Clayton C. Ruby

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted robbery and use of a firearm.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts of guilt were not unreasonable and were supported by the evidence.

The Court concluded that no error of law was committed at trial and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency.

At trial, the Crown conducted an improper and unfairly prejudicial cross-examination regarding the appellant's previous sexual conduct, and the trial judge misdirected the jury on the alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal found these errors but applied the proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the conviction due to strong circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to limit the cross-examination was an error of mixed law and fact, not an error of law alone, and therefore the proviso could not be applied.

The unfair prejudice resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants appealed their convictions, raising issues regarding court election under s. 429.1 of the Criminal Code and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where an accused consents to be tried by a judge who is not a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction, the Attorney General may choose trial before either a county/district court judge and jury or a supreme court judge and jury.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence or the jury charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent broke into an apartment building with a loaded sawed-off shotgun to confront his estranged wife.

During a struggle with the man his wife was living with, the gun discharged.

The respondent was convicted of attempted murder based on constructive murder provisions.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the mens rea for attempted murder is the specific intent to kill, overruling its previous decision in Lajoie.

The appellants were charged with second-degree murder.

After the jury was empanelled but before the appellants were put in the jury's charge and before any evidence was called, a juror was discharged pursuant to s. 573 of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded with eleven jurors, and the appellants were convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, holding that for the purposes of s. 573, a jury trial does not commence until the accused has been placed in charge of the jury.

The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder on an indictment of first degree murder without the intervention of a jury.

The trial judge increased the parole ineligibility period to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that a jury is not required for such a guilty plea, and declining to review the trial judge's application of principles regarding the parole ineligibility period.

The respondent pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown and the respondent presented conflicting versions of the assault.

The trial judge applied the balance of probabilities standard to the disputed aggravating facts and sentenced the respondent to four and a half years.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown must prove aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt and reduced the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on a question of law, and affirming that the Crown must prove disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt at a sentencing hearing.