Gérard V. La Forest

The accused, a 22-year-old teacher, was charged with sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old student during the summer holidays.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding he was not in a position of trust or authority and had not exploited his position, which the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and entered a conviction, holding that actual exploitation is not a constituent element of the offence.

The Court further held that teachers are inherently in a position of trust and authority towards their students, and absent evidence raising a reasonable doubt, the accused occupied such a position.

The appellant was acquitted of robbery at trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on complicity as an alternative basis for guilt under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on complicity warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by relying on the contents of the complainant's diary as corroboration of her testimony, even though the diary was not introduced into evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's application of the proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge and the Tax Court.

The Court held that the property in question retained its character as inventory in the hands of the appellant company after being acquired from a subsidiary.

This appeal concerned a variation application arising from a custodial parent's proposed relocation of the child to Australia.

The Court held that the party seeking variation must first establish a material change in the circumstances affecting the child, after which the court must conduct a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests without any legal presumption favouring the custodial parent, while giving that parent's views serious respect.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded that the relocation materially affected the child because it would significantly curtail frequent and meaningful contact with the access parent, but the child's best interests still favoured remaining in the custodial parent's care.

The appeal was allowed in part only to vary access so it could be exercised in Canada rather than Australia, with no costs.

The parties divorced in Maryland, with the father granted custody and the mother granted access rights.

The father moved to Quebec with the child while the mother's motions to modify access were pending in Maryland.

The mother obtained an ex parte interim custody order in Maryland and sought the child's return under the Quebec Act implementing the Hague Convention.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act did not apply because the father had custody at the time of removal and no custody modification proceedings were pending.

However, the Court affirmed the order returning the child to the United States, finding that the Quebec Superior Court had jurisdiction under civil law and correctly determined that returning the child was in her best interests.

The employer posted a position for a personal care attendant but rejected a female union member's application because it had determined a male was needed for the intimate personal care of elderly male residents.

The collective agreement contained a no-discrimination clause without a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception, whereas the provincial Human Rights Code included a BFOQ provision.

An arbitration board held that the employer could rely on the BFOQ provision, finding that the parties could not contract out of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while parties can contract out of human rights legislation to provide greater protection, the arbitration board's interpretation that the collective agreement should be read in harmony with the Code's BFOQ provision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and manslaughter.

The appeal concerned whether the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on self-defence and defence of another following a verbal threat made to an inmate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a Wet'suwet'en Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

He argued that the licensing scheme infringed his aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that a band by-law applied to the river.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the river was not part of the reserve, so the band by-law did not apply.

While the mere requirement of a licence did not infringe the appellant's aboriginal rights, the mandatory conditions attached to the licence did constitute a prima facie infringement that the government failed to justify.

Because the unconstitutional conditions were integral to the licence and not severable, the licence itself was invalid.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant's acquittal was restored.

The Minister of National Revenue sought to garnish funds owed to tax debtors who had failed to remit GST and employee source deductions.

The tax debtors had previously granted general assignments of book debts (GABDs) to lending institutions.

The lending institutions argued that the GABDs were absolute assignments, meaning the tax debtors no longer had an interest in the property, and thus the Minister could not garnish the funds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a GABD is a security interest, not an absolute assignment, because the debtor retains an equity of redemption.

Therefore, the clear wording of the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act gives the Minister priority over the lending institutions' security interests.

The appellants, members of the Squamish Indian Band, were charged with contravening the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations for net fishing on the Squamish River adjacent to their reserve.

They argued that a band by-law, passed pursuant to s. 81(1)(o) of the Indian Act, authorized their fishing and superseded the federal regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the fishery was not part of the reserve, the ad medium filum aquae presumption did not apply to navigable rivers to extend the reserve boundary, and the phrase 'on the reserve' in the Indian Act meant strictly within the reserve boundaries.

Consequently, the band by-law did not apply extra-territorially to the river, and the convictions were upheld.

A public school teacher publicly made anti-Semitic statements during his off-duty time.

A Jewish parent filed a human rights complaint alleging the school board discriminated by failing to discipline the teacher, thereby condoning his views and creating a poisoned educational environment.

The human rights board of inquiry found discrimination and ordered the school board to place the teacher on leave, appoint him to a non-teaching position if available, or terminate his employment, and to terminate him immediately if he published anti-Semitic materials in the future.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the school board discriminated and that the order to remove the teacher from his teaching position infringed his freedom of expression and religion but was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

However, the permanent ban on publishing was not minimally impairing and was severed.

Three status Indians under Treaty No. 8 were convicted of hunting offences under the Alberta Wildlife Act after shooting moose on privately owned lands.

They appealed, arguing the Act infringed their treaty right to hunt for food.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA) modified the treaty right, preserving the right to hunt for food on unoccupied Crown lands and other lands to which Indians have a right of access.

The Court found that Indians have a right of access to privately owned lands only if they are not put to a visible use incompatible with hunting.

Two appellants were hunting on visibly used land, so their convictions were upheld.

The third appellant was hunting on unoccupied land, so the licensing requirement constituted a prima facie infringement of his treaty right.

A new trial was ordered to determine if the infringement could be justified under the Sparrow test.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment that dismissed his motion to use a pseudonym in a civil action, seal the record, and impose a publication ban.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the decision of a judge of the Court of Appeal refusing leave, granting leave to appeal on the basis that the judgment at first instance raised questions of public importance and interest.

A stay previously granted remained in effect pending the Court of Appeal's ruling on the merits.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering a new trial after a jury conviction for second-degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing where intoxication, provocation, and self-defence were in issue.

The Court held that the common law Beard/MacAskill rule, which confined consideration of intoxication evidence to cases of incapacity to form specific intent, violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1.

The Court replaced that rule with an approach directing juries to consider intoxication evidence together with all other evidence in deciding whether the Crown proved actual specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applying that framework, the Court found the trial judge’s charge improperly treated intoxication as a threshold incapacity issue and failed to link intoxication to the common-sense inference of intent, so the curative proviso could not save the conviction.

The appellants challenged the exclusion of a woman from membership in a fraternal order under s. 8(a) of the Yukon Human Rights Act, arguing that the order's historical activities and membership practices amounted to services offered to the public.

The majority held that the proper inquiry focused on the service being offered and whether it created a public relationship, and concluded that the collection and recording of historical material were private activities while the public-facing service was only the end product made available without discrimination.

The majority further held that membership in the order, viewed as a spectrum of benefits, did not amount to a public service on the agreed facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, with two dissenting reasons that would have found s. 8(a) engaged.

The Crown appealed a sentence reduction in a case involving prolonged physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of the offender's children.

The Court held that there is no legal ceiling capping fixed-term sentences at 20 years under the Criminal Code, absent special circumstances, and that the totality principle requires only that the global sentence be just and appropriate and proportionate to the offender's overall culpability.

The Court further confirmed that retribution is a legitimate and important sentencing principle, distinct from vengeance and complementary to denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society.

Applying the deferential standard of review for sentence appeals, the Court held the appellate court erred by intervening absent demonstrable unfitness and restored the 25-year cumulative sentence.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from historical abuse allegations at an orphanage, arguing abuse of process and unreasonable verdicts.

The Court upheld the rejection of the abuse of process claim and maintained the conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

However, applying the unreasonable verdict standard under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, the Court held that the indecent assault convictions could not reasonably be supported given blatant falsehoods, material inconsistencies, possible collusion between complainants, and unreliable photographic identification.

The indecent assault convictions were quashed.

The appellant fatally shot his live-in companion during an argument and was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, he claimed the shooting was an accident, but the jury rejected this defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of intoxication vitiating intent, which could have reduced the conviction to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the strict capacity test from Beard no longer governs, the evidence of intoxication in this case was insufficient to permit a reasonable inference that the appellant did not in fact foresee the consequences of his actions.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following a severe beating of the victim.

At trial, the judge found that the appellants had the capacity to form the intent to commit murder despite evidence of their intoxication.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misdirected himself by focusing on the capacity to form intent rather than whether the appellants possessed the actual specific intent to kill, applying the newly established framework from R. v. Robinson.