support the Crown's inferences.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's evidence credible and that it raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The Court of Appeal reversed the Divisional Court's decision that had overturned a Discipline Committee penalty decision.

The Discipline Committee found that a physician sexually abused four female patients by unnecessarily touching their breasts and nipples during stethoscope examinations, and engaged in inappropriate conduct with a fifth patient.

The Committee imposed a six-month suspension with practice restrictions, supervision requirements, and mandatory training.

The Divisional Court found the penalty manifestly unfit and remitted it for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court failed to properly apply the deferential reasonableness standard of review, instead substituting its own view of the appropriate penalty.

The Court of Appeal restored the Discipline Committee's penalty, finding no inconsistent findings of fact and that the penalty fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons appealed a penalty imposed by its Discipline Committee on a physician found to have sexually abused four female patients and committed unprofessional conduct toward a fifth.

The Committee had imposed a six-month suspension and practice restrictions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the penalty clearly unfit and unreasonable given the gravity of the misconduct, the inconsistent factual findings regarding the physician's intent, and the need for general deterrence to eradicate sexual abuse in the profession.

The penalty was quashed and remitted to the Committee.