Reasonable doubt cannot be applied piecemeal to individual items of evidence.
The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions.
The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated.
Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection.
The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.
Confidential information is not property for the purposes of theft under the Criminal Code.
The appellant was charged with counselling theft and fraud after offering a hotel security guard money to obtain confidential information containing the names and addresses of hotel employees for a union.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that confidential information does not qualify as property for the purposes of the theft provisions in the Criminal Code, as it cannot be taken or converted in a manner that deprives the owner.
The Court also held that the conduct did not amount to fraud, as the hotel had no intention of dealing commercially with the information and thus faced no risk of economic deprivation.
The appeal was allowed and the acquittals restored.
Appeal from second degree murder conviction dismissed in a 4-3 split decision.
The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof, failed to warn himself about the risks of accepting accomplice evidence, and disregarded relevant evidence.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 4-3 split decision, dismissed the appeal, with the majority substantially agreeing with the majority decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
Appeal from convictions for attempted robbery and use of a firearm dismissed.
The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted robbery and use of a firearm.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts of guilt were not unreasonable and were supported by the evidence.
The Court concluded that no error of law was committed at trial and there was no miscarriage of justice.
The proviso cannot save a conviction where an unfairly prejudicial cross-examination constitutes an error of mixed law and fact.
The appellant was convicted of gross indecency.
At trial, the Crown conducted an improper and unfairly prejudicial cross-examination regarding the appellant's previous sexual conduct, and the trial judge misdirected the jury on the alibi defence.
The Court of Appeal found these errors but applied the proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the conviction due to strong circumstantial evidence.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to limit the cross-examination was an error of mixed law and fact, not an error of law alone, and therefore the proviso could not be applied.
The unfair prejudice resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Appeal dismissed; Crown may choose trial before supreme court judge despite accused's election under s. 429.1.
The appellants appealed their convictions, raising issues regarding court election under s. 429.1 of the Criminal Code and the admission of similar fact evidence.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that where an accused consents to be tried by a judge who is not a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction, the Attorney General may choose trial before either a county/district court judge and jury or a supreme court judge and jury.
The Court also found no error in the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence or the jury charge.
The appeal was dismissed.
The mens rea for attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill.
The respondent broke into an apartment building with a loaded sawed-off shotgun to confront his estranged wife.
During a struggle with the man his wife was living with, the gun discharged.
The respondent was convicted of attempted murder based on constructive murder provisions.
The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the mens rea for attempted murder is the specific intent to kill, overruling its previous decision in Lajoie.
A jury trial commences for the purposes of discharging a juror when the accused is placed in the jury's charge.
The appellants were charged with second-degree murder.
After the jury was empanelled but before the appellants were put in the jury's charge and before any evidence was called, a juror was discharged pursuant to s. 573 of the Criminal Code.
The trial proceeded with eleven jurors, and the appellants were convicted.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, holding that for the purposes of s. 573, a jury trial does not commence until the accused has been placed in charge of the jury.
Appeal dismissed; guilty plea to second degree murder on first degree murder indictment without jury upheld.
The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder on an indictment of first degree murder without the intervention of a jury.
The trial judge increased the parole ineligibility period to 15 years.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that a jury is not required for such a guilty plea, and declining to review the trial judge's application of principles regarding the parole ineligibility period.
Crown must prove disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt at a sentencing hearing.
The respondent pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.
At the sentencing hearing, the Crown and the respondent presented conflicting versions of the assault.
The trial judge applied the balance of probabilities standard to the disputed aggravating facts and sentenced the respondent to four and a half years.
The Court of Appeal held that the Crown must prove aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt and reduced the sentence.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on a question of law, and affirming that the Crown must prove disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt at a sentencing hearing.