Dr. Nussbaum

The applicant, a civil liberties organization, brought a public interest challenge against the administrative segregation provisions (sections 31-37) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, arguing they violated sections 7, 11(h), and 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the applicant had standing to seek a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1) but not a personal remedy under section 24(1).

The court held that the legislative scheme violated section 7 of the Charter because it failed to provide an independent review of the institutional head's decision to maintain an inmate in administrative segregation, which breached the principles of fundamental justice (procedural fairness) and was not saved by section 1.

The court dismissed the claims under section 11(h) and section 12, finding that segregation is not a punishment and that the scheme, if properly applied with consideration for inmates' mental health, does not constitute cruel and unusual treatment.

The court declared the provisions unconstitutional to the extent they authorize segregation beyond five working days without independent review, but suspended the declaration for 12 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the killing of his mother.

He raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after the appellant allegedly overheard the judge discussing expert evidence with a deputy; that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant failed to establish the defence of not criminally responsible; and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a sufficient factual inquiry regarding the bias allegation, that the weighing of conflicting medical opinions on the NCR defence was within the trial judge's exclusive province, and that the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the killing.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous and long-term offender application and the sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge had ruled that a dangerous offender designation required the predicate offence to warrant a minimum two-year sentence, similar to the long-term offender provision.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error of law, as the dangerous offender provision contains no such requirement.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence, designated the respondent a long-term offender, and imposed a sentence of time served plus a further period of community supervision.