Brenda J. Bowlby

The applicant, a student with multiple disabilities including learning disabilities, ADHD, and anxiety, alleged that the Toronto District School Board discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability-related needs to the point of undue hardship.

The applicant sought funding for a private residential school placement with a focus on elite sports, arguing it was necessary for his accommodation.

The Tribunal found that while providing a residential school placement is outside the school board's legislated mandate, the board nevertheless failed to accommodate the applicant during his Grade 9 year by delaying or failing to provide available supports such as social work, attendance counselling, and alternative placement discussions.

The Tribunal awarded $35,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, but denied compensation for the private school tuition.

The applicant requested an interim order for summary judgement or partial summary judgement in his favour before the respondent had presented its evidence.

The applicant argued that the Tribunal's Rule 19A and the principles of proportionality from the Rules of Civil Procedure supported granting summary judgement.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that Rule 19A provides for summary hearings to dismiss applications with no reasonable prospect of success, but does not grant the power to issue summary judgement in favour of an applicant without hearing the respondent's case.

Doing so would violate section 43 of the Human Rights Code and basic principles of procedural fairness.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding alleging discrimination based on disability brought two requests for orders during proceedings.

First, the applicant sought to admit the testimony of a former NHL player as an expert in the lived experience of anxiety-based mental illness.

The Tribunal denied this request, finding the proposed witness did not meet the Mohan criteria for expert evidence, as his personal experiences were not directly relevant to the applicant's specific educational context and did not qualify him to give opinion evidence.

Second, the applicant requested the disclosure of two letters written by his teachers to a private boarding school.

The Tribunal declined to order production because the respondent could not locate the documents, noting the applicant could question the teachers at the hearing or seek to introduce the letters later if obtained from the boarding school.

In an application alleging discrimination in educational services based on disability, the applicant sought an interim order to limit evidence regarding the parent's pursuit of medical treatment for the student and whether the parent prevented the school board from accommodating the student.

The Tribunal ordered that evidence regarding the lack of medical treatment or residential psychiatric programs be excluded, as the duty to accommodate exists regardless of such treatment.

However, the Tribunal declined to exclude evidence that the parent prevented accommodation, noting that some accommodations require parental consent.

The Tribunal also directed the applicant to comply with Rule 5.7 regarding the late disclosure of additional documents.

The respondent school board brought a Request for Order during Proceedings seeking the production of the applicant's medical records from various health practitioners and institutions, as well as records relating to a disability credit application.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some records fell outside the relevant time frame and raising privacy concerns.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to produce disability-related diagnostic and assessment records from 2005 to the date the applicant left the school board, finding them arguably relevant to the issue of accommodation.

The Tribunal declined to order the production of treatment records or disability credit application documents.

The applicant, a student, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services based on the content of an academic paper presented at a university philosophy club conference.

The paper allegedly contained racist and offensive statements.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the content of academic papers and the university's response to complaints about them do not fall within the meaning of 'services' under section 1 of the Human Rights Code, as the Code is not intended to regulate academic discourse or restrict freedom of expression and academic freedom.

The applicant failed to comply with a Case Assessment Direction requiring her to remove a recording of the hearing from YouTube, provide a copy to the Tribunal and respondent, and cease using inflammatory rhetoric.

Instead, the applicant continued to use unnecessary, inflammatory, and racist rhetoric in her written submissions and made further ultimatums.

The Tribunal directed the parties to provide written and oral submissions on whether the application should be dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order during Proceedings to amend her human rights application to increase her damages claim to $50,000 and add new allegations.

The request was made one month prior to the scheduled hearing.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that allowing the amendment at this late stage would prejudice the respondent by requiring an amended response and further preparation, and would likely necessitate an adjournment.

The applicant, a former nursing student, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and age after being withdrawn from the program for failing a clinical course twice.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed as untimely.

The Tribunal found that the last incident of alleged discrimination occurred when the applicant was withdrawn from the program in the spring of 2009, or at the latest on June 16, 2009, when the College clarified he could not proceed to the next semester.

As the application was filed on November 9, 2010, more than one year after the last incident, and the applicant failed to show the delay was incurred in good faith, the application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant, an Educational Manager, took medical leave after being diagnosed with advanced cervical cancer.

Upon her return, she commenced a gradual work-hardening program.

After five months of part-time work with increasing hours, the respondent employer presented her with options that would either terminate her employment immediately or place her on a one-year part-time contract ending in termination, arguing that her inability to work full-time caused undue hardship.

The Tribunal found that the respondent failed to accommodate the applicant to the point of undue hardship, as it improperly restricted its assessment of resources to a single department rather than the entire institution, and prematurely concluded she could not return to full-time work.

The Tribunal awarded $113,300 for lost wages and $25,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The applicant, a child with severe autism, sought judicial review of a Special Education Tribunal decision affirming his placement in a Primary Autism Pilot Project rather than an Intensive Behavioural Intervention (IBI) program.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in finding the requested IBI program was medical treatment rather than education, and in failing to apply the Charter and Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence that the pilot project was appropriate for the applicant's needs.

The respondents' child, who has cerebral palsy, was placed in a special education class by a Tribunal contrary to the parents' wishes.

The Court of Appeal held this violated section 15 of the Charter and read in a presumption of integration into the Education Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in deciding the constitutional validity of the Act without the required statutory notice.

Furthermore, the Tribunal's decision did not violate section 15 of the Charter, as it was based on the child's best interests and actual needs, and did not impose a burden or disadvantage.

A public sector employee challenged a Rand formula dues check-off clause and related statutory provisions, arguing that compulsory union dues used for political and social causes violated the Charter.

The Court held that the Charter applied because the dues obligation arose through government action involving a Crown-controlled public sector employer.

A majority dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no infringement of freedom of expression and no basis for relief under freedom of association, although the judges differed significantly on whether s. 2(d) included protection against compelled association and whether any prima facie infringement occurred.

The decision is a leading authority on Charter application to public sector labour relations, compelled association, and the constitutional treatment of mandatory union dues.

The parents of a profoundly deaf 11-year-old student appealed the school board's placement decision, requesting that the student continue to receive a resource withdrawal teacher fluent in cued speech.

The school board raised a preliminary objection that teacher qualifications were beyond the scope of a placement appeal, which the Tribunal dismissed, finding that placement includes considering the nature of programs and services.

On the merits, after hearing extensive expert and educator testimony regarding the student's dependency on cued speech and need to develop oral, lip-reading, and social skills, the Tribunal declined to order a cueing resource teacher.

Instead, the Tribunal ordered that the student spend 50% of the day in a regular class with a cueing interpreter, and 50% of the day with a qualified teacher of the deaf to develop comprehensive communication and independent work skills.

The appellants appealed the identification and placement of their child by the school board's Identification, Placement and Review Committee.

The board had identified the child as trainable retarded and placed the child in a segregated school for the trainable retarded.

The appellants sought an identification of multihandicapped and placement in a regular kindergarten class with support staff.

The Tribunal found that the child's severe physical and communication limitations met the definition of multihandicapped.

However, the Tribunal rejected placement in a regular classroom, finding it would not meet the child's intensive needs and would likely result in the teacher's aide becoming the primary caregiver.

The Tribunal ordered the child placed in a class for the multihandicapped with an appropriately modified program.