Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant companies were defrauded by their bookkeeper, who issued 155 fraudulent cheques payable to third parties and deposited them into her own accounts at the respondent bank.

The bank accepted many of the cheques without endorsement, and the bookkeeper forged endorsements on the rest.

The appellants sued the bank for conversion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was strictly liable for conversion.

The cheques were not payable to fictitious persons under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act because the intention of the corporate drawer, not the fraudulent employee, governed.

Furthermore, the bank could not rely on s. 165(3) to claim the rights of a holder in due course, as that section only protects a bank when a cheque is deposited to the credit of the legitimate payee or endorsee.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision finding it liable for negligence in failing to enforce a building by-law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the municipality owed no duty of care to the respondent in the circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal's judgment was reversed and the trial judgment dismissing the action was restored.

The appellant applied for an order pursuant to s. 70 of the Supreme Court Act to reverse a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Manitoba that upheld his sentence for manslaughter.

The original sentence included life imprisonment with a minimum ten-year period of incarceration before parole eligibility under s. 741.2 of the Criminal Code.

Upon reading the materials and noting the respondent's consent, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and varied the sentence by deleting the ten-year minimum incarceration requirement.

The appellant employer provided an income replacement insurance policy that terminated benefits for mentally disabled employees after two years unless they were institutionalized, while physically disabled employees received benefits until age 65 regardless of institutionalization.

The respondent, who became mentally disabled, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurance plan discriminated on the basis of mental disability contrary to s. 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, as the true purpose of the plan was to insure against the income-related consequences of disability generally, making the distinction between mental and physical disabilities discriminatory.

The respondents were issued speeding tickets under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act.

They failed to pay the fines and did not appear in court, resulting in convictions without a trial pursuant to s. 16 of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 16, arguing it infringed their right to be presumed innocent and to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 16 does not infringe s. 11(d), as the regulatory scheme provides sufficient safeguards and notice such that an accused's failure to act constitutes a valid waiver of their s. 11(d) rights.

The appellant broadcaster challenged an order made by a trial judge under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code excluding the public and media from part of the sentencing proceedings of an accused who pleaded guilty to sexual offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 486(1) infringes the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect the proper administration of justice.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion to exclude the public in this specific case, as there was insufficient evidence to support a concern for undue hardship to the victims or the accused.

The appeal was allowed and the exclusion order was quashed.

The appellant suffered back injuries in two successive motor vehicle accidents.

While recovering, he experienced a disc herniation during a mild stretching exercise.

The trial judge found the accidents contributed 25% to the herniation and awarded 25% of the global damages, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that apportionment between tortious and non-tortious causes is contrary to tort principles.

Because the accidents materially contributed to the indivisible injury, the defendants were fully liable for the entire loss under the thin skull rule.

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and being disguised with intent to commit an indictable offence, challenging the eyewitness identification.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal that the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that late Crown disclosure prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and that the trial judge erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement for its substantive use under a K.G.B. application.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the late disclosure.

The Court also held that a witness's failure of memory, which prevents complete cross-examination, is a factor going to the weight of the prior inconsistent statement rather than its admissibility.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of welfare fraud after selling real property without informing social assistance authorities.

The trial judge found her conduct did not create a risk of deprivation exceeding $1,000 and that she honestly believed her circumstances had not changed to affect her entitlement, negating mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding the trial judge made no error of law.

A class action was brought on behalf of hospital patients after illegal strikes by unionized employees disrupted care and services at a psychiatric institution.

The Court held that Quebec class action procedure does not alter the ordinary civil rules of evidence, and that prejudice may be proved by sufficiently serious, precise and concordant presumptions of fact.

It further held that moral prejudice in Quebec civil law is compensable on an objective basis and is not conditional on the victim’s subjective ability to enjoy monetary solace, although functional considerations remain relevant to quantification.

The Court concluded that the temporary discomfort suffered by the patients did not amount to an interference with inviolability under s. 1 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, but did interfere with dignity under s. 4.

Exemplary damages were properly awarded under s. 49 because the interference was unlawful and intentional.

The appellant challenged a securities disciplinary process on the basis that the appointment of the hearing panel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the tribunal's practice was only one of many factors in assessing whether the necessary degree of independence existed.

In the self-regulatory context, the circumstances were materially different from the authority relied on by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

During deliberations, the jury announced an impasse.

The trial judge exhorted the jury to reach a verdict, referencing the public expense of a new trial, the inconvenience to participants, and suggesting the minority reconsider the majority's views.

The jury returned a guilty verdict 15 minutes later.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the exhortation introduced irrelevant, coercive factors that interfered with the jury's right to deliberate freely.

The respondent was imprisoned for failing to pay fines under the Quebec Highway Safety Code.

He sought authorization to bring a class action against the government for damages, alleging the sentencing provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court denied authorization, finding no serious colour of right, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter generally cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Superior Court judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny authorization.

The appellant's 19-year-old son was fatally shot by a police officer while fleeing arrest.

The appellant brought a civil liability action against the officer and his employer, claiming compensatory and exemplary damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solatium doloris (grief and distress) is a compensable head of moral prejudice in Quebec civil law, and referred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to assess the quantum.

However, the Court dismissed the claims for interference with parental rights and for the victim's loss of life expectancy, ruling that the right to life is extinguished upon death and cannot be transmitted to heirs.

The Court also denied exemplary damages, finding that the officer's negligent conduct did not amount to 'intentional interference' under the Quebec Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm after a motor vehicle accident.

At the hospital, a police officer demanded a blood sample but failed to provide the medical assurances required under s. 254(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the blood evidence, finding the accused did not consent, and acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the demand was deficient and violated the Charter, consent is not an essential element under s. 254(3), and the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) must be determined at a new trial.

The appellants, members of the Algonquin people, were convicted of entering a controlled harvest zone without paying a motor vehicle access fee, and one appellant was convicted of fishing without a licence.

They argued they were exercising an aboriginal right to fish.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title and that the failure of the French colonial regime to legally recognize such rights did not extinguish them.

The Court found the appellants had an aboriginal right to fish for food in the zone.

The federal fishing licence requirement was found to be an unjustified infringement of this right, but the provincial motor vehicle access fee was held to be a valid user fee that did not infringe the right.

The appellant, a Mohawk, was charged with fishing without a licence in Lake St. Francis, contrary to the Quebec Fishery Regulations.

He argued that he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish for food protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title, and that the appellant had demonstrated an aboriginal right to fish for food in the area.

The Court found that this right had not been extinguished, and that the regulatory scheme, which subjected the right to unstructured ministerial discretion, constituted an unjustified infringement.

The appellant, a non-accused target of authorized electronic surveillance, sought access to the sealed wiretap packet and related recordings in order to pursue a civil claim for unlawful interception and Charter damages.

The Court held that a non-accused target may bring an application under s. 187(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code before commencing a civil action, but is not automatically entitled to disclosure.

For non-accused applicants, the statutory discretion remains governed by confidentiality concerns and will normally require some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully, such as fraud or wilful non-disclosure.

The motion judge erred by rejecting the application outright on the basis that the applicant was not an accused.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for reconsideration, while access to recordings was held to be premature at this stage.