Paul Champ

The Crown applied to designate the offender as a dangerous offender following a conviction for arson.

The offender has severe cognitive disabilities and a history of trauma, and sets fires as a coping mechanism.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

However, the court also found that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) historically failed to provide the offender with appropriate, tailored mental health treatment, resulting in prolonged periods of segregation.

The court held that serving an indeterminate sentence in a penitentiary without meaningful treatment would extinguish any hope of rehabilitation and parole, constituting an anticipatory breach of the offender's rights against cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

As a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, the court ordered CSC to transfer the offender to a provincial psychiatric hospital within 120 days and retained supervisory jurisdiction to monitor compliance.

The plaintiffs, a group of nurses and their organization who organized protests against COVID-19 mandates outside hospitals, sued the defendants for defamation over statements and articles criticizing their actions.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the plaintiffs' claim had substantial merit, they failed to show that the harm they suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions on matters of public health.

The action was dismissed.

The moving party defendants in a proposed class proceeding related to the 'Freedom Convoy' sought access to $200,000 of frozen escrow funds to retain counsel.

The funds were originally frozen by a Mareva injunction and a criminal restraint order, and were raised through crowdfunding platforms to support convoy participants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the funds were not the personal assets of the defendants and that the moving parties failed to provide full and frank financial disclosure to demonstrate impecuniosity or an inability to defend the action without access to the frozen funds.

The plaintiffs brought a pleading amendment motion in a class proceeding.

Counsel requested an adjournment because the Public Inquiry was ongoing, and certain defendants indicated a desire to bring a motion to strike portions of the claim.

The court ordered the motion adjourned to January 2023, to be heard alongside any motion to strike, and set a timetable for the exchange of materials.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an injunction, the court determined the costs of the motion.

The plaintiff argued costs should be in the cause, while the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs payable forthwith.

The court applied the presumptive 'pay as you go' rule under Rule 57.03, finding no reason to depart from it.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the motion was not frivolous or an abuse of process.

Partial indemnity costs totaling $44,000 were awarded to the various defendants, with payment extended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a police officer on leave serving as union president, was suspended and barred from police facilities following criminal charges.

He sued, alleging interference with his union duties.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute arose either under the collective agreement or the disciplinary regime of the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent former employees and their new competing businesses from soliciting its customers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the non-competition agreements were either expired or likely unenforceable.

Furthermore, the court found no irreparable harm, concluding that damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff ultimately succeeded at trial.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligence and defamation on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired, and a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for a breach of their section 6 Charter mobility rights.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not have reasonably discovered the material facts of their claim until the release of the Iacobucci Inquiry Report, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The court also refused to strike the section 6 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail given the practical restrictions on the plaintiffs' ability to leave Canada.

Both motions were dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 58-year-old top-performing sales manager with eight years of service, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer.

The court found the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, from the start of his engagement.

The court awarded a 12-month reasonable notice period, calculating damages based on base salary and an upward trend in commissions.

The court dismissed the claim for aggravated damages due to insufficient evidence of mental distress, but awarded $50,000 in punitive damages because the employer alleged just cause in bad faith as a negotiation tactic and significantly delayed paying statutory entitlements.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the reasonable notice period following her without-cause termination.

The 41-year-old plaintiff was employed as a middle manager for 2.5 years.

The court found that the employer's contributions to CPP and EI should be included in the calculation of her compensation package.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court fixed the reasonable notice period at six months and awarded damages of $23,315, representing the balance owing after deducting severance payments already made.

The applicant, an inmate awaiting sentencing for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault related to HIV transmission, applied for habeas corpus to be removed from administrative segregation and placed in the general prison population with a cellmate.

The applicant argued a denial of procedural fairness and failure to conduct mandated five-day reviews.

The court found that while there was a denial of procedural fairness in how the reviews were documented, the applicant was aware of the reasons for his segregation.

Due to the high risk the applicant posed to other inmates, the court held that administrative segregation was lawful and necessary for safety.

The application was dismissed, but the institution was ordered to continue offering alternative accommodation proposals.

A human rights organization sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in three related civil actions alleging human rights abuses in Guatemala by subsidiaries of Canadian mining companies.

The proposed intervention related to pending motions by the defendants to dismiss the claims for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The proposed intervenor argued it could assist the court by providing expertise on international human rights law, transnational corporate responsibility, and the potential scope of a duty of care owed by Canadian parent corporations for overseas conduct of subsidiaries.

The court held that the organization could provide a useful legal perspective on international standards and policy considerations without interfering with the evidentiary record.

Leave to intervene was granted with limits on written and oral submissions.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of $23,895.43.

The plaintiff argued for reduced costs because the defendants brought two separate summary judgment motions when one would have sufficed.

The court agreed that the duplication of proceedings warranted a reduction and fixed the defendants' costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of power, negligence, and Charter breaches arising from an income tax reassessment.

The plaintiff conceded the malicious prosecution claim.

For the remaining claims, the court held that the limitation period commenced when the plaintiff discovered the material facts underlying her claims, which occurred by 1998 or at the latest 2001 when she included them in her Notice of Tax Appeal.

The court rejected the argument that the cause of action only accrued after her tax appeal was successfully resolved in 2005.

As the action was commenced in 2007, it was statute-barred and dismissed.