Ronald Foerster

Bell Canada sought an interlocutory injunction against Cogeco Cable Canada GP Inc. regarding two aspects of Cogeco's new advertising campaign: the phrase "the best Internet experience in your neighbourhood" and the rebranding of Internet packages with the prefix "Ultra" (e.g., UltraFibre 250).

Bell alleged false and misleading representations under the Competition Act and Trade-marks Act, as well as common-law claims.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

It found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored granting an injunction against the use of "the best Internet experience in your neighbourhood" as Cogeco could not objectively claim to offer the best speed and performance in all areas.

However, the court denied an injunction regarding the "UltraFibre" branding, deeming it puffery when accompanied by specific speed commitments.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Applicants (Hollinger Inc. et al.) sought approval of settlement agreements with their former auditors (KPMG) and lawyers (Torys).

The Non-Settling Defendants, including Conrad Black and David Radler, opposed the settlements, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and that the included third-party releases and bar orders would deprive them of procedural rights to discovery.

The court held it had jurisdiction under the CCAA to manage litigation as a corporate asset.

The court approved the Pierringer-style settlements, finding that the procedural rights of the Non-Settling Defendants could be adequately protected through active case management and the application of the principle of proportionality in discovery.

The moving parties sought a stay of proceedings relating to a sealing order in a CCAA proceeding pending the determination of their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding that the CCAA judge was better placed to assess the stay, and that the moving parties failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The appellants appealed a sealing order that redacted the amounts to be paid under two proposed settlement agreements in a CCAA proceeding.

The appellants argued the sealing order unjustifiably infringed the open court principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that litigation settlement privilege applied to the settlement agreements until approved by the court.

The court held that the sealing order was a minimal intrusion on the open court principle, the requirement to sign a confidentiality agreement did not impose an undue burden, and the respondents did not waive privilege by complying with the court order.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision imposing conditions on his real estate broker registration.

The respondent cross-appealed the Tribunal's finding that the appellant would conduct his business with honesty and integrity.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under s. 14(5) of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 to impose conditions to protect the public.

The Court also found the Tribunal's conclusion regarding the appellant's past conduct and future integrity was reasonable.

The respondent, as president and chairman of the appellant corporation, ruled at an annual shareholders' meeting that certain proxy votes could only be used to vote for the management slate of directors, based on the advice of corporate counsel.

This ruling was later overturned in court, and costs were awarded against the respondent.

The respondent sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal costs under s. 136(1) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was entitled to indemnification because he acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, particularly by reasonably relying on the advice of corporate counsel.

A public sector employee challenged a Rand formula dues check-off clause and related statutory provisions, arguing that compulsory union dues used for political and social causes violated the Charter.

The Court held that the Charter applied because the dues obligation arose through government action involving a Crown-controlled public sector employer.

A majority dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no infringement of freedom of expression and no basis for relief under freedom of association, although the judges differed significantly on whether s. 2(d) included protection against compelled association and whether any prima facie infringement occurred.

The decision is a leading authority on Charter application to public sector labour relations, compelled association, and the constitutional treatment of mandatory union dues.