Gérard V. La Forest

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal and quashed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.

As the Crown did not request a new trial in the event of a dismissal, the acquittal was upheld.

The respondent, as president and chairman of the appellant corporation, ruled at an annual shareholders' meeting that certain proxy votes could only be used to vote for the management slate of directors, based on the advice of corporate counsel.

This ruling was later overturned in court, and costs were awarded against the respondent.

The respondent sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal costs under s. 136(1) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was entitled to indemnification because he acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, particularly by reasonably relying on the advice of corporate counsel.

The respondent, a police officer, was forced to retire at age 60 pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy in the collective agreement.

He filed a human rights complaint alleging age discrimination.

The Board of Inquiry found the policy was not a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) because the employer lacked a sincerely held belief in its necessity at the time of adoption, and because individual accommodation was possible.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the subjective element of the BFOR test can be satisfied where a policy is adopted in good faith through collective bargaining without ulterior motives.

The Court also held that the objective element does not require individual accommodation where a general rule is reasonably necessary and individual testing is impractical.

The mandatory retirement policy was justified as a BFOR.

The appellant contracted HIV from an artificial insemination procedure performed by the respondent physician in 1985.

The appellant sued for negligence and breach of implied warranty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the physician could not be found negligent for failing to know of the risk of HIV transmission through AI at that time, as it was not standard medical knowledge.

The Court also held that a jury cannot find a standard medical practice negligent unless it is fraught with obvious risks.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Sale of Goods Act and common law implied warranties do not apply to contracts primarily for medical services involving biological materials like semen.

Finally, the Court affirmed that the rough upper limit on non-pecuniary damages applies and that trial judges should instruct juries on this limit when appropriate.

The appellant, a citizen of China, sought Convention refugee status claiming a well-founded fear of persecution by forced sterilization for violating China's one-child policy, and for his pro-democracy political opinions.

The Immigration and Refugee Board rejected his claim, finding that forced sterilization was a general population policy, not persecution.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while forced sterilization might constitute persecution of a particular social group, the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that his fear of forced sterilization was objectively well-founded on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant was tried in Canada for assisting in a prison escape based on statements she made to United States police in the U.S. The trial judge excluded one statement because the U.S. police did not give a second right-to-counsel warning when the interrogation shifted focus, which would be required under the Canadian Charter.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Charter did not apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Charter does not apply to foreign authorities acting outside Canada, and the admission of the evidence obtained in compliance with U.S. law did not render the trial unfair.

The appeal concerned whether Saskatchewan workers' compensation legislation permitting a board to recover unpaid assessments from a principal contractor, coupled with a right of indemnity and set-off against monies otherwise payable to a bankrupt contractor, conflicted with the federal bankruptcy priority scheme.

The majority held that the combined operation of s. 133(1) and s. 133(3) effectively secured the board's claim against the bankrupt estate and thereby reordered priorities fixed by s. 136 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Applying division of powers and paramountcy principles, the Court concluded the provision was inapplicable in bankruptcy to that extent.

The appeal was dismissed, with a four-judge dissent concluding the provincial provisions were complementary to the bankruptcy regime and preserved by s. 97(3).

The appellant, a tenured professor, sued the University of Regina for breach of contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and entered judgment in favour of the appellant in the amount of $208,872.66, with costs throughout.

The appellant, a lawyer, initiated a fee-for-referral scheme with police officers.

When the Law Society investigated the allegations, the appellant submitted false statutory declarations from the officers and clients to conceal the scheme.

He was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

On appeal, he argued that a Law Society investigation does not constitute the 'course of justice' under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the admission of wiretap evidence and the statutory declarations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'course of justice' includes investigations by statutory disciplinary tribunals, the wiretap evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the false declarations were not protected by solicitor-client privilege as they were created to further a crime.

The appellant was attacked by a gang while driving his van and was shot, resulting in severe injuries.

He applied for no-fault benefits under his automobile insurance policy, which covered injuries caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, use, or operation of a vehicle.

The insurer denied the claim, and the lower courts upheld the denial, finding the van was merely the situs of the attack.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, establishing a two-part test of purpose and causal link.

The Court found that the shooting was not random but resulted from an attempt to gain entry to the van, thus satisfying the causal connection requirement.

The parties divorced and entered into a separation agreement providing for spousal and child support.

The respondent later applied to vary the support orders under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing that the appellant's cohabitation with a new partner and the child's independence constituted material changes in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application regarding spousal support, finding the cohabitation was foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal reduced spousal support based on a presumption of self-sufficiency.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's order for spousal support, as the cohabitation was known at the time of the agreement and did not constitute a material change.

Child support was cancelled as the child was now married and independent.

Constitutional appeals challenging federal tobacco advertising and labelling restrictions.

The Court held that Parliament had authority under the criminal law power to legislate in relation to tobacco advertising, promotion, and warning requirements aimed at protecting public health.

A majority further held that the impugned advertising ban, trademark restrictions, and unattributed package warning provisions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1 because the government failed to demonstrate minimal impairment.

Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the Act were declared of no force or effect.

The accused was charged with driving while prohibited under the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that the combined effect of ss. 92 and 94(1) created an absolute liability offence punishable by imprisonment, violating s. 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the offence is one of absolute liability because the prohibition is automatic and without notice, effectively removing the defence of due diligence.

However, the Court found no Charter violation because s. 4.1 of the provincial Offence Act precludes imprisonment for absolute liability offences.

A new trial was not ordered due to the unfairness to the accused.

The respondent, a lawyer, was defamed by the appellants who published documents falsely alleging he had misappropriated funds intended for a community organization.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge's finding that the publications were defamatory and that the appellants were jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors.

The Court rejected the defence of qualified privilege, finding that the appellants had exceeded the limits of the occasion and were motivated by express malice.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of $140,000 in compensatory damages and $325,000 in special damages for loss of business, as well as the award of prejudgment interest for 12.5 years.

The appellants appealed a libel judgment arising from a press conference at which counsel publicly read and commented on contempt allegations against a Crown attorney that were later found to be untrue.

The Court held that the private defamation action did not constitute government action under s. 32 of the Charter, but confirmed that the common law must nonetheless develop consistently with Charter values.

The Court declined to adopt the American actual malice rule, holding that Canadian defamation law appropriately balances freedom of expression with the protection of reputation.

It further held that any qualified privilege attached to the occasion was defeated by the excessive, careless, and high‑handed dissemination of serious allegations.

The jury's awards of $300,000 general damages, $500,000 aggravated damages, and $800,000 punitive damages were upheld.

The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment and the trial judge ordered that he serve one half of the sentence before being eligible for parole under s. 741.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal the sentence, including the parole eligibility order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review orders made under s. 741.2 as part of the 'sentence' under ss. 673 and 675(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant company dismissed an employee for chronic absenteeism caused by alcoholism.

The employee subsequently underwent successful treatment.

The arbitrator found the dismissal was justified at the time it was made, but relied on the subsequent successful treatment to annul the dismissal and reinstate the employee.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by relying on subsequent-event evidence to annul a dismissal that was justified at the time it was implemented.

The appeal was allowed and the arbitrator's decision was quashed.

The appellant railway challenged an environmental prosecution arising from controlled burns that released dense smoke onto neighbouring properties, roads, and residences.

The appeal focused on whether Ontario's broad pollution prohibition in s. 13(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that, in the environmental regulatory context, broad language may be constitutionally valid where the provision provides sufficient guidance for legal debate and does not capture merely trivial or imaginary impairments.

The Court rejected the vagueness and overbreadth claims, affirmed the constitutional applicability of the provision to the federal undertaking, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was charged with attempted murder as a party after being forced at gunpoint by a drug dealer to lure his friend to the lobby of an apartment building, where the friend was shot.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of aggravated assault.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that duress could negate the mens rea for party liability under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that duress operates as an excuse-based defence rather than negating mens rea, and that the common law defence of duress is unavailable if the accused had a safe avenue of escape, determined on an objective standard that considers the accused's personal circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant employee allegedly drove the employer's leased vehicle with a flat tire, causing damage.

The employer brought a civil action for negligence to recover repair costs.

The appellant moved to strike the claim, arguing the dispute arose out of the collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitration under the Public Service Labour Relations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the concurrent decision in Weber v. Ontario Hydro.

The Court held that the essential character of the dispute concerned the preservation of employer property, which inferentially fell under the collective agreement, thereby depriving the courts of jurisdiction.