John Andrew Howlett

The appellants appealed an order requiring $550,000 to be paid into court under Rule 45.02, pending resolution of a dispute arising from a house building project.

The respondent claimed monies owed from a promissory note, share of profits, and unpaid wages.

After the appellants sold the house without notice, a caution was registered, then removed in exchange for an irrevocable direction to hold $550,000 in trust.

The appellants sought to set aside this direction, arguing the caution was invalid and the direction was procured by economic duress.

The application judge dismissed the appellants' application and allowed the respondent's cross-application.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the agreement was negotiated by counsel, which belied claims of duress or invalidity of the caution.

The court affirmed the application judge's finding that the criteria for a Rule 45.02 order were met, as the respondent claimed a specific fund, raised a serious issue to be tried, and the balance of convenience favored the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal, specifically challenging the inclusion of commission income and a bonus during the 16-month notice period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the commission award, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent should continue to receive commission on all advertising revenue.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bonus, finding the motion judge misapprehended the evidence regarding a guaranteed bonus.

The costs award from the court below was also reduced.

The plaintiff, a 42-year-old magazine publisher with 16.5 years of continuous service (including time with a predecessor employer), brought a summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal damages after being terminated without cause.

The court awarded a 16-month reasonable notice period.

The court also resolved disputes over the calculation of commissions and bonuses during the notice period, projecting commissions based on the plaintiff's historical performance and the new magazine's total revenue.

A trust and accounting approach was ordered for mitigation during the remainder of the notice period.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing her application for a declaration that she was the sole owner of a boundary tree.

She sought to cut down the tree without her neighbours' consent, arguing that under previous jurisprudence, the trunk at ground level was entirely on her property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of section 10(2) of the Forestry Act, finding that 'trunk' should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, encompassing the part of the tree from its roots to where it branches out, not just at ground level.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following dismissal of an application concerning ownership and removal of a boundary tree under s. 10 of the Forestry Act, the successful respondents sought costs on a full indemnity or substantial indemnity basis, alleging abusive litigation conduct.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence governing elevated costs awards and confirmed that such awards are reserved for rare circumstances involving reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.

The court found that the application raised a legitimate issue of statutory interpretation and that the parties conducted the litigation professionally and without abuse of process.

As none of the exceptional circumstances required for elevated costs were present, costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded $10,000 in fees plus HST and disbursements of $2,951.48 plus HST.

The appellant commercial landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent tenant to deduct hydro payments from its gross rent.

The lease contained a general clause stating gross rent included utilities, but a specific clause required the tenant to pay hydro directly to the utility company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the principle that specific provisions qualify general ones.

The court found the specific requirement to pay hydro directly meant it was not an expense to be paid by the landlord and passed on as part of gross rent, and the tenant was not entitled to deduct these payments.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding whether a trial court loses jurisdiction over an indictment when it fails to proceed at the time set for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that reasonable procedural latitude is desirable in proceedings pursuant to indictment.

The Court concluded that there is no loss of jurisdiction when a trial court fails to proceed at the scheduled time, absent unconstitutional conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat of death by telephone.

He had telephoned police headquarters and threatened a police officer.

The issue was whether these telephone calls constituted 'private communications' under s. 178.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a message to a police station to convey a threat to a police officer cannot reasonably be considered a private communication.