Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant employee was suspended for abusing sick leave benefits after the employer hired private investigators who gained entry to his home under false pretenses.

The employee filed grievances under the collective agreement and also commenced a court action for torts and Charter breaches.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory arbitration clause in the Labour Relations Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on labour arbitrators for all disputes arising from the collective agreement.

The Court concluded that both the tort and Charter claims arose from the administration of the collective agreement, and that the arbitrator was a court of competent jurisdiction empowered to grant Charter remedies, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the courts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements that referred to sexual activity other than the subject matter of the charge.

The trial judge excluded three of these statements under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in excluding the statements.

The Court held that s. 276 should not be used to prevent cross-examination on material inconsistencies relevant to credibility, especially when the reference to prior sexual activity was inextricably linked to police questioning.

The appellant Milk Board, which holds both provincial and federal delegated authority, issued orders to collect levies on milk production from the respondent dairy farmers.

The Court of Appeal invalidated the orders because they did not specify on their face which source of statutory authority the Board was exercising.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that there is no legal requirement for an administrative body to specify the exact source of its jurisdiction on the face of its orders, provided that the jurisdiction actually exists.

The testator, an 81-year-old man, left the bulk of his estate to the appellant, a 29-year-old friend.

The respondents, the testator's family members, challenged the will, alleging suspicious circumstances and undue influence.

The trial judge admitted the will to probate, finding the testator had testamentary capacity and was not unduly influenced.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the trial judge failed to properly apply the doctrine of suspicious circumstances to shift the burden of disproving undue influence to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, clarifying that while suspicious circumstances shift the burden of proving knowledge, approval, and testamentary capacity back to the propounder of the will, the burden of proving fraud or undue influence always remains on those attacking the will.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

At trial, he argued that the complainant consented or that he had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge refused to put the mistaken belief defence to the jury, finding no 'air of reality' to it, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

On appeal by the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly withheld the defence from the jury because there was no evidence capable of supporting an honest belief that the complainant was actually consenting at the time of the assault.

The appellant union sought judicial review of a CRTC decision regarding who could perform installation work on a telephone company's support structures, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the union's interest in the telecommunications policy decision was purely indirect and did not trigger the audi alteram partem rule.

Furthermore, the Court found that the governing statute placed the obligation to notify employees on the employer, not the CRTC, and that the CRTC did not err by failing to defer to labour arbitration board decisions.

The CRTC ordered British Columbia Telephone Company (BC Tel) to permit cable companies to install their own cables on BC Tel's support structures.

However, a labour arbitration board had previously ruled that allowing cable companies to perform this work violated BC Tel's collective agreement with the Telecommunications Workers Union.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the CRTC decision, finding it exceeded its jurisdiction by requiring BC Tel to violate its collective agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the CRTC had jurisdiction to make the order and was entitled to curial deference.

The Court established that where two administrative tribunals issue operationally conflicting decisions, the courts must determine which takes precedence based on legislative intent.

In this case, the CRTC's broad policy-making decision took precedence over the labour arbitration board's interpretation of a private collective agreement.

The Crown appealed from an order granting a new trial and entering a stay after a sexual offences conviction.

The accused had cross-examined the complainant in a manner alleging recent fabrication after reading a book.

The court held that prior consistent statement evidence from a social worker and a doctor was admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting that allegation by proving the complaints were made, not for their truth.

The court further held there was no basis to conclude the trial judge improperly used inadmissible portions of the social worker's report.

The conviction was restored.

The appeal concerned a Charter challenge to the child support taxation regime requiring a custodial parent to include support payments in income while permitting the payor to deduct them.

The respondent argued that the regime imposed an unequal tax burden on separated or divorced custodial parents, most of whom were women, contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter.

A majority of the Court held that the impugned provision did not impose a burden or deny a benefit within the meaning of s. 15(1), particularly when read with the family law system that fixes support and accounts for tax consequences.

The appeal was allowed, the constitutional challenge failed, and costs were awarded to the respondent throughout.

A same-sex couple challenged the definition of 'spouse' in the Old Age Security Act after the younger partner was denied a spousal allowance available to opposite-sex common law spouses.

The appeal raised whether exclusion of same-sex couples from the statutory definition violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and, if so, whether it could be justified under s. 1.

A majority dismissed the appeal, with four judges concluding there was no discrimination and one judge concluding there was a s. 15 breach but that it was justified as part of an incremental extension of social benefits.

The decision recognized sexual orientation as an analogous ground under s. 15 and became a foundational equality-rights case in Canadian constitutional law.

On a preliminary insurance coverage issue arising from a motor vehicle accident, the appellants challenged the exclusion of unmarried common law partners from accident benefits under the standard automobile policy mandated by provincial legislation.

The majority held that the 1980 policy definition of "spouse" did not include unmarried partners, but that the exclusion violated s. 15(1) of the Charter because marital status is an analogous ground of discrimination and the denial of benefits perpetuated disadvantage against non-marital family units.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because marital status was not a reasonably relevant marker of stable economic interdependence and less impairing alternatives were available.

The Court retroactively read in the broader 1990 statutory definition of "spouse" and remitted the action for trial.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of section 14(1) of the Public Accounting and Auditing Act, which restricted the practice of public accounting to members of the provincial institute of chartered accountants.

They argued the provision infringed their rights under sections 2(b), 6, and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal, finding no restriction of those Charter rights based on its previous decisions.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal, which had quashed the accused's conviction for wilfully promoting hatred and ordered a new trial.

The accused subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal on constitutional and non-constitutional grounds.

The Crown moved to quash the accused's application for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Crown's motion, holding that under the dual proceedings approach, either party may seek leave to appeal rulings on constitutionality regardless of whether the ruling on culpability is appealed.

However, the Court ultimately dismissed the accused's application for leave to appeal.

Police investigating cocaine trafficking entered and secured the accused's home without a warrant while awaiting issuance of a search warrant, in order to prevent destruction or removal of evidence after public arrests nearby.

The majority held the warrantless entry breached s. 8 of the Charter, but concluded under s. 24(2) that the cocaine and marked money should not be excluded because the evidence was real evidence, trial fairness was unaffected, exigent circumstances mitigated the seriousness of the breach, and the evidence was vital to prosecution of serious drug offences.

A concurring judge would have found no s. 8 breach because exigent circumstances justified entry, while the dissent would have excluded the evidence as the product of a serious, police-created Charter breach.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant challenged a murder conviction arising from the admission of derivative evidence obtained after prolonged police interrogation and a plea bargain offer made while his counsel was unavailable.

The Court held that the police violated s. 10(b) by continuing to question the accused after repeated requests for counsel, undermining defence counsel, and presenting a plea bargain directly to the accused without counsel present.

Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the majority excluded the gun, the fact of its discovery, related identification evidence, and the accused's statement to a third party because the evidence would not have been obtained but for the Charter breach.

A stay was refused, but the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) did not apply.

The respondent leased two helicopters to Pegasus Helicopters under agreements containing an option to purchase at fair market value.

The leases were not registered under the Conditional Sales Act.

When Pegasus defaulted on its bank loans, the appellant bank appointed a receiver.

The respondent claimed priority to the helicopters, arguing the leases were not conditional sales.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the leases contained true options to purchase, giving the lessee the unilateral right to compel a sale, and therefore fell within the definition of a conditional sale under the Act.

Because the leases were unregistered, the respondent's reservation of title was void against the appellants.

Appeal from an order staying the public hearings of a provincial inquiry into a fatal mine explosion while criminal proceedings against certain mine managers were pending.

The Court held that the inquiry served a legitimate and pressing public purpose, and that the accused managers were compellable witnesses subject to constitutional protections against use of their testimony and derivative evidence.

The Court rejected a broad stay as the appropriate remedy for anticipated prejudice, emphasizing that fair trial concerns from publicity ordinarily should be addressed through narrower measures such as publication restrictions and by the commissioner in the first instance.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of the public hearings was set aside.

The appellants, who were either charged or suspects in connection with an explosion and fire, were subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiries of other accused persons separately charged with the same offence.

The appellants applied to quash the subpoenas, arguing that compelling them to testify would violate their right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were compellable witnesses and that section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act does not infringe section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found no evidence that the subpoenas were a form of pre-trial interrogation or otherwise objectionable, noting that the witnesses would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination at any subsequent proceedings against them.

The appellant, who was charged with first degree murder, was subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiry of another individual separately charged with the same murder.

The appellant sought to quash the subpoena, arguing that compelling his testimony would violate his right to silence and protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the appellant's application as tantamount to a certiorari application under the Dagenais framework.

On the merits, the Court held that the appellant was compellable, as the predominant purpose of the subpoena was not to incriminate him, and he would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination in his own subsequent proceedings.

The British Columbia Securities Commission commenced an investigation into a company following a report disclosing questionable expenditures.

The appellants, two officers of the company, were served with summonses compelling their attendance for examination under oath and requiring them to produce records pursuant to s. 128(1) of the Securities Act.

The appellants challenged the summonses, arguing that s. 128(1) violated their rights against self-incrimination under s. 7 and their right against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the predominant purpose of the inquiry was regulatory rather than penal, and thus did not violate s. 7.

The Court also held that the compelled production of documents did not violate s. 8, given the lower expectation of privacy in a highly regulated industry.