Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion, which sought to dismiss the respondent's personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in November 2015 but did not commence her action until November 2021.

The motion judge found the claim was timely because the respondent only discovered her injuries met the 'permanent serious impairment' threshold under the Insurance Act in July 2020, following a meeting with a neuropsychologist.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the respondent reasonably ought to have known her injuries met the threshold earlier.

Given the persistence of her debilitating symptoms and earlier medical advice that she might never fully recover, the Court held the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant, a former lawyer, sued the respondent banks for freezing his accounts after he was charged with money laundering and fraud.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and awarded $225,000 in substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial despite the respondents' delay in bringing the motion.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, reducing it to $175,000 on the basis that the unaccepted settlement offer should not have elevated costs incurred prior to the offer being made.

A lawyer employed on a contingency fee commission basis resigned to join a competing firm.

The employer law firm terminated him immediately and sought a declaration that he was not entitled to compensation for unbilled work in progress (WIP) or files settled but not yet collected.

The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to compensation for both.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the lawyer was entitled to his share of fees for files settled prior to his departure, the employment contract did not provide for compensation for WIP on files that remained at the firm and were settled after his departure.

The Court also upheld the finding that the lawyer did not breach his duty of good faith by merely planning his departure.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants.

He applied to reopen his trial based on fresh evidence from a related proceeding where a judge found a police officer had deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the misconduct was not relevant to the appellant's defence and the evidence could have been adduced with due diligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's decision not to reopen was a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion and the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence were not met.

The appellants, a real estate brokerage and its realtor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for a $650,000 commission from the respondent purchaser after a commercial real estate transaction failed to close.

The motion judge found that the Buyer Representation Agreement, which listed the commission as 'TBD', did not contractually bind the purchaser to pay the commission amount set out in a separate agreement between the brokerage and the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable error in his contractual interpretation and that his conclusion was open to him based on the highly fact-specific circumstances.

The appellants appealed an order that foreclosed their ability to defend the action, arguing the motion judge failed to provide reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed that reasons were warranted for such a serious decision, but found the reasons were discernible from the record.

The appeal was dismissed for the reasons previously given by the court in refusing a stay pending appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault arising from a shootout outside a nightclub that injured the initial shooter and five bystanders.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a mistrial over the Crown's opening address, declining to direct acquittals on the assault charges, and refusing to leave self-defence with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's corrective instruction was sufficient, there was circumstantial evidence to support secondary party liability, and self-defence lacked an air of reality given the indiscriminate nature of the return fire.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision striking down provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020 and its Regulation.

The application judge had found that provisions invalidating consent to enter a farm obtained under false pretences violated the freedom of expression of animal rights activists seeking to conduct undercover exposés.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the activists' claim was a positive rights claim seeking access to private property on their own terms.

The Court found that the legislation did not substantially interfere with freedom of expression and that any limits were justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by characterizing the complainant's mother's evidence as 'corroborative' when it only confirmed peripheral details.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not use the term in its technical legal sense, but rather as confirmative of the complainant's general reliability, which was a permissible use of the evidence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent a shortfall of $58,067.48 following the sale of a property under power of sale.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in determining the sale price by 'rectifying' a Land Transfer Tax statement contrary to the Land Titles Act and reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not rectify the document but simply weighed the evidence to determine the actual consideration received, and that s. 78(4) of the Land Titles Act did not apply.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order enforcing a settlement agreement in a construction lien dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 71(1) of the Construction Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The Court declined to traverse the appeal to the Divisional Court because the responding parties had failed to oppose the confirmation of the associate judge's report, meaning they must first seek leave in the Superior Court to extend the time to file a motion in opposition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The plaintiff suffered a severe wrist injury after falling on unsecured wooden steps at the defendant's property.

The defendant's pleadings were struck, resulting in a default judgment on liability.

The court found the defendant 100% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for failing to ensure the premises were reasonably safe.

The plaintiff was awarded $280,000 in damages, plus an OHIP subrogation claim and substantial indemnity costs, due to the permanent and debilitating nature of her injury.

The corporate appellant defaulted on a Canada Small Business Financing Loan and the individual appellant was found liable as guarantor on a summary judgment motion.

On appeal, the appellants argued the action was statute-barred, improperly served, procedurally unfair, and that the bank breached obligations by not disbursing the full loan amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors by the motion judge in concluding the loan was in default, the guarantee was enforceable, and the bank owed no duty of care to disburse the full amount.

The appellant challenged a jury conviction for sexual interference on the basis that the trial judge wrongly admitted a young child's hearsay statement under the principled exception and permitted the jury to use it as similar fact evidence across counts.

The court held that the trial judge failed to identify and analyze key hearsay dangers, including the risk of maternal misinterpretation of non-verbal gestures and the risk that the statement was shaped by leading and suggestive questioning.

Applying the threshold reliability framework, the court concluded contemporaneous cross-examination could have materially assisted the truth-seeking process and that reliability was not sufficiently established.

Because the impugned statement may have influenced the conviction on the surviving count, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

She argued the Board failed to adequately consider her proposal for a conditional discharge that included a 'Young clause' and treatment compliance conditions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board must meaningfully consider whether the proposed conditions could practically and effectively address the risk to the public, and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant property developer sued the respondent municipal councillor for defamation after she made a police complaint about him following an altercation.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action lacked substantial merit as the mere making of a police complaint that is closed without charges does not constitute defamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and making and distributing child sexual abuse and exploitation material involving a 14-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions and his four-and-a-half-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying a stay of proceedings for egregious Crown misconduct, finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach, instructing the jury on prior inconsistent statements, and not leaving the private use exemption defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the global sentence was fit and the 18-month reduction for the s. 7 Charter breach was an appropriate remedy.

The parties separated in 2015, and the appellant commenced an application seeking an equalization payment.

After nine years and multiple court orders, the appellant failed to provide complete financial disclosure regarding his bank accounts and alleged business interests.

The motion judge found the non-compliance egregious and struck the appellant's application under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge failed to consider the relevance of the undisclosed documents, the disclosure already made, and alternative remedies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly applied the framework for assessing non-disclosure and reasonably concluded that the appellant's failure to disclose made it fundamentally unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim.

The appellant tenant appealed the dismissal of its application to restrain the respondent landlord from terminating its commercial lease.

The landlord relied on a 30-day termination clause from a 1998 amending agreement.

The tenant argued that subsequent amending agreements, which included a six-month termination clause conditional on redevelopment, indicated the 30-day clause was confined to the 1998 extension term.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by failing to address this key argument regarding contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.