Donna J. Miller

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his common-law wife.

Upon the arrival of the police, he made a spontaneous inculpatory statement.

After being arrested and advised of his right to counsel and legal aid, but not specifically of the availability of duty counsel, he made a second inculpatory statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the failure to inform the appellant of duty counsel violated his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter, the second statement was admissible under section 24(2) because the breach did not affect his behaviour and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Following the 1985 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights decision, a dispute arose regarding which instruments had to be translated to comply with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 23 applies to orders in council of a legislative nature, determined by their form, content, and effect.

The Court also held that documents incorporated by reference in legislation must be translated if the primary instrument is legislative, the incorporation is true, and the document was generated by the government, unless there is a bona fide reason for incorporation without translation.

The period of temporary validity for unilingual Acts was extended.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted an application to hold a special hearing to determine constitutional questions regarding the translation and temporary validity of Manitoba laws under section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Court ordered that the temporary validity of the laws in question be continued until the hearing is held and judgment is rendered.

On a constitutional reference concerning prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions, the Court considered whether the bawdy-house offence and the public communication offence infringed freedom of expression and the principles of fundamental justice.

The majority held that the public communication offence engaged s. 2(b) because it prohibited public communication for the purpose of prostitution, but found the infringement justified under s. 1 in light of Parliament’s objective of addressing the social nuisance associated with street solicitation.

The majority further held that neither provision was impermissibly vague and that s. 7 did not protect the asserted economic liberty to pursue prostitution as a profession.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on the basis that the communication provision unjustifiably infringed both ss. 2(b) and 7.