Bazos (aka Goldy) v. Bell Media Inc.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Cavanagh J.

October 16, 2018

APPLICATION for declaratory relief and mandatory order.

Counsel: Clayton Ruby and Stephanie DiGiuseppe, for applicant. Steven G. Mason, Richard Lizius and Charlotte-Anne Malischewski, for respondent.

CAVANAGH J. : —

Overview

[1] The applicant, Faith Bazos, goes by the name "Faith Goldy". Ms. Goldy is one of 35 candidates for mayor of the City of Toronto in the upcoming municipal election that will take place on October 22, 2018.

[2] Bell Media Inc. ("Bell") is a Canadian broadcaster that owns and operates local television stations across Canada as well as certain discretionary programming services, including Cable Pulse 24 ("CP24").

[3] Ms. Goldy's team contacted CP24 in late August 2018 to inquire about purchasing advertising time to run electoral advertisements and, in response, she was contacted by an account executive for CP24 on August 22, 2018. Over the ensuing days, Ms. Goldy made arrangements with Bell to place political advertisements in respect of her candidacy for mayor of Toronto to run on its CP24 television station.

[4] On September 26, 2018, CP24 notified Ms. Goldy that it would not be able to run the advertisements that were planned and that it would refund the money that she had paid for these advertisements.

[5] No reason was given by Bell for this decision at the time that it was communicated to Ms. Goldy.

[6] Bell has provided evidence on this application that it received over 80 written complaints and over 15 complaints by voicemail opposing the running of Ms. Goldy's advertisements on CP24, and that a number of advocacy groups posted messages on Twitter asking Bell not to run Ms. Goldy's advertisements and encouraging their followers to contact Bell on the subject. Bell provided evidence that Ms. Goldy is publicly known for political views that have been described as "far right" and "alt right". In its factum for the hearing of the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, Bell describes its decision not to complete its business transaction with Ms. Goldy as a "business decision".

[7] Ms. Goldy's evidence is that she believes that Bell refuses to run her advertisements because those with decision-making responsibilities at Bell do not agree with her political beliefs and wish to silence her.

[8] Ms. Goldy started to look for counsel to represent her in respect of Bell's decision on the same day that she was informed of this decision. She was initially not able to find counsel to represent her. She was only able to meet with her legal counsel on this application on October 3, 2018, and she was not able to complete arrangements to retain counsel until October 5, 2018, the Friday before the Thanksgiving weekend. Ms. Goldy commenced this application on Tuesday, October 9, 2018.

[9] On her application, Ms. Goldy seeks a declaration pursuant to rule 14.05(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 that Bell is required to allocate time for the broadcasting of her partisan political advertisements relating to her candidacy in the 2018 Toronto municipal election and a mandatory order requiring Bell to do so. In the alternative, Ms. Goldy seeks the same declaratory relief and mandatory order pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She also seeks this declaratory relief and a mandatory order pursuant to a contract with Bell.

[10] In support of her application, Ms. Goldy relies upon regulations passed by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC") pursuant to the federal Broadcasting Act that address the allocation of time for the broadcasting of advertisements of a partisan political character to rival candidates represented in an election. Ms. Goldy submits that under these regulations, she has a statutory right to purchase airtime from Bell on an "equitable basis" and that Bell breached her statutory right by refusing to provide airtime for her election advertisements.

[11] Bell objects to the jurisdiction of this court to adjudicate on Ms. Goldy's application. Bell submits that if Ms. Goldy wishes to enforce CRTC regulations against Bell, she should be seeking a mandatory order from the CRTC and that provincial superior courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret and apply CRTC regulations. Ms. Goldy disagrees, and submits that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear this application and, in the circumstances, it should hear the application, otherwise access to justice will be denied.

[12] On Wednesday, October 10, 2018, counsel for the parties attended at Civil Practice Court and agreed that there would be a hearing in the afternoon on Monday, October 15, 2018, with a compressed timetable for exchange of materials, for determination of the following preliminary issues:

(a) Does the court, based on the circumstances of this case, have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, and, if so, based on the factual matrix of this case, should it exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought, notwithstanding the existence of a specialized tribunal, the CRTC?

(b) Are the remainder of the issues to be heard urgent in nature?

[13] For the following reasons, I conclude that the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction to grant the relief sought on this application that involves the interpretation and enforcement of the CRTC regulations upon which Ms. Goldy relies for the relief she seeks. I conclude that Ms. Goldy's alternative claims for relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CRTC and this court. I conclude that in respect of the claim for Charter relief, this court should not exercise its discretion to hear this part of the application. The entire application should be heard by the CRTC.

Analysis

[14] First, I will address the statutory and regulatory framework governing the allocation of advertising time to candidates during an election.

[15] I will then address the jurisdictional issue that the parties have agreed should be decided as a preliminary matter. This part of my analysis will follow the approach suggested by counsel for Ms. Goldy that involves answering the following questions:

(a) Is the area with which the dispute is concerned one of concurrent, overlapping, or exclusive jurisdiction as between the Superior Court of Justice and the CRTC?

(b) If the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction in an area with which the dispute is concerned, is the essential character of the dispute within the area of exclusive jurisdiction?

(c) If the essential character of the dispute is within an area of exclusive jurisdiction, is the remedy required one which the CRTC has the authority to grant?

(d) If the dispute falls within an area of concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction, should the court exercise its discretion to hear the matter notwithstanding the CRTC's jurisdiction?

[16] Finally, I will consider certain other matters that Ms. Goldy submits should influence my decision on the question of jurisdiction, specifically, (i) the subject matter of this application, in particular, the importance of electoral integrity and freedom of expression; (ii) the importance of the availability of a process that ensures access to justice; and (iii) whether the grounds of urgency and emergency upon which Ms. Goldy relies should affect my decision on the jurisdictional issue and, if so, how these grounds should be considered in the factual circumstances of this case.

The statutory and regulatory framework governing the allocation of advertising time to candidates during an election

[17] The broadcasting policy for Canada is declared in s. 3(1) of the Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11 ("Act") which contains 42 paragraphs and subparagraphs setting out the broadcasting policy objectives for Canada.

[18] Section 2(3) provides that the Act "shall be construed and applied in a manner that is consistent with the freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence enjoyed by broadcasting undertakings".

[19] Section 3(2) of the Act contains a further declaration that "the Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent public authority".

[20] This public authority is the CRTC.

[21] In the Act, "Commission" means the CRTC. Section 5(1) of the Broadcasting Act provides:

5(1) Subject to this Act and the Radiocommunication Act and to any directions to the Commission issued by the Governor in Council under this Act, the Commission shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1) and, in so doing, shall have regard to the regulatory policy set out in subsection (2).

[22] Section 5(2) of the Act provides:

5(2) The Canadian broadcasting system should be regulated and supervised in a flexible manner that

(a) is readily adaptable to the different characteristics of English and French language broadcasting and to the different conditions under which broadcasting undertakings that provide English or French language programming operate;

(b) takes into account regional needs and concerns;

(c) is readily adaptable to scientific and technological change;

(d) facilitates the provision of broadcasting to Canadians;

(e) facilitates the provision of Canadian programs to Canadians;

(f) does not inhibit the development of information technologies and their application or the delivery of resultant services to Canadians; and

(g) is sensitive to the administrative burden that, as a consequence of such regulation and supervision, may be imposed on persons carrying on broadcasting undertakings.

[23] Section 5(3) of the Act provides that the "Commission shall give primary consideration to the objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in subsection 3(1) if, in any particular matter before the Commission, a conflict arises between those objectives and the objectives of the regulatory policy set out in subsection (2)".

[24] Section 10(1) of the Act provides that the CRTC may, in furtherance of its objects, make regulations respecting matters specified in that subsection and respecting such other matters as the CRTC deems necessary for the furtherance of its objects. Section 10(1)(e) provides that the CRTC may make regulations "respecting the proportion of time that may be devoted to the broadcasting of programs, including advertisements or announcements, of a partisan political character and the assignment of that time on an equitable basis to political parties and candidates".

[25] Pursuant to its authority under the Act, the CRTC made regulations cited as the Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987, SOR/87-49. The Television Broadcasting Regulations govern the allocation of political broadcasts during an election period. In these regulations, the term "election period" means "in the case of a municipal election, the period beginning two months before the date of the election and ending on the date the election is held".

[26] The Television Broadcasting Regulations provide, in s. 8:

8. During an election period, a licensee shall allocate time for the broadcasting of programs, advertisements or announcements of a partisan political character on an equitable basis to all accredited political parties and rival candidates represented in the election or referendum.

[27] The CRTC also made regulations cited as the Discretionary Services Regulations, SOR/2017-159 under the Act. These regulations regulate the broadcast of discretionary services, which are Canadian specialty television channels which may be carried optionally by all digital subscription television providers.

[28] Section 6 of the Discretionary Services Regulations governs political broadcasts and provides:

6(1) If, during an election period, a licensee provides time on its programming service for the broadcast of programs, advertisements or announcements of a partisan political character, the licensee shall allocate the time on an equitable basis to all accredited political parties and rival candidates represented in the election or referendum.

[29] Pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Discretionary Services Regulations, in the case of a municipal election, "election period" means the period that begins two months before the day on which the election is to be held and that ends on the day on which the election is held.

[30] Section 12(1) of the Act provides:

12(1) Where it appears to the Commission that

(a) any person has failed to do any act or thing that the person is required to do pursuant to this Part or to any regulation, licence, decision or order made or issued by the Commission under this Part, or has done or is doing any act or thing in contravention of this Part or of any such regulation, licence, decision or order,

(a.1) any person has done or is doing any act or thing in contravention of section 34.1, or

(b) the circumstances may require the Commission to make any decision or order or to give any approval that it is authorized to make or give under this Part or under any regulation or order made under this Part,

the Commission may inquire into, hear and determine the matter.

[31] Section 12(2), under the heading "Mandatory orders" provides:

12(2) The Commission may, by order, require any person to do, without delay or within or at any time and in any manner specified by the Commission, any act or thing that the person is or may be required to do under this Part or any regulation, licence, decision or order made or issued by the Commission under this Part and may, by order, forbid the doing or continuing of any act or thing that is contrary to this part, to any such regulation, licence, decision or order or to section 34.1.

[32] Section 12(3) provides that any person who is affected by an order made pursuant to s. 12(2) may apply to the Commission to reconsider any decision or finding made by the panel, and the Commission may rescind or vary any order or decision made by the panel or may re-hear any matter before deciding it.

[33] Section 13(1) provides that any order made under s. 12(2) may be made an order of the Federal Court or of any Superior Court of a province and is enforceable in the same manner as an order of the court. Under s. 13(2), to make such an order in order of a court, the usual practice and procedure of the court in such matters may be followed or, in lieu thereof, the Commission may file with the register of the court a certified copy of the order, and thereupon the order becomes an order of the court.

[34] Section 31 of the Act provides for an appeal of decisions or orders of the CRTC:

31(1) Except as provided in this Part, every decision and order of the Commission is final and conclusive.

(2) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Federal Court of Appeal on a question of law or a question of jurisdiction if leave therefor is obtained from that Court on application made within one month after the making of the decision or order sought to be appealed from or within such further time as that Court under special circumstances allows.

Does the Ontario Superior Court of Justice have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought?

[35] In Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 7666 (S.C.J.), Pepall J. (as she then was) heard a motion for an order staying or dismissing the plaintiffs' claim on the basis that the CRTC has sole jurisdiction over the subject matter of the motion. In her reasons, Pepall J. addressed, at paras. 25-26, the proper analytical framework for determination of this issue:

The court should first determine the substance of the tribunal's jurisdiction. The essential character of the dispute should then be examined to see if it falls within the tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction. Even if it does not, the court should determine whether reason exists for the tribunal to determine the dispute nonetheless.

As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal is subject to the residual discretionary power of courts of inherent jurisdiction to grant remedies not possessed by the statutory tribunal. "It might occur that a remedy is required which the arbitrator is not empowered to grant. In such a case, the courts of inherent jurisdiction in each province may take jurisdiction . . . What must be avoided, to use the language of Estey J. in St. Ann-Nackawic [Pulp & Paper Co. v. C.P.U., Local 219 [citation omitted]], is a 'real deprivation of ultimate remedy'."

[36] The analytical approach proposed by Ms. Goldy corresponds closely with the framework for analysis expressed by Pepall J. in Allarco. I address each question in turn.

(a) Is the area with which the dispute is concerned one of concurrent, overlapping, or exclusive jurisdiction as between the Superior Court of Justice and the CRTC?

[37] CP24 is a 24-hour television channel that is a discretionary service as defined by the CRTC and subject to the Discretionary Services Regulations, including s. 6 thereof. Bell submits that CP24 is not subject to the s. 8 of the Television Broadcasting Regulations. The language in these two regulations is very similar and, for the purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue before me, I do not need to decide whether this submission is correct or not.

[38] Ms. Goldy submits that the area with which this dispute is concerned is not one where the CRTC enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. Ms. Goldy submits that this is an area of concurrent jurisdiction as between the Superior Court of Justice and the CRTC.

[39] With respect to Ms. Goldy's application for alternative relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, the Superior Court has jurisdiction: International Fund for Animal Welfare, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), at para. 7.

[40] Bell submits that the CRTC also has jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy. In support of this submission, Bell relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22 where, at paras. 78 and 81-82, Abella J. addressed the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to grant Charter remedies:

The jurisprudential evolution leads to the following two observations: first, that administrative tribunals with the power to decide questions of law, and from whom constitutional jurisdiction is not been clearly withdrawn, have the authority to resolve constitutional questions that are linked to matters properly before them. And secondly, they must act consistently with the Charter and its values when exercising their statutory functions. It strikes me as somewhat unhelpful, therefore, to subject every tribunal from which a Charter remedy is sought to an inquiry asking whether it is "competent" to grant a particular remedy within the meaning of s. 24(1).

Building on the jurisprudence, therefore, when a remedy is sought from an administrative tribunal under s. 24(1), the proper initial inquiry is whether the tribunal can grant Charter remedies generally. To make this determination, the first question is whether the administrative tribunal has jurisdiction, explicit or implied, to decide questions of law. If it does, and unless it is clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter from the tribunal's jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction and can consider and apply the Charter -- and Charter remedies -- when resolving the matters properly before it.

Once the threshold question has been resolved in favour of Charter jurisdiction, the remaining question is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy sought, given the relevant statutory scheme. Answering this question is necessarily an exercise in discerning legislative intent. On this approach, what will always be at issue is whether the remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature intended would fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal. Relevant considerations in discerning legislative intent will include those that have guided the courts in past cases, such as the tribunal's statutory mandate, structure and function.

(Citation omitted)

[41] With respect to the first question, it is clear that the CRTC has jurisdiction to decide questions of law. The Act does not demonstrate that Parliament intended to exclude the Charter from the CRTC's jurisdiction. With respect to the second question, the Charter remedy sought on this application, a declaratory order interpreting regulations made by the CRTC under authority conferred by the Act as requiring Bell to allocate time for Ms. Goldy's partisan political advertisements relating to her candidacy in the 2018 Toronto municipal election and a mandatory order requiring Bell to do so, is one that, in my view, the CRTC can grant, given the relevant statutory scheme. For the purpose of this jurisdictional hearing, I conclude that the CRTC has jurisdiction to grant the Charter remedy sought by Ms. Goldy.

[42] Ms. Goldy accepts that the CRTC has jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies.

[43] The Superior Court of Justice has constant, complete and concurrent jurisdiction in respect of Charter remedies: R. v. Mills, at para. 62.

[44] Therefore, with respect to the Charter remedies that Ms. Goldy seeks on this application, the Superior Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction with the CRTC.

[45] With respect to her application under rule 14.05(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for declaratory relief interpreting s. 8 of the Television Broadcasting Regulations and s. 6 of the Discretionary Services Regulations issued by the CRTC under the Act and a mandatory order in aid of enforcement of this declaration, Ms. Goldy submits that the Act does not explicitly or implicitly oust the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice. Ms. Goldy submits that in the absence of clear and express statutory language to oust the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts in favour of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in a statutory tribunal, concurrent jurisdiction is presumed.

[46] In support of this omission, Ms. Goldy points to s. 12(1) of the Act, which provides that where "it appears to the Commission that any person has failed to do any act or thing that the person is required to do pursuant to . . . any regulation . . . issued by the Commission . . . or has done or is doing any act or thing in contravention of . . . any such regulation, . . . the Commission may inquire into, hear and determine the matter" (emphasis added). Ms. Goldy submits that this permissive language should be contrasted with the mandatory language found in s. 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2 that requires that every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding settlement of differences by binding arbitration. The Supreme Court of Canada held in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, at para. 45, that given this language, the statute makes arbitration the only available remedy for such differences, and that where a dispute falls within the terms of the Labour Relations Act, there is no room for concurrent jurisdiction.

[47] The existence of the permissive word "may" in s. 12(1) of the Act in relation to the authority conferred on the CRTC to enforce its regulations does not support the conclusion advanced by Ms. Goldy that the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts has not been ousted and that, consequently, the CRTC lacks exclusive jurisdiction in this area. This language means only that the CRTC has discretionary power in the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction. There is no language in s. 12(1) of the Act that clearly conveys, expressly or implicitly, that the CRTC's jurisdiction in the area of interpretation and enforcement of its regulations is or is not exclusive jurisdiction. Unlike the language in the Labour Relations Act that was considered in Weber and made arbitration the only remedy for differences arising from a collective agreement, the language used in s. 12 of the Act is not helpful to assist me to decide, one way or the other, whether the Act ousts the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts in this area.

[48] Ms. Goldy relies upon the decision in Bell Canada c. Aka-Trudel, 2018 QCCA 829 in which the Quebec Court of Appeal held that the Quebec Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear an action based upon a private law cause of action between a consumer and a licensee under the Telecommunications Act involving late payment fees. The representative plaintiff was not relying upon a breach of the applicable statute or regulations in support of his claim. The CRTC had refrained from regulating the late fees associated with the telecommunication services that were in question in that case. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that, as a result, the representative plaintiff necessarily had recourse to the courts. The Quebec Court of Appeal, at para. 27, distinguished Mahar v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd., which I will address below, and other cases that followed it, on the basis that in those cases, an analysis of the true nature of the remedies sought revealed that each, in its own way, invoked or infringed a legislative provision, decision or regulation of the CRTC. The facts in Aka-Trudel are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case and, as the Quebec Court of Appeal found, from the facts in Mahar.

[49] Ms. Goldy also relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in St. Anne Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union, Local 219 in support of her submission that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice has not been clearly ousted by the Act. In that case, the court made the following observations, at para. 28, concerning the need for clear statutory language to oust the jurisdiction of the court:

In a limited role, the ready access by the parties to the court system provided by the community for the disposition of differences however arising in the community, can itself be another bulwark against the deterioration of employer-employee understanding. The interlocutory injunction by summary process but of limited life, for example as governed by the Judicature Act of Ontario, now the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, finds its origin in this reality. It is, of course, open to the legislature to close this access, as it has done in the case of the privative clauses relating to the labour relations boards themselves. Where the legislature resolves to narrow the forum and the remedies otherwise available to the parties, the interpretive rules applied by the court should require the legislature to express its intent clearly. Where the legislature does not do so, the duty remains in the court to respond to a proper request to enjoin an activity such as a strike or lockout which offends the statute and the collective agreement, in short the entire system of labour relations as established by the legislature.

(Citation omitted)

[50] Ms. Goldy submits that St. Anne's was considered and interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Weber, where McLachlin J. (as she then was) observed [at para. 41]:

Estey J. concluded [in St. Anne's] at p. 721 that subject to a residual discretionary power in courts of inherent jurisdiction over matters such as injunctions, concurrent proceedings were not available [in labour disputes].

Ms. Goldy submits that this interpretation suggests that the Superior Court of Justice enjoys an assumed or constant and concurrent jurisdiction in relation to injunctive remedies, unless the legislature takes that power away by express act.

[51] In Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board, 2005 SCC 16, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the residual discretion of the Quebec Superior Court to order an injunction in a case where parents sought access for their children to public instruction in English in Quebec, and attempted to bypass the administrative appeal process before the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec ("ATQ") as set out in the Charter of the French Language, C.Q.L.R. c. C-11. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the lower court that the ATQ had exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals in respect of entitlement to minority language education. The appellants argued that even if the ATQ has jurisdiction over the subject matter at hand, it lacks the ability to provide the remedies sought, including injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that only the Superior Court or a judge thereof may issue an injunction, although it noted that the ATQ had been given broad remedial power to ensure that justice is done. The Supreme Court of Canada considered in this context the availability of injunctive relief in urgent situations, at paras. 51-53:

The legislature's intention to confer exclusive jurisdiction over the matter in issue on the ATQ should be respected to the greatest extent possible. However, the fact remains that an injunction is defined in art. 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure as "an order of the Superior Court or of a judge thereof". Thus, the Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant an injunction, in the strict sense of the word.

That said, an injunction is a discretionary remedy that courts have on many occasions declined to grant where other avenues of recourse were available (see D. Ferland and B. Emery, Précis de procédure civile du Québec (4th ed. 2003), vol. 2, at p. 435). We have accordingly been at pains in this judgment to emphasize the exclusive jurisdiction and broad remedial powers accorded to the ATQ. As a result, the Superior Court should exercise sparingly its discretion to award injunctive relief in minority language education claims. Such injunctive relief should be granted only to fill in the cracks in the administrative process, so to speak. In this way, injunctive relief can complement the administrative process rather than serving to weaken it.

As a result, recourse to urgent injunctive relief remains possible in certain circumstances, but it should remain the rare exception, rather than the rule. Seeking injunctive relief should not be allowed to develop into a means of bypassing the judicial process, or as P.-A. Gendreau et al. note in L'injonction (1998), at p. 201: [TRANSLATION] ". . . neither the injunction nor any other procedure may be used to short-circuit an administrative tribunal's exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction or to obtain a review of its decision . . ."

[52] In my view, the case before me differs from Okwuobi in a material respect. In Okwuobi, the statute conferred general remedial jurisdiction to the tribunal to ensure justice is done, but the tribunal was not granted specific authority to grant relief in the nature of an injunction. In s. 12(2) of the Act, however, the CRTC is given statutory authority to, by order, require any person to do, without delay or within or at any time and in any manner specified by the CRTC, any act or thing that the person is or may be required to do under a regulation made or issued by the CRTC and the CRTC may, by order, forbid the doing or continuing of any such act or thing. A CRTC order can be readily made an order of a provincial superior court by simply filing a certified copy with the registrar of the court. There would be no need, except in a truly dire emergency, for a court to be required to "fill in the cracks" in an application for interpretation and enforcement of s. 8 of the Television Broadcasting Regulations or s. 6 of the Discretionary Services Regulations because, having regard to s. 12(2) of the Act, there are virtually no cracks to be filled from the perspective of the available remedies.

[53] The analytical approach taken by the courts to determination of whether the jurisdiction conferred on a statutory tribunal is concurrent, overlapping, or exclusive accepts that even where a tribunal is found to have exclusive jurisdiction, such as the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to settle differences arising from a collective agreement, it might occur that a remedy is required which the arbitral tribunal is not empowered to grant. As McLachlin J. wrote in Weber, at para. 57, "[i]n such a case, the courts of inherent jurisdiction in each province may take jurisdiction". The statement made by McLachlin J. in Weber, quoting Estey J. in St Anne's, that "[w]hat must be avoided . . . is a 'real deprivation of ultimate remedy'" must be read and understood in the context in which the statement was made, in which McLachlin J. was addressing the specific circumstance where a remedy is required which the arbitrator is not empowered to grant. In this regard, see, also, Allarco, at para. 26.

[54] Ms. Goldy submits that the Superior Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the application for the mandatory injunction that she seeks. I do not regard the distinction between a mandatory injunction as an equitable remedy and the statutory remedy that the CRTC has jurisdiction to grant under s. 12(2) of the Act which, upon being made an order of the Superior Court, would have the same legal effect as a mandatory injunction, to be significant.

[55] For these reasons, I do not agree with Ms. Goldy that St. Anne's, Weber and Okwuobi are authority for the proposition that the existence of residual jurisdiction conferred upon a superior court of justice to grant injunctive relief, such as the jurisdiction described in Okwuobi, means that a statutory tribunal cannot hold exclusive jurisdiction in a given area and that the Superior Court and the CRTC must, therefore, hold jurisdiction concurrently.

[56] Ms. Goldy also relies upon Chaudhary v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700 in support of her submission that the CRTC lacks jurisdiction in this area. This case involved appeals by four immigration detainees from a decision denying jurisdiction to determine a challenge to their detentions by way of habeas corpus. The appellants' continued detention was confirmed through a series of 30-day reviews and a review decision was subject to judicial review in the Federal Court pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. The Court of Appeal in Chaudhary relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 in which the court had considered five factors that militate in favour of concurrent jurisdiction by the Superior Court with the Federal Court. Rouleau J.A. acknowledged that the Federal Court has greater expertise in immigration matters than the superior courts and that in such matters, a superior court should defer to the Federal Court. However, he considered that the issues raised by the appellants are fundamentally detention decisions and that the issues do not require the court to have expertise in immigration law. The appellants were allowed to exercise their Charter right to access habeas corpus.

[57] The five factors that were addressed in Chaudhary were (i) the choice of remedies and forums, (ii) the expertise [of] provincial superior courts, (iii) the timeliness of the remedy, (iv) local access to the remedy and (v) the nature of the remedy and the burden of proof. Ms. Goldy submits that some of these factors apply in this case and support a finding that the Superior Court of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction with the CRTC to hear this application.

[58] I disagree that the decision in Chaudhary affects the determination of whether the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction in the area with which the dispute is concerned. The factors were considered only in relation to their relevance to the issue before the Court of Appeal, that is, whether the appellants were entitled to exercise a right to habeas corpus from the Superior Court. The subject matter of the case and the statutory framework are entirely different from those in relation to the issue of jurisdiction that is before me.

[59] Bell submits that the area with which this dispute is concerned involves the interpretation and enforcement by the CRTC of its own regulations and that it has long been the law of Ontario that this area is one of exclusive jurisdiction of the CRTC.

[60] Bell relies upon the decision of Sharpe J. (as he then was) in Mahar v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd. and other cases that have followed this decision.

[61] In Mahar, the applicant brought an application pursuant to rule 14.05(3)(d) seeking a declaration that the respondent had reached the Cable Television Regulations, 1986 by failing to provide notice of certain fee changes. Rogers moved for an order staying the application, contending that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The applicant agreed that the CRTC would have jurisdiction to deal with the matter in its entirety but insisted that the Superior Court of Justice retained concurrent jurisdiction and that it should exercise its jurisdiction.

[62] Sharpe J. held that the regulations under the Act and the interpretation of those regulations are not only a substantive component of the applicant's case, but the focus of the relief that the applicant sought. Sharpe J. considered that to decide the case would require a detailed consideration and interpretation of those regulations and that this exercise would require consideration of how those regulations operate in the overall framework of the scheme established by the Act and by the regulations as that scheme is administered by the CRTC.

[63] Sharpe J. considered the statutory and regulatory framework in the context of the nature of the claim and the relief sought. In his analysis, Sharpe J. referred to s. 3(2) of the Act which he regarded as central to the issue of jurisdiction. Section 3(2) provides:

3(2) It is further declared that the Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy set out in subsection (1) can best be achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent public authority.

[64] Sharpe J. considered s. 3(2) in the context of other provisions of the Act, including s. 5 which contains a statutory direction to the CRTC that it "shall regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system". This direction is made subject only to Parliament (through the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2) and to any directions issued by the Governor in Council under the Act. There is no suggestion in s. 5 that provincial superior courts are to play any role in the regulation of the Canadian broadcasting system.

[65] With respect to s. 3(2), Sharpe J. held [at para. 22]:

In my view, that section establishes, in effect, a principal of exclusivity. It clearly states Parliament's determination that the policies of the Act will best be achieved if a single independent public authority, namely, the C.R.T.C., is established to deal with all matters relating to those policies. The C.R.T.C. is a specialized body with particular expertise in the area. In my view, if this court were to assume jurisdiction, it would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of s. 3(2). The statutory mandate of the C.R.T.C. is fortified by the case-law which has consistently given a broad and generous interpretation to its powers and authority.

[66] Sharpe J. also held [at para. 25] that there should be a strong element of curial deference to decisions of the CRTC and that "where Parliament has created a statutory regime which includes both rights and a procedure for their resolution, there is at the very least a strong reluctance to permit jurisdiction to be divided between the specialized agency or tribunal in the courts or to permit overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction". Sharpe J. held that to decide the applicant's case would require him to consider the regulations upon which the applicant relied and interpret them having regard to their purposes and objectives and with a proper understanding of the underlying policies behind the regulations and in light of the overall regulatory context. Sharpe J. concluded, at para. 35:

In my view, the task of deciding this case has been specifically assigned by Parliament to the C.R.T.C. The principle established by the case-law, in particular the Shaw case, supra, of the deference due to the decisions of the C.R.T.C. on legal matters within its jurisdiction seems to me significant. It is true that this is not a case where review is sought of the decision of the C.R.T.C. nor is it a collateral attack on such a decision. In some ways, however, the case at bar presents a more serious challenge to the integrity of the regime established by Parliament. If the applicant's submissions were accepted and this court were to decide the case, there would, in effect, be an alternate forum for the determination of an important aspect of the relationship between suppliers of cable services and subscribers. A superior court would be deciding that issue without the benefit of the opinion of the C.R.T.C. Because this is but one of ten provincial superior courts the spectre of various approaches from various provincial courts is raised. Assumption of jurisdiction by this court would not only evade the C.R.T.C., it would also remove the case from the authority of the Federal Court of Appeal which is mandated to review the C.R.T.C. The net result would be to disrupt the scheme envisaged by Parliament for the interpretation of the regulations, a scheme which includes scrutiny by a court exercising jurisdiction akin to that of a superior court.

[67] As was observed by Sharpe J. in Mahar, assumption of jurisdiction by a provincial superior court in a given case would remove the case from the authority of the Federal Court of Appeal to which the statutory mandate to review decisions of the CRTC was assigned. Sharpe J. noted that the result would be to "disrupt the scheme envisaged by Parliament for the interpretation of regulations" made under the authority of the Act, "a scheme which includes scrutiny by a court exercising jurisdiction akin to that of a superior court". I agree with these observations, which also support the conclusion that the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction in the area of interpretation and enforcement of regulations made under the Act.

[68] The decision of Sharpe J. in Mahar has been followed by judges of the Superior Court of Ontario as well as by judges of the superior courts of other provinces: Allarco Entertainment 2008 Inc. v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 7666 (S.C.J.), supra; B & W Entertainment Inc. v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004 CarswellOnt 4515 (S.C.J.); LaRoque c. Société Radio-Canada; MTS Allstream Inc. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2009 ABCA 372; Shaw Cablesystems (SMB) Ltd. v. MTS Communications Inc., 2006 MBCA 29; and Penney v. Bell Canada, 2010 ONSC 2801.

[69] In addition to granting broad jurisdiction to the CRTC to regulate and supervise all aspects of Canadian broadcast policy, Parliament directed that the jurisdiction of the CRTC to do so must be exercised in accordance with the numerous broadcasting policy objectives set out in s. 3(1) of the Act. The Federal Court of Appeal has described the adjudication process by which the CRTC must have regard to these "sometimes conflicting" policy objectives in implementing broadcasting policy as "polycentric", involving numerous participants with opposing interests: Société Radio-Canada v. Métromédia Cmr Montréal Inc., at para. 5. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that a specialized tribunal such as the CRTC is entitled to curial deference where it acts within its area of expertise and jurisdiction: British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd., at para. 30.

[70] Ms. Goldy submits that the principle that curial deference that may be owed to decisions of the CRTC need not be considered on this application because there has been no decision made by the CRTC to which deference should be afforded. I disagree that this principle is not a factor to be considered in determining whether a tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in an area, even where no CRTC decision was made. The reason that deference is afforded is precisely because of the specialized expertise of the tribunal. In my view, Parliament must be taken to have intended that a dispute with an essential character that falls within an area of specialized expertise of a statutory tribunal to which curial deference is afforded should be taken to the tribunal, to be adjudicated according to the regime provided for by statute, and not to a court.

[71] It is clear that the area with which the dispute between Ms. Goldy and Bell on this application involves the interpretation and enforcement of s. 8 of the Television Broadcasting Regulations and s. 6(1) of the Discretionary Services Regulations. I agree with the conclusion of Sharpe J. in Mahar [at para. 22] that s. 3(2) of the Act, particularly when read together with s. 5 of the Act, establishes a "principle of exclusivity" by which Parliament expressed that the policies of the Act will best be achieved if a single independent public authority, the CRTC, is established to deal with all matters relating to those policies and that if this court were to assume jurisdiction in this area, it would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of s. 3(2). The conclusion reached by Sharpe J. in Mahar applies directly to this case, and I rely upon this decision to answer the first question with respect to the jurisdictional issue before me.

[72] For these reasons, I conclude that the area with which the dispute between Ms. Goldy and Bell on this application is concerned is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CRTC.

(b) If the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction in an area with which the dispute is concerned, is the essential character of the dispute within the area of exclusive jurisdiction?

[73] Ms. Goldy submits that the decision of Sharpe J. in Mahar is distinguishable because the applicant in Mahar conceded that the CRTC would have jurisdiction to deal with the matter in its entirety, including the element of the claim which was based on the regulations and the element of the claim which was based on the alleged "background law" or common law right to notice, whereas no such concession is made in on this application.

[74] I disagree that this is a material distinction. The significance of the concession made by the applicant in Mahar was that the CRTC would have the jurisdiction to deal with this matter in its entirety. In this case, Ms. Goldy accepts that the CRTC has jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy, the alternative ground upon which Ms. Goldy seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition, Ms. Goldy accepts that the CRTC has jurisdiction, she says concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court of Justice, to interpret the regulations at issue and make declaratory and mandatory orders. That the remedies that Ms. Goldy seeks arise from her contractual dealings with Bell does not alter the fact that the CRTC has jurisdiction to deal with Ms. Goldy's application in its entirety. This is not simply a private contractual dispute between Ms. Goldy and Bell. Ms. Goldy acknowledges that her relationship with Bell flows through the contract by virtue of the CRTC regulations and the Charter. I disagree with Ms. Goldy's submission that this dispute would not involve a detailed consideration of the regulations that are relevant to this dispute. In order to decide Ms. Goldy's claims in contract, the adjudicator would have to interpret and apply the CRTC regulations, including through consideration of what is "equitable" in these circumstances, having regard to the many policy objectives in s. 3(1) of the Act.

[75] Ms. Goldy submits that the issues which Sharpe J. in Mahar held were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CRTC are properly characterized as "routine regulatory matters", whereas to determine this application on its merits will require the regulations to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Charter and common law rights and values such as freedom of expression, democratic rights and freedoms, electoral procedures, principles of equity and the specific equities at play during an electoral period. Ms. Goldy submits that these principles are squarely within the competence of the Superior Court of Justice and fall outside the traditional ambit and the regular practice of the CRTC. Ms. Goldy submits that this is effectively another way of saying that the essential character of the dispute between the parties in this case does not fall within the area of the exclusive jurisdiction of the CRTC, as found in Mahar.

[76] I disagree with Ms. Goldy's submissions in this regard. First, administrative tribunals, including the CRTC, must act consistently with the Charter and its values when exercising their statutory functions: Conway, at para. 78. Second, under the Act, the CRTC is required to regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy set out in s. 3(1). Section 3(1) declares as the broadcasting policy for Canada numerous broad objectives including, for example, that the Canadian broadcasting system should "serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada", "encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity", "serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society", and "be readily adaptable to scientific and technological change".

[77] The CRTC, as the regulator that made the regulations that are at issue on this application, and as the single independent public authority mandated by the Act to regulate and supervise the Canadian broadcasting system, has the experience and expertise that allows it to understand the social, economic, cultural and political ramifications of its decisions and to implement broadcasting policy based upon this experience and expertise.

[78] I take note of the fact that the CRTC issued a public notice (CRTC 1988-142) on September 2, 1988 in which it made reference to the fact that it had sought public comment on election campaign broadcasting through a public notice which posed questions on specific aspects of election campaign broadcasting; questions related to equitable time allocations, treatment of various types of elections, coverage, on-air personalities as candidates and the responsibilities of rebroadcasting stations. According to this public notice, some 29 organizations and individuals submitted comments. In this public notice, the CRTC addressed the underlying rationale for the policy that was adopted with respect to election campaign broadcasting and made the following statements:

It is the broadcaster's duty to ensure that the public has adequate knowledge of the issues surrounding an election and the position of the parties and candidates. The broadcaster does not enjoy the position of a benevolent censor is able to give the public only what it "should" know. Nor is it the broadcaster's role to decide in advance which candidates are "worthy" of a broadcast time.

From this right on the part of the public to have adequate knowledge to fulfil its obligations as an informed electorate, flows the obligation on the part of the broadcaster to provide equitable -- fair and just -- treatment of issues, candidates and parties. It should be noted that "equitable" does not necessarily mean "equal". But, generally, all candidates and parties are entitled to some coverage that will give them the opportunity to expose their ideas to the public.

The Commission acknowledges that each licensee's situation is unique. The Commission has no firm rules to cover all aspects of election campaign broadcasting; to some extent it will have to deal with situations on a case-by-case basis.

[79] This public notice is a statement only and has no force as a legislative Act. Nevertheless, this public notice reveals that the CRTC has gathered information in relation to policy considerations with respect to election advertising as part of its continuing regulatory role, and that it regards itself as the regulatory entity which is called upon to address situations in which these policy considerations arise. This shows that the CRTC's specialized expertise is not limited to the setting of rates or other "routine" matters. Ms. Goldy submits that this application raises issues of electoral policy, democratic rights, the freedom of expression of candidates and the freedom of conscience of voters. Even so, this does not lead me to conclude that the essential character of the dispute falls outside the area of the CRTC's exclusive jurisdiction. These are matters that the CRTC is well placed to address as part of its regulatory functions.

[80] For these reasons, I conclude that the essential character of the dispute raised by Ms. Goldy's application is within the area of the CRTC's exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of its regulations under the Act.

(c) If the essential character of the dispute is within an area of the CRTC's exclusive jurisdiction, is the remedy required one which the CRTC has the authority to grant?

[81] The remedies that Ms. Goldy seeks are a declaration requiring Bell to allocate time for the broadcasting of her partisan political advertisements relating to her candidacy in the 2018 Toronto municipal election and a mandatory order requiring Bell to do so. These are remedies that the CRTC has the authority to grant.

[82] Ms. Goldy concedes that the CRTC can make a mandatory order, which has much of the same character and effect as a mandatory injunction through the combined operation of ss. 12(2) and 13(1) of the Act.

(d) If the dispute falls within an area of concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction, should the court exercise its discretion to hear the matter notwithstanding the CRTC's jurisdiction?

[83] I have concluded that the CRTC and this court have concurrent jurisdiction over Ms. Goldy's alternative claim for relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter. I have concluded that the CRTC has exclusive jurisdiction in the area of Ms. Goldy's primary claim that involves the interpretation and enforcement of its regulations. The CRTC must act consistently with the Charter in discharging its statutory functions under the Act. The Charter issues are not unrelated to the other issues raised on this application.

[84] I decline to exercise my discretion to carve out the Charter issues and have them heard separately by the Superior Court of Justice. The entire application should be heard by the same tribunal, the CRTC.

Access to justice and urgency

[85] Ms. Goldy places considerable reliance on her submission that a finding that the Superior Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over the claims made in this application would effectively deprive her of access to justice in an important case that raises fundamental questions concerning freedom of expression about political issues that lie at the very core of what we wish to protect in a free and democratic society.

[86] I do not question that the application raises important issues for Ms. Goldy's electoral campaign as a candidate for mayor of Canada's largest city, and for candidates, broadcasters and others in future elections, involving the ability of candidates to meaningfully participate in the electoral process and the ability of all voters to be reasonably informed of all possible choices before them. The importance of the issues does not, however, determine the jurisdictional issue that is before me.

[87] Ms. Goldie submits that in the circumstances of this case, she acted reasonably and promptly, and that the CRTC was not able to hear her application because it does not have an emergency procedure for broadcasting matters provided for by statute or regulation and that this is by design, not oversight. She submits that, as a result, she would not have been able to obtain access to justice through an application for relief to the CRTC.

[88] Ms. Goldy provided evidence of the relevant time line for the commencement of this application. I do not question that Ms. Goldy acted promptly upon being notified that CP24 would not run her advertisements. Despite diligent efforts, she was not able to consult with counsel until October 3 and she was not able to retain her counsel until October 5. This application was commenced on the next business day, October 9. This preliminary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction was held yesterday afternoon on October 15, 2018, six days later.

[89] Ms. Goldy provided evidence that on October 11, 2018 her counsel called the CRTC to inquire with respect to the procedures at the CRTC for making a complaint. Counsel first spoke to the agent at the CRTC helpdesk and later with another individual at the Office of the Secretary General of the CRTC. Ms. Goldy's counsel was contacted by the general counsel for the CRTC in regard to her inquiries. The general counsel advised that the CRTC rule for making a complaint on an emergency basis in respect of telecommunications matters did not apply to broadcasting issues, and Ms. Goldy's counsel was advised that an application in writing was required. Ms. Goldy's counsel inquired as to whether if she completed the filing that day, the matter could be heard that week, and the general counsel for the CRTC advised that she did not have access to that information. The CRTC's general counsel advised that, notwithstanding the circumstances of Ms. Goldy and the impending election date, proceeding with the complaint before the CRTC to achieve a remedy prior to the election was "extremely, extremely ambitious".

[90] Undoubtedly, given that the election will be held on Monday, October 22, 2018, for Ms. Goldy and Bell to obtain a fair and just adjudication of the issues raised in the application, whether before the CRTC or the Superior Court of Justice, would be extremely challenging.

[91] At the hearing, Bell provided copies of three CRTC decisions that had been issued within very short times, nine days, eight days and seven days, following the filing of a written application. The CRTC has broad authority under s. 5(2) of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure, SOR/210-277 ("CRTC Rules of Practice and Procedure") to provide for "any matter of practice and procedure not provided for in these rules". On the evidence before me, I am not able to find that because of the absence of a specific emergency procedure for broadcasting matters in the CRTC Rules of Practice and Procedure, the CRTC is unable to accommodate urgent applications in relation to broadcasting issues.

[92] I am also unable to find that successfully completing an adjudication of these issues could not have been done through an an application to the CRTC, had one been made on October 5 or even on Tuesday of the following week. Indeed, when asked on October 11, the CRTC's general counsel did not say that the CRTC would be unable to hear and decide an application in time for Ms. Goldy's ads to run before the election; only that, as was evident, to do so would be very, very ambitious. Having been so informed, and with a hearing on a threshold jurisdictional issue scheduled for October 15, Ms. Goldy took no steps to make an application to the CRTC.

[93] In these circumstances, I do not agree that this application should be treated in the same way as, for example, emergency applications involving custody of children where courts have invoked their inherent parens patriae jurisdiction or applications for writs of habeas corpus in immigration matters. The issues raised by this application, which would have been raised on an application to the CRTC, affect Ms. Goldy and Bell most directly, but they also have significant public importance. For the same reasons as were given by Sharpe J. in Mahar, these issues should be heard and decided by the tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over this area, the CRTC.

[94] I do not hold that the Superior Court of Justice would not have residual jurisdiction to grant an injunction in rare circumstances such as those that involve a truly dire emergency, even where a statutory tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the injunction. I decline to exercise such jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case.

[95] Bell submits that there is no prejudice to Ms. Goldy, because there are numerous other television stations in Toronto on which she can place her advertisements, and that there are other means of publicizing her candidacy and getting her message out through, for example, online communications or radio ads. Ms. Goldy responds that she has a statutory right to advertise with the licensee of her choice, and that she had valid reasons for choosing CP24 to run her ads.

[96] I accept that Ms. Goldy may have valid reasons for preferring CP24 as the media outlet for her ads, but I consider the absence of evidence of her attempts to place ads with other less preferable television stations or other media outlets to be a factor that affects my discretion concerning the exercise of residual jurisdiction in rare and exceptional circumstances. I also consider as a factor in the exercise of my discretion the evidence that Ms. Goldy made no application to the CRTC upon or after counsel having being retained. I also consider that Ms. Goldy is polling at approximately 6 per cent according to the submissions of her counsel and that the outcome of this application will not have any realistic impact on the outcome of the election.

Disposition

[97] For the foregoing reasons, this application is dismissed.

[98] Counsel for Ms. Goldy made written submissions as to costs in his memorandum of oral argument. If Bell, after reviewing these submissions, seeks costs, it may make written submissions within ten days. Ms. Goldy may make written responding submissions within ten days thereafter. If so advised, Bell may make brief reply submissions within five days thereafter.

Application dismissed.

Notes

1. "48(1) Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding settlement by arbitration, without stoppage of work, of all differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable." (Emphasis added)