Danielle Stampley

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

Laurentian University brought an unopposed motion within its CCAA proceedings for an order extending the stay period to September 30, 2022, and an order approving a Pension Participation Agreement with the University of Sudbury.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, justifying the stay extension.

The court also approved the pension agreement, finding it to be a fair and reasonable settlement that provided substantial benefits to stakeholders and was consistent with the purpose of the CCAA.

The applicant university brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings for an order extending the stay period and an order approving the refinancing of its debtor-in-possession (DIP) facility with the provincial government.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, and that the cash flow forecast demonstrated sufficient liquidity to operate during the extended stay period.

The court granted the requested orders, noting the significant interest rate reduction under the replacement DIP facility.

In the CCAA proceedings of Laurentian University, the applicant sought an order regarding a Compensation Claims Process.

On consent, the court deferred relief related to Third Party RHBP Claims to a subsequent hearing, ordering that the deadlines and procedures in the Compensation Claims Process Order would not apply to those claims at this time.

The remaining unopposed relief was granted.

The appellants sought to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause in their standard form services agreement, requiring the respondent to resolve any dispute through mediation and then arbitration in the Netherlands under ICC Rules at an up-front cost of approximately US$14,500.

The majority held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, as there was a clear inequality of bargaining power between a large multinational corporation and a low-income delivery driver, and the resulting arbitration agreement was improvident in that the prohibitive fees effectively denied the respondent any meaningful access to dispute resolution.

The Court also clarified the framework for determining when a court, rather than an arbitrator, should resolve challenges to arbitral jurisdiction, holding that a court may depart from the general rule of arbitral referral where there is a real prospect that the challenge would never be resolved if referred to arbitration.

A concurring judgment by Brown J. agreed with dismissal but preferred to ground the result in public policy rather than unconscionability, finding that the arbitration clause imposed undue hardship by barring access to a legally determined dispute resolution.

Côté J. dissented, reasoning that the arbitration clause was valid, that the Court of Appeal erred in applying the Arbitration Act rather than the International Commercial Arbitration Act, and that the appropriate remedy, if any, was a conditional stay requiring Uber to advance the initiation fees.