Clayton C. Ruby

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The appellants, members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations, were convicted of gambling-related offences under the Criminal Code for conducting high stakes bingo and other gambling activities on their reserves.

They appealed, arguing that their activities were protected by an inherent aboriginal right to self-government under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which included the right to regulate gambling.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test and held that the claimed right must be characterized as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that gambling or its regulation was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the First Nations at the time of contact.

The Crown appealed a sentence reduction in a case involving prolonged physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of the offender's children.

The Court held that there is no legal ceiling capping fixed-term sentences at 20 years under the Criminal Code, absent special circumstances, and that the totality principle requires only that the global sentence be just and appropriate and proportionate to the offender's overall culpability.

The Court further confirmed that retribution is a legitimate and important sentencing principle, distinct from vengeance and complementary to denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society.

Applying the deferential standard of review for sentence appeals, the Court held the appellate court erred by intervening absent demonstrable unfitness and restored the 25-year cumulative sentence.

The respondent, charged with indecent assault, sought the production of the complainant's counselling records held by third-party institutions.

The trial judge ordered the records produced.

The third parties appealed the interlocutory order.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

On the substantive issue, the Court applied the framework established in the companion case of R. v. O'Connor, balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy and equality rights.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in ordering production without first determining likely relevance and balancing the competing Charter rights.

The appeal was allowed and the order for production was quashed.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

At their first trial, the judge refused to order the disclosure of a police informer's identity.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and directed the Crown to disclose the informer's evidence, name, and whereabouts, and to make him available.

Before the second trial, the Crown produced a hooded man claiming to be the informer but refused to disclose his name or whereabouts.

The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings due to non-disclosure and unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal quashed the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the stay but holding that the Crown had breached the binding disclosure order.

The Court directed that the trial proceed, giving the Crown the option to either fully comply with the disclosure order or apply to vary it based on new evidence regarding the informer's safety.

The appellants, who were either charged or suspects in connection with an explosion and fire, were subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiries of other accused persons separately charged with the same offence.

The appellants applied to quash the subpoenas, arguing that compelling them to testify would violate their right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were compellable witnesses and that section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act does not infringe section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found no evidence that the subpoenas were a form of pre-trial interrogation or otherwise objectionable, noting that the witnesses would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination at any subsequent proceedings against them.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a stabbing during a fight.

At trial, he admitted to punching the victim but claimed a third party committed the stabbing, and adduced evidence of the third party's prior violent acts.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the third party's criminal record was only relevant to credibility, and that the appellant's flight from the scene could be considered in reaching a verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that the third party's propensity for violence could support the defence theory, and by failing to warn that the appellant's flight was equally consistent with the admitted lesser offence of common assault.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was involved in two motor vehicle accidents, the second resulting in a fatality.

At the hospital, blood and urine samples were taken for medical purposes with the appellant's consent.

A coroner subsequently seized the samples under the Coroners Act and turned them over to the police for analysis.

The results were used to convict the appellant of impaired driving causing death and other offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the police's appropriation of the samples constituted an unreasonable seizure violating s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the samples existed independently of the breach, the authorities acted in good faith, and the evidence would have been discovered anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and a companion forcibly confined and sexually assaulted a young woman.

While the companion strangled the victim, the appellant held her legs to prevent her from struggling.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase 'caused the death' in s. 214(5) requires the accused's actions to be a substantial and integral cause of the death.

The Court found that the appellant's act of holding the victim's legs was a substantial cause of her death, as she likely would have resisted the strangulation otherwise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two unsavoury witnesses who had strong motivations to lie.

The trial judge failed to give a clear, sharp Vetrovec warning regarding their testimony, failed to instruct the jury on the limited use of a highly prejudicial letter written by one of the witnesses, and failed to instruct the jury on the use of prior inconsistent statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the cumulative effect of these errors could not be cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as there was a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different but for the errors.

The respondent attacked his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, killing his mother-in-law and seriously injuring his father-in-law.

At trial, he presented a defence of non-insane automatism, supported by uncontradicted expert medical evidence that sleepwalking is a sleep disorder, not a neurological or psychiatric illness.

The trial judge left only the defence of non-insane automatism with the jury, which acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that on the evidence and policy considerations, sleepwalking in this case did not stem from a 'disease of the mind' and was properly classified as non-insane automatism, entitling the accused to an absolute acquittal.

The appellant challenged both the common law rule allowing the Crown to raise insanity over an accused’s objection and the Criminal Code provision requiring automatic detention of an insanity acquittee pending the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor.

The Court held that the common law rule violated s. 7 because it impermissibly deprived an accused of control over the conduct of the defence, and it reformulated the rule so that the Crown may generally raise insanity only after the trier of fact has otherwise concluded the accused is guilty, or where the accused has put mental capacity in issue.

The Court further held that s. 542(2) was intra vires Parliament’s criminal law power, but violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter because it mandated automatic, arbitrary, and indeterminate detention without a hearing and without standards.

The appeal was allowed, a judicial stay of proceedings was entered, and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months with interim detention limits.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

At trial, evidence was led of three separate conspiracies, but the appellants were only involved in one (Phase II).

The appellants argued that the indictment charged a broader conspiracy encompassing all phases, and since they were not involved in Phase I, they should be acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the indictment adequately specified the time and locations relevant to the Phase II conspiracy, giving the appellants reasonable notice of the charge.

The Crown proved the conspiracy charged, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.

The appellants, Ministers of the Crown, were found guilty of contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal for failing to comply with an order to produce a file.

The order was served on their solicitor, but there was no evidence the Ministers had actual personal knowledge of it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the order.

The Court found that service on a solicitor under the Federal Court Rules does not create a presumption of actual knowledge for the purposes of a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding, nor does vicarious liability apply to hold the Ministers responsible for the actions of their officials.

A provincial Royal Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. The Commission sought to compel the attendance of the justices of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal who had heard the Reference that quashed the conviction, in order to question them about the composition of the panel and the record relied upon.

The justices successfully applied for a declaration of judicial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Commission's appeal, holding that the fundamental principle of judicial independence provides judges with absolute immunity from being compelled to testify about their adjudicative decisions and qualified immunity regarding administrative decisions such as panel composition.

The appellant, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and served eleven years in prison, sought judicial review of a ruling by a Royal Commission established to inquire into his prosecution.

The Commission ruled that while it would hear evidence on the general nature of cabinet discussions regarding the case, it would not permit questions about the views of individual cabinet members, deeming them irrelevant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Order in Council establishing the Commission gave it the exclusive discretion to determine what 'other related matters' were relevant to its inquiry.

The Court found that the Commission reasonably exercised its jurisdiction in balancing cabinet secrecy with the administration of justice.

The appellants were arrested in the middle of the night for break and enter and advised of their right to counsel.

After unsuccessfully attempting to reach their lawyers by phone, they were placed in a police line-up where they were identified by witnesses.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the appellants' rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel and by failing to refrain from eliciting evidence before they had done so.

The Court concluded that the line-up evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, rendering it inadmissible under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He admitted to forcing the complainant to have sexual intercourse but claimed his drunkenness caused the attack.

The trial judge instructed the jury that drunkenness is no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sexual assault causing bodily harm is an offence of general intent.

The Court affirmed the rule in Leary, holding that evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the trier of fact to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, and that this rule does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.