Jonathan G. Penner

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging provincial approval of a ski resort project in Qat’muk on freedom of religion and section 35 consultation grounds.

The majority held section 2(a) protects freedom to hold and manifest beliefs, not protection of the spiritual object itself, and found no Charter infringement.

It further held the Minister reasonably concluded deep consultation and accommodation had occurred over many years, and that section 35 guarantees a process rather than a veto over development outcomes.

The appellants sought to file French-language exhibits attached to affidavits in constitutional litigation concerning minority-language education rights.

The majority held that British Columbia law required civil court proceedings, including exhibits relied on for their content, to be in English unless impracticable, and that this framework displaced residual inherent jurisdiction to admit untranslated French documents.

The Court further held that the 1731 English statute was received into provincial law and had not been displaced for this issue.

The dissent would have recognized continued inherent jurisdiction absent clear legislative ouster and remitted the matter for discretionary determination.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the appellants.

The respondent, a lawyer representing low-income clients, challenged the constitutionality of British Columbia's 7 percent tax on legal services, arguing it infringed a fundamental constitutional right to access to justice.

The chambers judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, finding a general constitutional right to legal services in proceedings determining rights and obligations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the province's appeal, holding that while the rule of law is a foundational constitutional principle, it does not encompass a general constitutional right to counsel in all court and tribunal proceedings.

The Court noted that the Charter specifically provides for the right to counsel only upon arrest or detention, and the historical understanding of the rule of law does not support a broad general right to legal representation.