Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a decision regarding its liability to make contributions to employee pension plans.

At the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant conceded the appeal was moot.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal under the Borowski criteria and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to lift a mandatory publication ban protecting the identity of a sexual assault complainant.

The trial judge had revoked the ban on his own motion after acquitting the accused, citing the complainant's lack of credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the trial judge lacked the authority to revoke the mandatory publication ban without the consent of the Crown or the complainant.

The appeal was allowed and the publication ban was restored.

The plaintiff underwent breast implant surgery and subsequently suffered a rupture of one of the implants.

She sued the manufacturer for negligence and failure to warn of the risk of rupture.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn consumers of dangers inherent in the product's use.

While the manufacturer could discharge this duty by warning the prescribing physician under the 'learned intermediary' rule, the warnings provided to the physician in this case were inadequate.

The Court applied a subjective test for causation, finding that the plaintiff would not have consented to the surgery had she been properly warned, and held the manufacturer liable.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of ex facie contempt of court for violating an injunction prohibiting protest activities.

He argued that under s. 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act, the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction over the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while Parliament can confer jurisdiction over ex facie contempt on youth courts, it cannot do so to the exclusion of provincial superior courts.

The power to punish for contempt is part of the core, inherent jurisdiction of superior courts protected by s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and cannot be removed without a constitutional amendment.

The parties separated and the mother was granted custody of their child, subject to an agreement not to relocate outside Quebec.

The mother subsequently moved to France with the child and refused to return.

The father applied for a change of custody, which was initially dismissed but granted on appeal.

The mother appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the mother's conduct in flaunting court orders and placing herself beyond the reach of the law left the courts with no alternative but to award custody to the father based on the available evidence.

The respondent, charged with indecent assault, sought the production of the complainant's counselling records held by third-party institutions.

The trial judge ordered the records produced.

The third parties appealed the interlocutory order.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act.

On the substantive issue, the Court applied the framework established in the companion case of R. v. O'Connor, balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy and equality rights.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in ordering production without first determining likely relevance and balancing the competing Charter rights.

The appeal was allowed and the order for production was quashed.

The accused appealed after the Court of Appeal set aside a judicial stay entered because of repeated Crown non-disclosure in a sexual offence prosecution.

A majority held that non-disclosure violates s. 7 only where it prejudices the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and that a stay is reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice cannot be otherwise remedied.

The Court also established a landmark framework for obtaining production of private third-party records, requiring the accused to show likely relevance and requiring the court to balance trial fairness against privacy and equality interests.

The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.

The Beaver Band surrendered the mineral rights on its reserve to the Crown in 1940 to lease for its benefit.

In 1945, the Band surrendered the reserve to the Crown to sell or lease.

The Crown subsequently sold the land to the Director of The Veterans' Land Act, inadvertently including the mineral rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown did not breach its fiduciary duty regarding the surrender and sale of the surface rights.

However, the Crown breached its fiduciary duty by transferring the mineral rights and failing to correct the error when it learned of it.

The action was not barred by limitation periods as the running of time was postponed until the Band discovered the facts.

The appellant judge challenged the disciplinary framework governing complaints before the Conseil de la magistrature after the Chief Judge filed a complaint based on her public statements and conduct.

The majority held that the statutory scheme permitting the Chief Judge to initiate a complaint did not breach the constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter or s. 23 of the Quebec Charter, and did not create either institutional bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias on the facts.

The Court characterized the disciplinary process as investigative rather than adversarial and held that the Chief Judge’s administrative and moral authority did not disqualify the Conseil or Comité.

The Court further held it was premature to rule on the freedom of expression challenge to the ethical duty of reserve, but concluded that the rule was not void for vagueness.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order refusing leave to appeal after a provincial court of appeal set aside his conviction on fresh evidence but entered a stay of proceedings for abuse of process rather than an acquittal or new trial.

The majority held that, in exceptional circumstances, the Court may reconsider a leave refusal under Rule 7 despite Rule 51(12).

It further held that a stay order made under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code is ancillary and divisible from the judgment setting aside the conviction, and is therefore appealable by leave under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act notwithstanding s. 40(3).

Leave to appeal was granted.

The appellants, who operated an adult video store, were charged with knowingly selling obscene material without lawful justification or excuse.

The videos had been approved by the Ontario Film Review Board.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mens rea for the offence requires the Crown to prove the retailer knew of the specific acts that make the material obscene in law, not just that it involved the exploitation of sex.

The Court also held that while film board approval does not negate mens rea or provide a lawful justification, it may be relevant to wilful blindness or officially induced error of law.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of sexual assault.

During deliberations, the jury requested further instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.

In his recharge, the trial judge instructed the jury that they must be unanimous in their doubt to give the benefit of that doubt to the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this instruction was a clear error that tainted the earlier instructions on reasonable doubt, creating a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence appeal decision that had reduced a second degree murder offender's parole ineligibility period from 12 years to the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 744 of the Criminal Code, the sentencing judge must consider the offender's character, the nature of the offence, and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and that dangerousness, denunciation, and deterrence may inform but do not replace those statutory criteria.

The Court rejected the proposition that parole ineligibility beyond 10 years requires unusual circumstances and held that appellate review is limited to whether the sentence is unfit or clearly unreasonable.

On the facts, the trial judge committed no error, and the 12-year parole ineligibility period was restored.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

At their first trial, the judge refused to order the disclosure of a police informer's identity.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and directed the Crown to disclose the informer's evidence, name, and whereabouts, and to make him available.

Before the second trial, the Crown produced a hooded man claiming to be the informer but refused to disclose his name or whereabouts.

The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings due to non-disclosure and unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal quashed the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the stay but holding that the Crown had breached the binding disclosure order.

The Court directed that the trial proceed, giving the Crown the option to either fully comply with the disclosure order or apply to vary it based on new evidence regarding the informer's safety.

The appellant was subpoenaed as a Crown witness at a preliminary inquiry but refused to be sworn and was abusive toward the presiding judge.

The judge convicted him of contempt of court instanter, without notice, a show cause hearing, or an opportunity to consult counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, holding that while the judge was justified in initiating summary contempt procedures, there was no urgent and imperative need to forego the usual steps required by natural justice.

The appellant, a commercial fisherman, was charged with overfishing under the Fisheries Act.

At trial, the Crown sought to introduce statutorily required hail reports and fishing logs completed by the appellant.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 7 of the Charter, finding it violated the principle against self-incrimination, and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the principle against self-incrimination does not prevent the Crown from relying on statutorily required records in a regulatory prosecution, as the regulatory context lacks the adversarial and coercive elements present in criminal investigations.

The accused was acquitted at trial of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury, including mischaracterizing evidence, failing to properly instruct on prior inconsistent statements, and improperly leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's errors was significant and that there was no evidentiary foundation to lend an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Brooke J.A. in the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's extensive interventions and the admission of inadmissible opinion evidence rendered the trial unfair.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault at trial but acquitted on appeal by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction for the reasons given by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for sexual touching and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision to order a new trial.