Maanit Zemel

The court dismissed the appeal by RatesDotCa Group Ltd. (formerly Kanetix Ltd.) from a decision denying leave to further amend its statement of claim to plead that Trader Corporation breached its duty of good faith and honest performance in contractual dealings.

The court found that the proposed amendments raised a new cause of action and a new remedy, both of which were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also found no error in the associate judge’s application of the law regarding discoverability and the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim to increase general damages, add a claim for punitive damages, and allege a breach of the duty of good faith and honest performance.

The defendant consented to the damages increase but opposed the other amendments.

The court found that the proposed amendments regarding good faith and honest performance relied on new material facts and constituted a new cause of action.

Because the plaintiff provided no evidence to rebut the presumption of discoverability under the Limitations Act, 2002, the new claims were statute-barred.

The motion was granted only to increase the general damages claimed.

The appellant, Tanvir Farid, sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for failure to perfect it within a judicially set deadline.

The original appeal challenged a summary judgment finding him liable for defamation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Registrar's interpretation of the deadline and dismissed Mr. Farid's motion to set aside the dismissal, concluding that he failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the appeal lacked arguable merit, causing prejudice to the respondents.

The plaintiffs, having succeeded in a defamation action, sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant, self-represented and claiming impecuniosity, argued for reduced costs.

The court rejected the defendant's impecuniosity argument due to lack of evidence and the egregious nature of his underlying conduct.

However, the court declined to award full or substantial indemnity costs, finding that while the defendant's conduct was sanctionable in the underlying action, it did not meet the high threshold of "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous" conduct required for elevated costs in this costs endorsement.

The court fixed partial indemnity legal fees for the plaintiffs and referred the disbursements for assessment due to a lack of supporting documentation.

Following a summary judgment finding the defendant liable for a massive campaign of internet defamation against 53 plaintiffs, the court conducted a trial on the assessment of damages.

The defendant had posted thousands of vile and false statements online, accusing the plaintiffs—mostly recruiters and executives—of pedophilia, sexual assault, fraud, and other egregious acts.

The court awarded general damages ranging from $50,000 to $95,000 per plaintiff, aggravated damages of $1,500 to 34 plaintiffs who demonstrated significant mental distress, and punitive damages of $9,000 to each plaintiff due to the defendant's malicious and high-handed conduct.

The court also granted a permanent injunction and ordered the defendant to remove the defamatory content from the internet.

The appellants (Donkers parties) appealed the damages and costs awards made in a counterclaim by the respondents (Priest parties).

The original litigation stemmed from the Donkers parties' seizure of assets from the Priest parties' waste removal business without notice, leading to the Priest parties' business failure.

The trial judge had quantified damages for the Priest parties' counterclaim for breach of contract.

The Donkers parties argued the trial judge erred by not reducing the award for an excavator lease and by not applying consistent asset valuations.

They also raised new arguments regarding mitigation and expert fees.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the appellants' submissions, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondents.

On a summary judgment motion arising from a large-scale online defamation campaign, the court held that the moving parties established on a balance of probabilities that the responding party authored the impugned internet postings.

The court applied the defamation test, found the postings defamatory as to each plaintiff, rejected the limitation defence based on discoverability under the Limitations Act, 2002, and found no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability.

The only issue directed to trial was quantum of damages.

Although the court found intentional breaches of the Anton Piller regime and accepted evidentiary spoliation and adverse inferences, the contempt relief was dismissed without prejudice for procedural reasons.

The respondents brought a motion for reconsideration of the determination of an appeal, seeking to re-argue issues the court had previously stated it would not entertain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to meet the high hurdle required to reopen an appeal and did not establish an accidental slip or omission under Rule 59.06.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded against the moving parties.

The applicants, six individuals with ongoing litigation against the respondent, brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant and stay all her proceedings.

The respondent had initiated over 50 proceedings, many involving allegations of sexual assault and defamation against former romantic partners.

Despite finding that the respondent exhibited many badges of vexatious conduct, the court dismissed the application, emphasizing the importance of allowing civil claims of sexual assault to be adjudicated on their merits rather than being summarily stayed.

The Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether the Administrative Judge of the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to make orders under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP provisions).

The court found that such jurisdiction lies exclusively with Superior Court judges, based on statutory interpretation, prior jurisprudence (Bruyea, Nanda, Ontario College of Teachers), and the incompatibility of the complex s. 137.1 process with the summary nature and rules of the Small Claims Court.

The appeals were allowed, confirming the Administrative Judge's lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 30.06 for a further and better affidavit of documents, seeking financial, operational, and accounting records from the defendants.

The underlying action involved claims of partnership dissolution, breach of contract, and intellectual property infringement.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the documents were irrelevant, not proven to exist, and disproportionate to produce at this stage.

The court found the requested documents were relevant to both liability and damages, and that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of their existence.

The court rejected the defendants' proportionality arguments, noting they failed to provide evidence of undue burden, and granted the motion with costs.

This appeal arose from the seizure of heavy construction equipment without notice following a default on a promissory note and an unassumed lease.

The trial judge had dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, concluding that no notice was required under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the common law duty to provide reasonable notice before seizing secured assets (the Lister v. Dunlop principle) was not displaced by the PPSA.

Furthermore, the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) explicitly required 15 days' notice, and the doctrine of merger did not apply to this personal property transaction.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in holding Mr. Priest personally liable for the unassumed excavator lease, as he was not a party to that specific agreement.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's re-calculation of damages in the main action was dismissed, as no error in principle was identified.

The case was remitted to the Superior Court for an assessment of damages on the counterclaim.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions brought by the plaintiffs and defendants by counterclaim against Tanvir Farid.

The plaintiffs sought to continue an interlocutory injunction against Farid for defamatory online postings, amend previous orders, review the execution of an Anton Piller Order (APO), and gain access to seized data.

Additionally, the plaintiffs and other defendants by counterclaim (Maanit Zemel, Hexigent Consulting Inc., Ryan Duquette, and Jason Green) moved to strike Farid's counterclaim.

The court continued the interlocutory injunction until trial, found the APO was properly executed, and granted access to seized data subject to privilege review.

The court denied the plaintiffs' requests to delete a paragraph from a prior order and to issue a mandatory order for Farid to remove defamatory material at the interlocutory stage.

Crucially, Farid's counterclaim, alleging fraud upon the court and improper conduct by the plaintiffs, their counsel, and investigators, was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The court found the counterclaim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous and vexatious, and was barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

Costs were awarded against Farid.

The appellant, a rapper performing under the name Avalanche the Architect, appealed the dismissal of his libel action against a newspaper and its reporter.

The action was struck as statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The core issue was whether the Act's notice and limitation periods apply to online newspaper articles.

The court held that the Act applies to online versions of newspapers, that the limitation period begins when the libel comes to the plaintiff's knowledge, and that the plaintiff's initial complaint did not constitute proper notice under the Act as it merely complained of factual errors without asserting libel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The child applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board for release from a secure treatment program, arguing that the criteria for emergency admission under section 124(2) of the Child and Family Services Act were not met.

The Board reviewed evidence of the child's mental disorder, including multiple suicide attempts, self-harm, and substance abuse, which grossly impaired her judgment.

The Board found that all five statutory criteria for admission were satisfied, as the secure setting was necessary and effective to prevent serious bodily harm, appropriate treatment was available, and no less restrictive method was appropriate.

The application for release was denied.