Clayton C. Ruby

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and possession of explosives in relation to a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in exchange for his testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, primarily focusing on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the unsavoury Crown witnesses, improperly gave a Vetrovec-like warning regarding a defence witness, and failed to instruct the jury properly on a hearsay statement.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent following a two-day armed standoff with police.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred and a custodial sentence was initially warranted, the respondent's successful compliance with the conditional sentence and significant rehabilitative progress over the past five and a half months meant that a custodial sentence was no longer in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to obstruct justice following a guilty plea.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence demonstrating that she honestly believed the information she asked a social worker to provide to the police was true, and that her trial counsel failed to identify and investigate this defence of honest mistake of fact.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that trial counsel's failure to investigate the defence resulted in an uninformed guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the complainant was unable to testify due to her fear of the appellant.

The trial judge admitted her videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that while the necessity requirement was met, the trial judge erred in finding threshold reliability.

The statement lacked an oath or warning about the consequences of lying, there was no evidence explaining how the statement came to be given, and the complainant expressed a strong motive to fabricate.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, a used car dealer, was convicted of fraud and possession of stolen property relating to the sale of stolen and revinned vehicles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the wilful blindness doctrine and failed to consider significant evidence probative of his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge correctly articulated the wilful blindness doctrine, he failed to address a large body of potentially significant evidence that pointed away from a finding of wilful blindness.

This deficiency in the reasons foreclosed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first and second-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the principal Crown witness, an alleged accomplice who had originally been charged with the murders.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by failing to give the mandatory warning, the error was cured by the application of the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the jury was sufficiently alerted to the dangers of the witness's evidence.

The court also dismissed several other grounds of appeal relating to bad character evidence, criminal records, reply evidence, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and self-defence.

The applicant, Earthroots Coalition, sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to permit the improvement and use of a logging road crossing the Bob Lake Conservation Reserve.

The applicant argued the road use violated the Conservation Reserve Regulation, which prohibits commercial forest harvest and industrial uses in the reserve.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court dismissed the application.

The court held that the regulation must be interpreted purposively within the broader legislative framework of the Public Lands Act and the Crown Forest Sustainability Act, making the Minister's decision to balance conservation with forest management objectives reasonable.

The Information Commissioner appealed a refusal by the RCMP to disclose historical postings and employment information of four RCMP officers requested under the Access to Information Act.

The RCMP claimed the records were exempt as 'personal information' under the Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the information constituted personal information relating to employment history, it fell within the exception for information relating to the position or functions of a government employee.

The Court ruled that this exception applies retroactively to past positions and ordered the disclosure of the officers' historical postings, ranks, years of service, and anniversary dates.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of the appellant's propensity for violence while intoxicated.

The trial judge did not provide a specific limiting instruction to the jury regarding this evidence.

Additionally, the trial judge permitted both counsel to comment on the evidence to the jury after the jury charge was completed.

The Court of Appeal held that the propensity evidence was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, and the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a reversible error.

The post-charge comments by counsel were also found to be improper.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for indecent assault and sexual assault arising from intrafamilial allegations supported by extensive similar fact evidence from multiple family witnesses.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge failed to give an adequate limiting instruction against impermissible bad-character reasoning and failed to instruct on the significance of possible collusion among witnesses who had discussed the allegations and had related civil proceedings.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence principles, the court found the instructional deficiencies undermined the safety of the convictions.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of fraud for failing to report employment income while receiving social assistance.

She appealed, arguing that the welfare agency's sharing of her T4 slips with the police violated her rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the compelled production of pre-existing documents like T4 slips does not violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

Furthermore, the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 that the agency would not share evidence of fraud with the police.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to delete a probation term requiring $100 monthly restitution payments due to the appellant's limited means, though the intermittent jail sentence and free-standing restitution order were upheld.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal refusing a stay of an order enforcing Letters Rogatory from a California court.

They argued the original Letters Rogatory were null and void, depriving the court of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried.

The court held that under s. 60 of the Evidence Act, jurisdiction is established when it is made to appear that a foreign court has duly authorized a request, and the moving parties failed to challenge the validity of the request at the original hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in handling jury selection and failing to hold a fitness hearing.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly denied the appellant's right to challenge jurors for cause regarding pre-trial publicity by instead asking a general question to the panel.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not directing a fitness hearing when the self-represented appellant exhibited clear signs of mental illness and an inability to understand the proceedings.

The convictions were set aside, and the appellant was declared unfit to stand trial.

The respondents, two Canadian citizens who were 18 at the time of the offences, were wanted in the State of Washington for three counts of aggravated first degree murder.

The Minister of Justice ordered their extradition without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while sections 6(1) and 12 of the Charter were not directly violated, extraditing the respondents to face the death penalty without assurances violated their rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the principles of fundamental justice, informed by Canada's abolition of the death penalty, international trends, and concerns over wrongful convictions, require the Minister to seek assurances in all but exceptional cases.

The violation could not be justified under section 1.

The Minister's appeal was dismissed.

A young person appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from a dispute over whether consent to sexual intercourse had been withdrawn.

The court held that the trial judge’s approach to the appellant’s testimony was fundamentally flawed because it was rejected in its totality on an unsupported view of inconsistency, without proper consideration of other evidence supporting that version of events.

The reasons also raised concern that different standards of scrutiny may have been applied to the accused’s and complainant’s evidence.

The appeal against conviction was allowed, the verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

In light of that result, the court did not address the disposition appeal, while noting the Crown’s concession that the original disposition exceeded the statutory maximum under the Young Offenders Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the child-protection recognizance regime created a status offence, was overbroad, and was impermissibly vague, and further challenged the availability of arrest and detention procedures in such proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 810.1 is preventive, not punitive, and is directed at assessing present risk of future harm to children rather than punishing status.

The court found the regime sufficiently tailored and procedurally safeguarded, upheld the reading down of 'shall' to 'may' in s. 810.1(2), and confirmed that ss. 507(4) and 515 apply to s. 810.1 proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

Police entered private commercial property at night after observing circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of a break-in or theft.

Upon contact with the property owner, the officer observed signs of impairment, arrested the owner for care and control, and force was used during the ensuing resistance.

The court held the officer's entry was authorized by an implied invitation extending to protective investigation of suspected crime against the property, so no s. 8 search occurred.

The court further held the arrest was lawful, rejected ss. 7 and 9 arguments, upheld findings that the force used was not excessive, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants sought to set aside a sentence order directing forfeiture of cash bail toward restitution arising from a break and enter and theft involving the release of mink from a fur farm.

The Crown conceded that the Criminal Code did not authorize forfeiture of bail money to satisfy a restitution order, and the court quashed that portion of the sentence.

The majority held, however, that it should not direct payment of the bail funds to third-party family members and a friend who had supplied the money, particularly given possible competing creditor claims and the unsuitability of criminal proceedings to adjudicate such disputes.

Requests for costs and interest against the Crown were also denied.

A dissent would have ordered the bail money returned directly to the third-party funders ex debito justitiae.

The appellant was a trespasser growing marijuana in abandoned fields.

The police seized the plants pursuant to a warrant issued after receiving a tip.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the fields, applying R. v. Edwards and R. v. Belnavis.

Consequently, it was unnecessary to consider section 24(2) of the Charter, and arguments under sections 7 and 11(d) were also rejected.