Clayton C. Ruby

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempted murder, and firearm offences arising from a shootout with police.

At trial, he advanced an alibi defence that was not disclosed prior to his testimony.

He argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the late disclosure of his alibi, the failure to call his mother as an alibi witness, and the lack of an unsavory witness caution for a key Crown witness.

He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to serve a notice of alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions and concluding that defence counsel's decision not to serve a notice of alibi was a competent tactical choice.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing her action against Her Majesty the Queen and the Honourable Elizabeth Heneghan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reasons regarding judicial immunity and upholding the costs order.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a destruction order for a pit bull under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appeal judge had interpreted section 4(8) of the Act as requiring the court to find that destruction was necessary for the protection of the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary and natural meaning of section 4(8) is clear and unambiguous: once a pit bull is found to have bitten or attacked, the court is mandated to order its destruction.

The original destruction order was reinstated.

The appellant, a government employee, was convicted of fraud on the government and breach of trust after directing government funding applicants to a consulting firm that subcontracted work to his wife's company.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misinterpreted s. 121(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and erred in admitting offshore banking documents obtained contrary to foreign law.

He also appealed his six-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 121(1)(c) does not require the accused to personally benefit when a family member receives the benefit, the admission of the banking documents did not render the trial unfair, and the sentence was fit given the need for general deterrence.

The appellants, husband and wife, were convicted of second degree murder in the death of their seven-year-old son, who died following months of severe physical abuse.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh medical evidence regarding the cause of death and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on aiding and abetting, out-of-court statements, and propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the required cogency threshold to affect the verdict, particularly given the tactical decision not to call such evidence at trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upheld the 18-year parole ineligibility period for the stepmother.

The accused was charged with multiple counts arising from two separate sexual assaults committed against different complainants approximately one month apart.

The trial judge denied the accused's pre-trial application to sever the counts.

The accused was convicted on all charges, and the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly balance the relevant factors for severance.

The Court held that the significant risk of prejudice to the accused, including the dangers of credibility cross-pollination and prohibited propensity reasoning, clearly outweighed any minimal benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant police service sought costs of over $90,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $20,000 for the costs of the underlying application.

However, the court found the requested appeal costs unreasonable, noting the appeal involved novel issues that the appellant had an institutional interest in resolving.

The court fixed the appeal costs at $25,000, payable by the respondent.

No costs were ordered for or against the interveners.

The respondent, whose criminal charges for sexual offences were withdrawn upon entering a peace bond, applied for jobs requiring a Vulnerable Persons Search.

He signed consent forms authorizing the Toronto Police Service to conduct the search.

The Peel Police Service disclosed the withdrawn charges to the Toronto Police Service.

The respondent obtained an injunction prohibiting the Peel Police Service from disclosing the withdrawn charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the disclosure was authorized by the respondent's consent under s. 32(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding no violation of his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 8.

The appellant, a 73-year-old retired labourer, was convicted of uttering a death threat after posting a poorly written, satirical poem about his municipal councillor on neighbourhood mailboxes.

The poem expressed frustration over the councillor's performance and included imagery about digging a hole to hide her body.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the full context of the poem, including its nature as political commentary and the appellant's public posting of it.

The Court concluded that a reasonable person, fully informed of the circumstances, would not view the poem as a serious threat.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, he admitted causing her death but claimed he did not mean to kill her, raising defences of self-defence, necessity, and accident.

He alleged his wife had tried to poison him and set a fire in their home, and that she died from traumatic asphyxia during a struggle when he accidentally kneeled on her chest.

The trial judge instructed the jury on accident as to unintended consequences but refused to leave accident as to the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to leave the defence of an accidental act with the jury, as there was an air of reality to the appellant's claim that he kneeled on his wife accidentally.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to classify the Bloor Street Transformation Project as a Schedule A/A+ project under the Municipal Class Environmental Assessment, which exempted it from a full environmental assessment.

The Divisional Court held that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness and found the City's classification of the road and sidewalk reconstruction project to be reasonable.

The court also held that, in any event, the discretionary remedy of judicial review would be refused due to the applicant's delay in bringing the application, as construction had already begun and halting the project would prejudice the public interest.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's ban on pit bulls under the Dog Owners' Liability Act, arguing the law was overbroad and vague under s. 7 of the Charter, and that a provision allowing a veterinarian's certificate as proof of breed violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d).

The application judge upheld the ban but struck down parts of the definition and the certificate provision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the Attorney General's cross-appeal, restoring the struck provisions.

The Court held the ban was not grossly disproportionate to the risk posed by pit bulls, the definition was not unconstitutionally vague, and the certificate provision did not create a mandatory presumption of guilt.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including aggravated sexual assault and overcoming resistance by choking, arising from two separate brutal attacks on two different women approximately five weeks apart.

He was sentenced to a total of 22.5 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts, failing to give a propensity instruction, and imposing a sentence that offended the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his severance ruling or jury instructions, and that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the callous nature of the offences and the appellant's lack of remorse.

The applicant pleaded guilty to drug and weapons offences and received a lenient sentence based on a joint submission.

Shortly after, the band council on the reserve where he lived passed a resolution banishing him due to his criminal record.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence, hoping a conditional discharge might prompt the band council to reconsider.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the unexpected and drastic collateral consequence of banishment justified allowing the late appeal.

The respondent pleaded guilty to criminal harassment after travelling from British Columbia to Ontario to attend his wife's home, having recently told his daughter he purchased a gun to bring the family back together.

He received a suspended sentence and three years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's status as a first offender, the distance separating the parties, and the protective conditions imposed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on weapons charges after the trial judge excluded evidence of a loaded sawed-off shotgun found in the trunk of a car.

The accused and three passengers were arrested after police found knives and pellet guns on them and in the car's interior.

The trial judge ruled the trunk search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the accused had a minimal privacy interest in the trunk and the search was a lawful search incident to arrest given the discovery of multiple weapons.

A new trial was ordered on all counts.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous and long-term offender application and the sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge had ruled that a dangerous offender designation required the predicate offence to warrant a minimum two-year sentence, similar to the long-term offender provision.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error of law, as the dangerous offender provision contains no such requirement.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence, designated the respondent a long-term offender, and imposed a sentence of time served plus a further period of community supervision.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and possession of explosives in relation to a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in exchange for his testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, primarily focusing on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the unsavoury Crown witnesses, improperly gave a Vetrovec-like warning regarding a defence witness, and failed to instruct the jury properly on a hearsay statement.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent following a two-day armed standoff with police.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred and a custodial sentence was initially warranted, the respondent's successful compliance with the conditional sentence and significant rehabilitative progress over the past five and a half months meant that a custodial sentence was no longer in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to obstruct justice following a guilty plea.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence demonstrating that she honestly believed the information she asked a social worker to provide to the police was true, and that her trial counsel failed to identify and investigate this defence of honest mistake of fact.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that trial counsel's failure to investigate the defence resulted in an uninformed guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.