Michael Wright

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The Applicants, licensed cannabis producers, sought court approval and sanction of their second amended and restated plan of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA.

The Plan aimed to implement a settlement framework for multiple securities class actions arising from the Applicants' illegal cannabis growing operations.

While the court found the Allocation and Distribution Scheme reasonable and rejected KPMG's complaint about being excluded from voting, it refused to sanction the Plan.

The court held that the Plan's provisions regarding the assignment of claims against KPMG and the Judgment Reduction Provision in the Bar Order were not fair and reasonable to the non-settling defendants, as they failed to limit the non-settling defendants' liability to several liability.

The appellants sought to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause in their standard form services agreement, requiring the respondent to resolve any dispute through mediation and then arbitration in the Netherlands under ICC Rules at an up-front cost of approximately US$14,500.

The majority held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, as there was a clear inequality of bargaining power between a large multinational corporation and a low-income delivery driver, and the resulting arbitration agreement was improvident in that the prohibitive fees effectively denied the respondent any meaningful access to dispute resolution.

The Court also clarified the framework for determining when a court, rather than an arbitrator, should resolve challenges to arbitral jurisdiction, holding that a court may depart from the general rule of arbitral referral where there is a real prospect that the challenge would never be resolved if referred to arbitration.

A concurring judgment by Brown J. agreed with dismissal but preferred to ground the result in public policy rather than unconscionability, finding that the arbitration clause imposed undue hardship by barring access to a legally determined dispute resolution.

Côté J. dissented, reasoning that the arbitration clause was valid, that the Court of Appeal erred in applying the Arbitration Act rather than the International Commercial Arbitration Act, and that the appropriate remedy, if any, was a conditional stay requiring Uber to advance the initiation fees.

Following certification of a securities class action, the court determined the appropriate costs award arising from the leave and certification motions.

The moving parties sought more than $1.18 million in fees and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The court emphasized the need for transparency, proportionality, and historical benchmarking when assessing certification-motion costs under Rule 57.01(1).

After adjusting excessive hourly rates and disbursements, and considering historical averages for comparable certification motions, the court fixed costs at $467,234 payable forthwith, with an additional $100,000 in disbursements payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act to bring an action against Manulife Financial Corporation and its former executives.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the adequacy of Manulife's risk management practices and failed to disclose its massive unhedged exposure to equity market risk prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable possibility of success at trial, and certified the action as a class proceeding, certifying seven common issues.