Andrew Lister

In a Rule 76 wrongful dismissal and misrepresentation action, the court determined a dispute over whether mandatory mediation should proceed in person or by videoconference.

The court held that Rule 1.08(8) contemplates efficient direction at a case conference and does not support burdensome motion practice over mode of attendance.

On the evidentiary record, there was no objective basis to find that in-person mediation would be more effective than virtual mediation.

Emphasizing proportionality, cost-effectiveness, and current civil practice realities, the court directed that mediation proceed by videoconference, with a hybrid format permitted if all participants agree.

No costs were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' counsel and their law firm on the basis of a conflict of interest.

The defendant, Marc Lewis, had previously retained the same law firm for an employment matter with a former employer.

The court applied the MacDonald Estate test and found that the previous retainer was not sufficiently related to the current malfeasance action, and no relevant confidential information was imparted.

Furthermore, the law firm had implemented an ethical wall.

The motion to disqualify counsel was dismissed.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff, former Executive Director of the local Chamber of Commerce, sued the defendants after they wrote letters to various organizations criticizing her job performance and calling for her termination.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to believe the defences of qualified privilege and fair comment would fail.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions, which were vitriolic and motivated by personal animus.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicants brought an application seeking the interpretation of a previous judgment regarding the dimensions of their purchased cemetery plots, known as the Cyr Family Garden.

The parties disputed whether the garden consisted of a larger trapezoid area shown on a land survey or a smaller area adjacent to six burial spaces.

The court applied the principles for interpreting court orders and concluded that, based on the circumstances of the previous trial, the parties had contested and the judgment intended to grant the larger trapezoid area containing both the conventional grave plots and the cremation places.

Following the dismissal of the responding party's urgent motion for breach of fiduciary duty and contempt, and the dismissal of the moving party's cross-motion to remove counsel, the moving party sought partial indemnity costs of $30,019.

The responding party argued for no costs due to divided success or that costs be reserved.

The court found the moving party was the successful party on the substantive issues, which were more complex and important than the removal motion.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1), the court fixed costs at $24,000 payable by the responding party.

The applicant brought a motion in an oppression application, alleging the respondent breached her fiduciary duties by usurping a corporate opportunity to extend a commercial lease and seeking a constructive trust over the new lease.

The applicant also alleged the respondent was in civil contempt of an interim order governing the joint management of their deadlocked company.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the lease extension was not a maturing corporate opportunity because the parties' deadlock rendered the company unable and unwilling to pursue it.

The court also found the applicant failed to establish civil contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff, a former staff member for a Member of Parliament, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that her employment contract was valid and that the collective agreement had no legal force, arguing that the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act excluded MP staff from collective bargaining.

The defendant MP brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to the collective agreement's arbitration clause.

The plaintiff also sought to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for defamation for lack of notice under the Libel and Slander Act, and to strike a paragraph referencing her counsel's political background.

The court dismissed both motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the Act and the collective agreement, and whether the defamation claim required notice.

However, the court granted the motion to strike the paragraph about the plaintiff's counsel's political background as irrelevant and vexatious.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking additional production and answers to undertakings, the court addressed costs.

The defendants were successful and sought substantial partial indemnity costs after incurring over $17,000 in legal fees.

The court held that although the defendants were entitled to costs, the circumstances justified only a modest award because certain factual concessions were made after the cross-examinations that contributed to the dispute.

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court fixed costs at $4,500 on a partial indemnity basis.

Payment of the award was deferred pending determination of a related summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion for further production of corporate and financial records to resist a pending summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff sought to establish that multiple related corporate defendants were his common employer.

The defendants admitted to joint control and administration, and the operating companies undertook joint and several liability for any damages awarded.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested disclosure was disproportionate and unnecessary given the defendants' admissions.