Diana Lumba

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to two respondents charged in a massive cross-border drug trafficking investigation.

The application judge had found the delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling and declined to deduct time for joint-trial scheduling or find the case exceptionally complex.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 107 days of joint-trial scheduling delay should have been deducted as a discrete exceptional circumstance.

Furthermore, the overarching complexity of the multi-agency project prosecution, which involved voluminous disclosure, justified the remaining modest delay above the ceiling.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

Sentencing of two offenders convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

Jason Wisdom, a mature recidivist, was convicted of possessing large quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as a loaded restricted firearm and breaching prohibition orders.

He was sentenced to a total of 17 years imprisonment.

Dae-Shawn Wisdom, a younger recidivist, was convicted of possessing fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and was sentenced to 7 years and 4 months consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.

The court applied the totality principle and Lord Coke's principle regarding subsequent convictions.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a 7-year global sentence, while the defence sought 4 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the large quantities of highly addictive drugs and the offender's prior related record while on parole.

A global sentence of 6 years was imposed, reduced to 4 years and 4 months after applying credits for pre-sentence custody, harsh lockdown conditions, and restrictive bail conditions.

Police responding to a domestic violence call arrested the accused in the basement of his home and, incident to that arrest, conducted a visual clearing search of an adjoining basement living room, discovering methamphetamine in plain view.

The majority held that the common law standard for search incident to arrest must be modified where the area searched is outside the arrested person's physical control at the time of arrest: the police must have reasonable suspicion of a safety risk, and the search must be conducted in a manner tailored to the heightened privacy interests in a home.

Applying that standard, the majority found no breach of s. 8 of the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The dissent (Karakatsanis, Brown and Martin JJ.) would have required reasonable suspicion of an imminent threat and found the standard unmet, favouring exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

Côté J. agreed with the dissent on the standard and the s. 8 breach but would not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and related offences.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record, including prior firearms convictions, as well as mitigating factors such as systemic racism and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

A global sentence of 9 years was imposed, with 64 months of credit granted for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, leaving 44 months to serve.

The accused was convicted by a jury of substantive charges including possession of a firearm and cocaine.

The failure to comply (FTC) charges were severed by a consent order to be tried by judge alone, with the evidence from the jury trial to apply.

At the FTC trial, the Crown argued the judge was bound by the jury's factual findings, while the defence argued the judge could independently assess the evidence.

The court found the severance order was unclear and the parties were not ad idem.

To avoid inconsistent verdicts or unfairness, the court ordered a mistrial of the FTC charges, directing them to be tried before a different judge with new evidence.

The Crown applied to admit a recanting witness's prior videotaped statement to police for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who had been arrested for the same drug trafficking offences as the accused but released without charges, refused to adopt her statement during cross-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the absence of procedural safeguards, such as an oath, warning, or opportunity to consult counsel.

The court also held that the substantive reliability of the statement, though corroborated by police observations, did not meet the high standard set out in Bradshaw.

Alternatively, the court would have excluded the statement under its residual discretion.

The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order by failing to report to his probation officer.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant based on a failure to notify of a change of address, an offence with which he was not charged.

Furthermore, there was no admissible evidence that the appellant knew he was required to report upon his release from custody, as the evidence relied upon was hearsay.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an exemplification of the probation order without notice, as it is admissible at common law.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.