Gérard V. La Forest

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender, and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the court below, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Minister of Justice appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the surrender of a fugitive to a foreign state.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge in the court below.

The Court held that the Minister's surrender decision did not infringe the fugitive's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and restored the Superior Court's decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus.

The United States of America appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal regarding the extradition of the respondent for immigration offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, adopting the dissenting reasons of Hetherington J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the order of committal for extradition.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of inciting hatred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal regarding the trial judge's handling of jury requests.

The Court also reaffirmed its previous ruling that the reverse onus in s. 319(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, while infringing s. 11(d) of the Charter, is justified under s. 1.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Nova Scotia legislature amended the Residential Tenancies Act to create a new dispute resolution mechanism, empowering a provincially appointed Director and Board to investigate, mediate, and adjudicate residential tenancy disputes.

The constitutionality of these unproclaimed provisions was referred to the Court of Appeal, which found the Board's powers ultra vires.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the provisions do not violate s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that at the time of Confederation, superior courts did not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over residential tenancy disputes, as inferior courts shared this jurisdiction.

Therefore, conferring this power on a provincial tribunal is constitutionally permissible.

The bankrupt transferred funds from his non-exempt RRSPs into an exempt RRIF (a life insurance annuity) and designated his wife as beneficiary prior to declaring bankruptcy.

The appellant creditor sought to attach the RRIF, arguing the transfer was a void settlement under s. 91 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the designation of a beneficiary is a settlement that is void against the trustee under s. 91, the RRIF remains exempt from the claims of creditors under s. 67(1)(b) of the Act and provincial insurance legislation.

The two provisions operate at different stages of bankruptcy: s. 91 brings property into the trustee's possession, while s. 67(1)(b) prevents the trustee from dividing exempt property among creditors.

The appellant borrowed $1 million to purchase shares, later transferring them to a holding company in a section 85 rollover transaction for replacement shares with a fair market value of $1,000.

The Minister reassessed the appellant, limiting his interest deduction under section 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act to the interest on $1,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the interest deduction is based on the amount of the original loan, not the value of the replacement property, provided the entire proceeds of disposition are reinvested in an eligible use property.

The appellant accepted an offer of employment but the employer cancelled the contract before the appellant was obliged to provide services.

The parties settled for $400,000.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the damages as a taxable 'retiring allowance'.

The Tax Court of Canada set aside the assessment, finding the damages were not a retiring allowance nor income from employment.

The Federal Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's findings of fact on apportionment and held the damages were taxable as income from employment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court further held that the damages were not a 'retiring allowance' because the appellant had not yet commenced employment, and they were not taxable under the general provision of s. 3(a) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted a motion to adduce fresh evidence and, based on that evidence, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal regarding whether a broker's fee paid by mortgagors constituted interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the broker's fee was not interest and the resulting interest rate was not criminal.

The appellant challenged his conviction for possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking on the basis that drugs were discovered during a warrantless search of his girlfriend's apartment.

The Court held that a claim under s. 8 of the Charter requires the accused to establish a personal reasonable expectation of privacy, assessed on the totality of the circumstances.

On the facts, the appellant was merely an occasional visitor, contributed nothing to household expenses, lacked authority to regulate access, and had denied ownership of the seized drugs in the courts below.

Because no personal privacy interest of the appellant was infringed, he could not invoke s. 24(2) to exclude the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured obtained a life insurance policy that was backdated to September 26, 1980, to secure lower premiums, though the initial premium was paid on November 14, 1980.

The policy contained a two-year suicide exclusion clause.

In early 1981, the coverage was increased from $500,000 to $1,000,000.

The insured committed suicide on October 20, 1982.

The insurer refused to pay, arguing the suicide occurred within the two-year exclusion period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the backdating of the policy meant the insurance contract came into effect retroactively on September 26, 1980, making the suicide fall outside the two-year exclusion period.

The Court also held that the increase in coverage was merely a variation of the existing contract, not a new contract, so no new exclusion period began.

The insurer was ordered to pay the full $1,000,000.

The respondent's statutory release was revoked by the National Parole Board based partly on evidence gathered during a search that may have violated his Charter rights.

The respondent argued the Board should have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the National Parole Board is not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' under s. 24 of the Charter because it lacks jurisdiction over the remedy of excluding evidence.

The Board's structure, function, and statutory mandate require it to consider all relevant information to assess the risk to society, though it remains bound by a duty of fairness to ensure information is reliable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding the inclusion of his German pension benefits in calculating his tax liability under Part I.2 of the Income Tax Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Federal Court of Appeal that the provisions of the Canada-Germany Tax Agreement do not prevent the operation of s. 180.2 of the Income Tax Act.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal regarding a mandatory firearms prohibition order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal for the reasons of Chief Justice McEachern, setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal and restoring the trial judge's imposition of a ten-year firearms prohibition.

The appellants were acquitted at trial on charges of keeping gambling devices and keeping a common gaming house.

The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeals and ordered new trials, finding that the police seizure of gambling devices in business establishments open to the public did not violate the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeals, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a business establishment open to the public.

The police received an anonymous tip about marijuana cultivation at the appellants' home.

After a fruitless perimeter check, officers knocked on the door, smelled marijuana when it was opened, and arrested the appellants.

They secured the premises, obtained a search warrant based partly on the smell, and seized marijuana plants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that approaching a home to secure evidence exceeds the implied licence to knock and constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The warrantless 'sniff' search was unreasonable, rendering the subsequent warrant invalid.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), reasoning that it was non-conscriptive real evidence, the police acted in good faith, and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a denial of access to information by the Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal, which found the Clerk was justified in denying access.

However, the Court awarded costs to the appellant throughout.