Irwin G. Nathanson

The appellant waste contractor alleged that the respondent municipal district breached a contractual duty of good faith by reallocating waste from a more distant disposal facility to a closer one, thereby preventing the appellant from achieving its target operating profit ratio for 2011.

The majority held that the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith requires exercise of discretion in a manner connected to the purposes for which the discretion was granted, and that exercising it unreasonably — meaning in a manner unconnected to those purposes — constitutes a breach.

The majority found that the respondent's reallocation was guided by legitimate objectives of maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs, and was therefore not unreasonable.

The concurring minority agreed the appeal should be dismissed, emphasizing that the standard of review was correctness given the statutory right of appeal, and that good faith cannot be used to create unbargained-for obligations.

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Applicants (Hollinger Inc. et al.) sought approval of settlement agreements with their former auditors (KPMG) and lawyers (Torys).

The Non-Settling Defendants, including Conrad Black and David Radler, opposed the settlements, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and that the included third-party releases and bar orders would deprive them of procedural rights to discovery.

The court held it had jurisdiction under the CCAA to manage litigation as a corporate asset.

The court approved the Pierringer-style settlements, finding that the procedural rights of the Non-Settling Defendants could be adequately protected through active case management and the application of the principle of proportionality in discovery.

A lawyer (Strother) advised his client (Monarch) that its tax-shelter business was dead due to new tax rules.

Later, Strother learned of a potential workaround and agreed to help a former Monarch executive (Darc) obtain a tax ruling for a new company (Sentinel) in exchange for a personal financial interest in Sentinel's profits.

Strother did not disclose this to Monarch, which remained a client of his firm (Davis).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Strother breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Monarch by acquiring a personal financial interest in a competitor that conflicted with his duty to provide candid advice to Monarch.

Strother was ordered to disgorge his profits from Sentinel for the period he remained at Davis.

Davis was held vicariously liable for Strother's breach under s. 12 of the Partnership Act, despite being innocent of the breach.

The respondents, members of a pension plan, sought to terminate the pension trust and distribute its $11 million surplus among themselves using the common law rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The employer, Rogers Communications Inc., had previously closed the plan, taken contribution holidays, and merged it with other plans.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier does not apply to employment pension trusts, which are heavily regulated by the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 (PBSA).

The Court found that the PBSA provides a comprehensive scheme for plan termination and that the members must seek recourse through the Superintendent of Financial Institutions rather than relying on the common law rule to bypass the statutory framework.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.

The British Columbia Development Corporation (B.C.D.C.) and its subsidiary, First Capital, were involved in an urban redevelopment project.

They refused to renew the lease of a restaurant, King Neptune, which then complained to the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman commenced an investigation, but B.C.D.C. challenged his jurisdiction, arguing the refusal to renew a lease was a business decision, not a 'matter of administration'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction, as the phrase 'matter of administration' encompasses everything done by governmental authorities in the implementation of government policy, including commercial activities.

The appellant union appealed a decision regarding the application of the provincial Labour Code to picketing arising from a federal labour dispute.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the interpretation of the Labour Code of British Columbia.

The Court found it unnecessary to answer the constitutional question.

The appellant, an expropriated owner, had land taken for highway purposes by the respondent.

Arbitrators fixed compensation and awarded compound interest based on 90-day finance company paper rates.

The respondent argued that s. 3 of the Interest Act limited the rate to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia held the rate was limited to 5% but could be compounded.

The Court of Appeal held it was limited to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that where a statute provides for interest and remits the rate to an adjudicator, the rate is 'fixed by law' within the meaning of s. 3 of the Interest Act, and thus the 5% limit does not apply.

The arbitrators' award of compound interest was restored.