David E. Platts

In a medical negligence appeal, the central issue was whether a trier of fact must draw an adverse inference of causation when physicians’ fault made proof of causation more difficult and the plaintiff adduced some affirmative causation evidence.

The majority held that under Quebec civil law, any such inference is a permissive presumption of fact under art. 2849 C.C.Q., not a mandatory rule, and the burden of proving causation on a balance of probabilities remains with the plaintiff.

The Court further held appellate intervention required deference to factual findings absent palpable and overriding error, and restored the trial judgment that causation was not proven.

The appeal was allowed, with a dissent that would have upheld appellate intervention on factual-error grounds.

The appellant was severely injured in a car accident and treated by the respondent orthopaedic surgeon.

The respondent failed to diagnose a spinal fracture, leading to delayed immobilization, and the appellant was eventually diagnosed with paraparesis.

The trial judge found no fault and no causation.

The Court of Appeal found the respondent committed a fault by failing to conduct proper neurological tests and immobilize the patient, but upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the accident itself, not the medical fault, caused the paraparesis.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's intervention on the standard of care and its factual findings on causation, and declined to apply a presumption of causation.

The appellant judge challenged the disciplinary framework governing complaints before the Conseil de la magistrature after the Chief Judge filed a complaint based on her public statements and conduct.

The majority held that the statutory scheme permitting the Chief Judge to initiate a complaint did not breach the constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter or s. 23 of the Quebec Charter, and did not create either institutional bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias on the facts.

The Court characterized the disciplinary process as investigative rather than adversarial and held that the Chief Judge’s administrative and moral authority did not disqualify the Conseil or Comité.

The Court further held it was premature to rule on the freedom of expression challenge to the ethical duty of reserve, but concluded that the rule was not void for vagueness.