Peter R. Grant

The Attorney General of Canada brought a Request for Directions to appoint an Independent Special Advisor to review certain Independent Assessment Process claims by former students of St. Anne's Indian Residential School.

The review was prompted by concerns that some claims were resolved before additional document disclosure was made available.

The court agreed that an independent review was necessary but modified Canada's proposed process to ensure claimants' interests were represented by an amicus and to remove arbitrary restrictions on the review.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging provincial approval of a ski resort project in Qat’muk on freedom of religion and section 35 consultation grounds.

The majority held section 2(a) protects freedom to hold and manifest beliefs, not protection of the spiritual object itself, and found no Charter infringement.

It further held the Minister reasonably concluded deep consultation and accommodation had occurred over many years, and that section 35 guarantees a process rather than a veto over development outcomes.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

Following earlier decisions concerning requests for directions in litigation arising from the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, the court had previously awarded costs payable by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Independent Counsel.

After that decision was released, Canada delivered additional submissions asserting it should not be liable for costs, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission asserted a right to file further reply submissions.

The court held that the additional submissions were unnecessary and procedurally improper because the parties had already been given the opportunity to address costs.

The judge confirmed that the earlier costs decision would not be altered and refused to permit further reply submissions.

Following earlier reasons concerning Requests for Direction under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement regarding the treatment of Independent Assessment Process documents, the court addressed costs.

Independent counsel who represented the interests of claimants sought full or substantial indemnity costs against the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The court held that although the commission’s request for directions was reasonable and undertaken pursuant to its mandate, independent counsel had effectively acted as amicus curiae and provided helpful submissions on behalf of claimants.

Considering the partial success of the parties and the reasonableness of the amounts claimed, the court exercised its discretion to award reduced partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, a former student at an Indian residential school operated by the Government of Canada and the United Church of Canada, sought damages for sexual abuse suffered at the school.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both Canada and the Church were jointly vicariously liable for the sexual assaults committed by a dormitory supervisor, rejecting the application of a doctrine of charitable immunity for the Church.

The Court also found that the Indian Act did not impose a non-delegable statutory duty on Canada to ensure student safety.

The trial judge's unequal apportionment of fault (75% to Canada, 25% to the Church) and assessment of damages, which excluded prior trauma and statute-barred wrongs, were upheld.

The appellant, a Wet'suwet'en Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

He argued that the licensing scheme infringed his aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that a band by-law applied to the river.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the river was not part of the reserve, so the band by-law did not apply.

While the mere requirement of a licence did not infringe the appellant's aboriginal rights, the mandatory conditions attached to the licence did constitute a prima facie infringement that the government failed to justify.

Because the unconstitutional conditions were integral to the licence and not severable, the licence itself was invalid.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant's acquittal was restored.