Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his common-law wife.

Upon the arrival of the police, he made a spontaneous inculpatory statement.

After being arrested and advised of his right to counsel and legal aid, but not specifically of the availability of duty counsel, he made a second inculpatory statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the failure to inform the appellant of duty counsel violated his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter, the second statement was admissible under section 24(2) because the breach did not affect his behaviour and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The respondent was found asleep behind the wheel of his running car and was arrested for impaired driving.

He was read his Charter rights, including the right to apply for Legal Aid, but was not informed of duty counsel as Prince Edward Island did not have a 24-hour duty counsel system.

The respondent declined to call a lawyer and refused to provide a breath sample.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 10(b) of the Charter does not impose a positive obligation on governments to provide a 24-hour duty counsel system.

As the police complied with the informational requirements of section 10(b) based on the services available, no Charter breach occurred, and the evidence of the refusal was admissible.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and read his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The arresting officer advised him of the right to free legal advice from legal aid but failed to mention the 24-hour toll-free duty counsel number printed on the caution card.

The appellant expressed confusion about contacting a lawyer but eventually took and failed two breathalyser tests.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police breached the informational component of s. 10(b) by failing to advise the appellant of the toll-free duty counsel service.

The Court excluded the breathalyser evidence under s. 24(2), concluding its admission would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant challenged a substituted conviction for driving-related alcohol offences on the basis that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed when, after unsuccessful attempts to contact legal aid lawyers outside regular business hours, police proceeded with breathalyser testing.

The majority held that s. 10(b) does not constitutionally require governments to provide free and immediate duty counsel on request, but does require police to hold off from eliciting incriminatory evidence where a detainee has asserted the right to counsel, acted diligently, and remains unable to reach counsel because of institutional unavailability.

The court further held that the appellant had not validly waived the right to counsel and that the police were required to advise him of the continuing right to a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel before proceeding.

Applying s. 24(2), the majority excluded the breath samples as conscriptive evidence obtained in a manner that rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that police failed to comply with the informational component of s. 10(b) of the Charter by mentioning legal aid but not advising of existing 24-hour duty counsel services and the toll-free number for immediate free legal advice.

The majority held that where duty counsel services exist and are available in the jurisdiction, detainees must be routinely informed of their existence and basic means of access, absent valid waiver or urgency.

Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the Court held that both the breathalyser results and the incriminating statement were obtained in the course of the Charter breach and that their admission would render the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal as of right filed by a young offender to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The young offender had been found guilty of indictable offences and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal with one judge dissenting.

The Supreme Court granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that section 27(5) of the Young Offenders Act clearly precludes appeals as of right to the Supreme Court, requiring leave to appeal in all such cases.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis that his court-appointed interpreter, when called as a defence witness, failed to provide full and contemporaneous interpretation of his own testimony and part of an exchange with the trial judge.

The Court held that s. 14 of the Charter protects an accused's right to interpretation that is continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous whenever the case is being advanced.

The Court rejected any requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage, found no valid personal waiver, and held that the Criminal Code curative provisos do not apply to an infringement of the constitutional right to interpreter assistance.

Because the breach occurred during material trial evidence on identification, the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations, was arrested on outstanding warrants and subsequently confessed to a murder and several robberies.

He waived his right to counsel multiple times, despite advice from a lawyer to remain silent, claiming voices in his head compelled him to confess.

The trial judge excluded the statements, finding the appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the consequences of waiving his rights, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'operating mind' test applies to the confession rule and the waiver of Charter rights, requiring only that the accused have sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what they are saying and that it can be used against them, which the appellant possessed.

The respondent choreographed and took neo-Nazi photographs in a Jewish cemetery, featuring a young male simulating urinating on identifiable gravestones.

He was charged with offering indignities to human remains under s. 182(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that physical contact with the remains was required.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that physical interference is not necessary and that offering indignities to monuments marking human remains constitutes offering indignities to the remains themselves.

The Court also amended the charges to accurately reflect the respondent's conduct in choreographing the event.

The accused, a 43-year-old stranger, took an 8-year-old boy from a school yard in his car to take photographs of him, without the parents' knowledge or consent.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of abduction of a person under 14 years of age (s. 281 of the Criminal Code), finding no evidence of an 'unlawful' taking or intent to deprive the parents of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that 'unlawfully' in s. 281 does not require an additional unlawful act, and that the mens rea is satisfied if the accused foresaw that his actions were certain or substantially certain to deprive the parents of possession of the child.

The appellant was convicted of raping a 13-year-old girl.

The complainant's testimony contained inconsistencies regarding the number of assaults and her sexual history, which she explained as resulting from repressed memory.

The appellant did not testify.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the jury drew an improper inference from his failure to testify and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to accept the complainant's explanations for the inconsistencies and that the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The testator left his wife of 43 years only a life estate in the matrimonial home and the benefit of a discretionary trust, leaving the bulk of the estate to one of his two sons.

The wife and the disinherited son claimed against the estate under the Wills Variation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife's appeal, holding that the Act requires a court to consider both the legal and moral obligations of the testator.

The Court awarded the wife title to the matrimonial home, a life interest in a rental property, and the residue of the estate, finding that her legal and moral claims took precedence over the moral claims of the independent adult sons.

The bankrupt was ordered to pay child and spousal support to the Director of Maintenance Enforcement.

He later filed for bankruptcy and assigned his post-bankruptcy income tax refund to the trustee.

The Director filed a notice of continuing attachment against the federal Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the income tax refund constituted 'wages' under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy Act and did not automatically vest in the trustee under s. 67.

Furthermore, the assignment of the refund to the trustee was invalid under s. 67 of the Financial Administration Act.

Therefore, the Director's garnishment had priority.

The appellant uttered threats to his social worker regarding a former social worker to whom his file was being transferred, stating he would blow up her office, strangle her, and kill her.

He was convicted of uttering threats under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the mens rea required an intent to intimidate or instill fear, while the Crown argued it only required an intent that the threat be taken seriously.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the mens rea is satisfied if the words were meant to intimidate or to be taken seriously, viewed objectively in the context they were spoken.

The Supreme Court of Canada issued additional reasons regarding the proper procedure for directed verdicts of acquittal.

The Court modified the common law rule, holding that where a trial judge determines there is no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict, the judge should withdraw the case from the jury and enter an acquittal directly, rather than directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.

This change avoids unnecessary delay, reduces jury frustration, and preserves the division of responsibilities between judge and jury.

The appellant parity committee sought to inspect the respondents' premises and documents under s. 22(e) of the Act respecting Collective Agreement Decrees to verify compliance with a decree.

The respondents refused, arguing the inspectors needed a search warrant.

The respondents were convicted of obstructing an inspection, but the Court of Appeal acquitted them, finding s. 22(e) violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the inspection powers constitute a search or seizure under s. 8, they are reasonable in the context of administrative inspections in a regulated industrial sector where expectations of privacy are lower.

The Governor in Council referred two questions to the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the constitutional validity of proposed amendments to Quebec's sales tax designed to harmonize it with the federal goods and services tax.

The Court held that the proposed value-added tax, including the input tax refund mechanism and various exemptions, constitutes direct taxation within the province.

The tax is therefore within the legislative authority of the province under section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The respondents were senior managers of Prime and Calpine, two reporting issuers involved in mineral exploration.

The British Columbia Securities Commission found that the respondents breached the timely disclosure provisions of the Securities Act by failing to disclose material changes, including drilling results, a private placement, and a contractual dispute, before engaging in securities transactions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Commission's orders, finding errors of law in the interpretation of "material change".

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that considerable deference is owed to specialized tribunals like the Securities Commission, even where there is a statutory right of appeal and no privative clause.

The Court restored the Commission's findings and orders, confirming that drilling results can constitute a material change and that senior management has a duty to inquire about material changes before causing an issuer to engage in securities transactions.

Three Jewish teachers took a day off to celebrate Yom Kippur.

The School Board granted them a leave of absence but without pay.

The teachers' union brought a grievance seeking reimbursement for the day's pay.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the school calendar, although neutral on its face, had the effect of adversely discriminating against Jewish teachers.

The Court found that the School Board failed to take reasonable steps to accommodate the teachers short of undue hardship, as paying them for the day would not impose an unreasonable financial burden and was permitted under the collective agreement.

The accused shot and killed a woman sleeping in his apartment while suffering from a paranoid delusion that she was part of a conspiracy to kill him.

At trial, he raised the defence of insanity under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him of second degree murder, finding that while he subjectively believed his act was justified, he retained the general capacity to know right from wrong.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 16(1) exempts an accused from criminal responsibility if a mental disorder deprives them of the capacity to rationally apply their knowledge of right and wrong to the specific act committed.