Rochelle Fox

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision striking down the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, which eliminated TTC employees' right to strike and replaced it with binding interest arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complete ban on strikes violates the employees' right to meaningful collective bargaining under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court further found that the Crown failed to justify the infringement under s. 1, as it did not demonstrate that the complete ban was minimally impairing or that its salutary effects outweighed the deleterious effects on the workers' Charter rights.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The plaintiffs sought to schedule an urgent motion for an interlocutory injunction to compel the closure of schools to in-person learning in York Region due to COVID-19, prior to commencing a formal proceeding.

Several unions and school boards sought to intervene.

The court scheduled the injunction motion conditionally, requiring the plaintiffs to formally commence an action or application first.

The court declined to schedule the intervention motions on an urgent basis, finding it would be unfair to the responding parties given the tight timeline.

Following the dismissal of a constitutional challenge to amendments to the Mental Health Act enacted through Brian's Law, the unsuccessful public interest applicant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered whether this was one of the rare and exceptional cases where costs should be awarded to an unsuccessful constitutional litigant.

Applying the discretionary principles governing costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and jurisprudence on public interest litigation, the court emphasized factors including the importance of the issues, the novelty of the constitutional challenge, the applicant’s limited resources, and the quality of the litigation.

The court also considered that interim funding might have been granted had it been requested.

Weighing all factors, the court concluded that the circumstances justified a partial costs award.

Applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to Ontario’s Mental Health Act introduced by Brian’s Law, including expanded civil commitment criteria (Box B) and the community treatment order regime.

They alleged the provisions violated ss. 7, 9, 10, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by permitting involuntary psychiatric assessment, detention, and community-based treatment for persons not posing a danger to themselves or others.

The court held that the legislation pursued a dual purpose of public safety and improved treatment for individuals with serious mental illness, and that the impugned provisions were neither overbroad, arbitrary, vague, nor grossly disproportionate.

Procedural safeguards, individualized clinical assessments, and consent mechanisms supported the statutory scheme’s constitutionality.

The Charter challenge was dismissed.