Howard L. Krongold

The appellant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, and two counts of breach of undertaking arising from a sustained campaign of social media posts, threats, and communications targeting an OPP officer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the specific intent offences of intimidation and criminal harassment and erred in convicting on one breach of undertaking count.

The Court of Appeal held that the requisite mens rea findings were implicit in the trial judge's meticulous description of the appellant's conduct, which gave rise to irresistible inferences of intent.

However, the court set aside the conviction on the breach of undertaking count alleging the appellant went where the complainant was known to be, finding the trial judge misdescribed the count and failed to make findings supporting the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge erred in interpreting 'following from place to place' under s. 264(2)(a) of the Criminal Code by finding that repeatedly driving past the complainant in the opposite direction constituted following.

The appeal judge declined to follow prior coordinate decisions that restricted the definition to pursuing or chasing, finding such an interpretation inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the harassment provisions.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence to identify him as the author of an obscene notebook.

The appeal judge agreed the trial judge erred but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii), concluding the trial judge would have convicted anyway based on overwhelming independent evidence of identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and misapplied the W.(D.) principles when assessing credibility.

The appellant also argued the trial judge improperly relied on demeanor, given the appellant's testimony that he was on the autism spectrum.

The summary conviction appeal court found no error in principle, concluding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence as a whole and did not shift the onus to the accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, robbery, forcible confinement, and weapons offences, brought pre-trial motions to sit at the counsel table and to sever the firearms charges.

The court dismissed the seating application, finding the accused posed a security risk and that his presence in the prisoner's box would not cause undue prejudice.

The court also dismissed the severance application, concluding that the evidence was not complex, the counts were factually connected, and a separate trial would cause further delay and consume additional resources.

The applicant, charged with trafficking in heroin, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a declaration that sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code are unconstitutional.

The applicant argued that the 'may assist' standard for targeting an individual's private communications for interception violates section 8 of the Charter, which requires a reasonable and probable cause standard.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence that upheld the constitutional validity of the Part VI wiretap regime and the 'may assist' criteria.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder and serving a life sentence with 25 years parole ineligibility, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

At the judicial screening stage under s. 745.61, the court was required to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would reduce the period of parole ineligibility.

After reviewing extensive documentary evidence, including correctional records, psychological assessments, and statements from family members, the court concluded that the applicant continued to minimize responsibility for the offence and had not demonstrated meaningful change in character.

Although the applicant had made some institutional progress, the seriousness of the offence, lack of full accountability, and ongoing manipulative behaviour outweighed rehabilitative factors.

The court held that a reasonable jury would not be substantially likely to grant a reduction.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge against the retrospective application of the amended s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code.

The amendment changed the screening standard for faint hope applications from a 'reasonable prospect of success' to a 'substantial likelihood of success'.

The applicant argued this violated his s. 11(h) Charter right against double punishment by potentially increasing his time in custody.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the amendment concerns punishment, it does not increase it.

The change was procedural in nature and did not thwart the applicant's settled expectations of liberty.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.