Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant CBC forced a journalist to choose between his position as a radio host and his role as president of a trade union after he published an article opposing free trade in a union newsletter.

The union filed a complaint alleging an unfair labour practice under s. 94(1)(a) of the Canada Labour Code.

The Canada Labour Relations Board upheld the complaint, finding the CBC's journalistic policy did not justify the interference.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the CBC's appeal, holding that the Board's decision was within its jurisdiction and not patently unreasonable, and that the Board's interpretation of the external Broadcasting Act did not alter the overall standard of review to correctness.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that a stay of proceedings should have been granted due to an 11-year delay in laying charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

Three justices dissented, stating they would have allowed the appeal to the extent of entering a stay of proceedings.

Jehovah's Witness parents challenged Ontario child protection legislation after their premature infant was made a temporary ward of a children's aid society so that doctors could administer a blood transfusion deemed medically necessary.

The appeal raised whether the statutory scheme infringed parental liberty under s. 7 and freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

A majority held that any s. 7 deprivation was either not established or was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, and that the infringement of freedom of religion was justified under s. 1 in light of the pressing objective of protecting children at risk.

The Court also dismissed the cross-appeal concerning the unusual costs award made against the Attorney General of Ontario.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a car accident after leaving a dinner theatre.

The driver, her brother, had been drinking heavily at the theatre but showed no visible signs of intoxication.

The plaintiff and another passenger were sober and knew how much the driver had consumed, yet allowed him to drive.

The plaintiff sued the commercial host for negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a commercial host owes a duty of care to third parties who might be injured by an intoxicated patron, the host did not breach its standard of care in this case.

It was reasonable for the host to assume that the sober passengers would ensure the intoxicated patron did not drive.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove that any intervention by the host would have changed her decision to let her brother drive.

The appellant condominium corporation, a subsequent purchaser of a building, discovered severe structural defects in the exterior cladding after a large section fell off.

The appellant repaired the building at its own expense and sued the original general contractor in tort for negligence to recover the pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a contractor owes a duty of care in tort to subsequent purchasers of a building to take reasonable care in construction and to ensure the building does not contain defects that pose a foreseeable and substantial danger to health and safety.

The Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the reasonable cost of repairing dangerous defects is recoverable in tort, and ordered the matter to proceed to trial.

The appellant Indian bands enacted property tax assessment by-laws under the Indian Act, which included appeal procedures to band-appointed tribunals.

The respondents, who owned a railway right-of-way through the reserves, sought judicial review to challenge the assessments, arguing their lands were not 'in the reserve'.

The motions judge struck the judicial review application, finding the band appeal procedures provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bands' appeal, holding that the band tribunals lacked sufficient institutional independence (due to lack of financial security and security of tenure), and therefore did not constitute an adequate alternative remedy, allowing the judicial review to proceed.

The appellant, a federal undertaking, appealed a decision regarding the application of the provincial Environmental Protection Act to the maintenance of its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal on the first ground, holding that the provincial environmental legislation constitutionally applies to the appellant based on established precedent.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal that affirmed an order granting mandamus to compel the Minister of National Health and Welfare to issue a notice of compliance respecting a generic version of a drug.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics based on intercepted communications.

The trial judge found errors in the supporting affidavit material and set aside the wiretap authorizations, leading to acquittals.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding that errors in the information presented to the authorizing judge do not lead to automatic vitiation of the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was sufficient reliable information to support the authorization even after excluding the erroneous parts.

The insured was involved in a motor vehicle accident after his automobile insurance policy had expired.

Prior to the expiry, the insurer mailed an offer to renew along with a 'pink card' valid for the renewal period.

The insured did not pay the renewal premium.

The Court of Appeal held that the pink card constituted an insurance policy, binding the insurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an offer to renew accompanied by a pink card does not constitute a binding insurance policy under the Insurance Act.

The pink card is merely an administrative requirement and does not bind the insurer in the absence of an underlying policy.

These companion appeals concerned the governing choice of law rule for interprovincial tort claims arising from motor vehicle accidents.

The Court held that the general rule in tort is lex loci delicti, not lex fori, emphasizing territoriality, certainty, predictability, constitutional coherence, and the need to reduce forum shopping.

In the British Columbia action, Saskatchewan substantive law governed, including its limitation period, which the Court characterized as substantive.

In the Ontario action, Quebec's no-fault statutory scheme applied to the bodily injury claims and barred the action and cross-claim.

The Court overruled prior authority adopting the forum law approach.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The issue concerned whether the use of a police informant, who was to be paid in full only in the event of a successful investigation, constituted an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the informant's evidence was not inadmissible.

The appellants appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had dismissed one appellant's appeal against conviction and allowed the Crown's appeal against the other appellant's acquittal for conspiracy to commit robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Ontario.

On a Crown appeal arising from a pre-trial constitutional ruling, the Court held that the reverse onus in s. 394(1)(b) of the Criminal Code violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes framework, the Court accepted that deterring theft of precious metal ore was a pressing and substantial objective and that some burden on the accused was rationally connected to that objective.

However, imposing a legal burden on the accused was not minimally impairing and was not proportionate, because an evidentiary burden would substantially achieve Parliament's purpose with far less intrusion on the presumption of innocence.

The appeal was allowed in part, the stay remained lifted, and the provision was modified to impose only an evidentiary burden.

The appellant media organization challenged a publication ban imposed during a young offender's trial involving sexual offence allegations by two child complainants.

The Supreme Court held that there was no direct third-party right of appeal from the interlocutory criminal order to the provincial court of appeal.

The proper route was certiorari to a superior court judge because the order was made by a provincial court judge, with any further appeal proceeding under s. 784(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the Court declined to review the publication ban order itself.

The appeal concerned a media challenge to a publication ban obtained in criminal proceedings to stop the broadcast of a fictional television mini-series said to risk prejudicing pending jury trials involving allegations of abuse in religious institutions.

The Court held that discretionary publication bans must be assessed in accordance with Charter values and reformulated the common law test to require necessity, the absence of reasonably available alternative measures, and proportional balancing between trial fairness and freedom of expression.

The Court also addressed the proper procedural routes for third-party challenges to publication bans imposed by provincial and superior court judges.

Applying the new framework, the Court concluded the ban was overbroad and unjustified because reasonable alternatives were available.

The appeal was allowed and the publication ban order was set aside.

The City of Beauport appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding municipal taxation powers.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision.

The Court held that there is no contradiction or incompatibility between s. 13 of the Charter of the City of Beauport and s. 486 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The taxation power granted by s. 13 is not subject to the requirement of taxation by annual by-law provided for in s. 486, as only the tax rate is annual.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to put the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury and misdirected the jury on the issue of consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that even if the defence should have been put to the jury, the jury's conviction negatived that defence based on how the issue of knowledge of absence of consent was framed.

The Court agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that there was no misdirection on the issue of consent.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and buggery.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence but found each count proved beyond a reasonable doubt before analyzing that evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that a properly instructed jury could not reasonably have come to a different conclusion if the similar fact evidence had not been admitted.

The Crown appealed from a decision quashing a conviction under a vagrancy provision that prohibited certain previously convicted sexual offenders from loitering in or near school grounds, playgrounds, public parks, and bathing areas.

The majority held that the word “loiter” bore its ordinary meaning and that the provision infringed liberty under s. 7 of the Charter because it was overbroad in its geographic reach, duration, class of affected persons, and absence of notice or review.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the provision failed minimal impairment, particularly when compared with the more tailored later-enacted prohibition regime in s. 161 of the Criminal Code.

The Court declined to read down or read in limiting features, holding that doing so would amount to judicial rewriting.

The appeal was dismissed, with four judges dissenting.