Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which held that the respondent telephone company is an interprovincial work and undertaking within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the undertaking falls under federal jurisdiction pursuant to ss. 92(10)(a) and 91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that the nature of the services provided and the mode of operation, which allowed subscribers to send and receive interprovincial and international communications, placed the telecommunication signal carrier service within federal authority.

The eight-year-old appellant was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in a truck driven by the respondent.

The appellant was not wearing a seat belt, and the respondent driver had not instructed him to do so because the appellant's father was also a passenger in the vehicle.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal found that the respondent owed no duty of care to the child regarding the seat belt due to the father's presence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a driver owes a duty of care to passengers under 16 to take reasonable steps to ensure they wear seat belts, and this duty is not negated by the presence of a parent.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and indecent assault based primarily on the testimony of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons did not adequately explain why the evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that a court of appeal cannot set aside a verdict that is reasonably supported by the evidence merely because the trial judge failed to indicate expressly that all relevant considerations were taken into account.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's admission of expert psychiatric evidence regarding the complainant's behaviour and history of abuse.

The respondent was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

At trial, breathalyzer evidence was excluded due to a Charter violation.

The Crown elected to call no further evidence, resulting in a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found the evidence was wrongly excluded but dismissed the appeal, holding the Crown's refusal to call further evidence was an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that courts of appeal have no residual discretion under s. 686(4) of the Criminal Code to refuse a new trial absent an abuse of process, and that the Crown's conduct here did not constitute an abuse of process.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly allowed the Crown to reopen its case and then amend the indictment in a child sexual offence prosecution.

The majority held that once the defence had begun to answer the case by disclosing an intended alibi, the discretion to reopen was severely restricted and could be exercised only in the narrowest circumstances.

Reopening to correct the complainant's mother's evidence about the year of the alleged offences effectively changed the case the accused had committed to meet and indirectly violated the principle against self-incrimination.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal on the remaining count stood.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges arising from the confinement, robbery, deportation and deaths of Jewish civilians in wartime Hungary, prosecuted in Canada under the war crimes provisions of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that Canadian courts had jurisdiction only where the acts constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity, and that these international elements, including the requisite subjective awareness of the surrounding facts, formed integral aspects of the offences for jury determination.

The Court also held that superior orders and peace officer defences remained available subject to manifest illegality and the absence of moral choice, and upheld the admission of key hearsay evidence and the trial judge’s decision to call certain witnesses.

The Crown appeal was dismissed and the respondent’s Charter cross-appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the calculation of interest on non-mortgage loans.

The core issue was the interpretation of the loan contract and section 4 of the Interest Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was rendered a paraplegic when a diseased tree located on private property adjacent to a provincial highway fell on his truck.

The appellant sued the provincial Department of Transportation for negligence in failing to identify and remove the tree.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the province owes a duty of care to maintain highways, which includes removing obvious hazards on adjacent lands, the Department's decision to conduct a limited survey of dead trees was a policy decision involving resource allocation and thus exempt from tort liability.

Furthermore, the Department was not negligent in carrying out the survey, as the tree appeared healthy and its disease was not apparent to a layperson.

The appellant was injured when his vehicle skidded on black ice on a provincial highway.

He sued the province for negligence in failing to maintain the highway and respond to icy conditions in a timely manner.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the province owes a duty of care to users of its highways, the decision to keep the highway maintenance crew on a summer schedule was a policy decision exempt from tort liability.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to prove that the operational delays in dispatching a sand truck were caused by the province's negligence or that they contributed to the accident.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs were injured in separate motor vehicle accidents and received disability benefits under their respective collective agreements while off work.

They sued the defendants in tort for lost wages.

The defendants argued the disability benefits should be deducted from the damage awards to prevent double recovery.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that disability benefits obtained pursuant to a collective agreement are in the nature of private insurance and should not be deducted from a claim for lost wages, provided there is evidence the employee paid for the benefits (e.g., through trade-offs in collective bargaining or payroll deductions).

The Court also held that damages for lost income should not be reduced by the amount of income tax that would have been payable.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, which had allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal on charges of indecent assault and sexual assault and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's reasons regarding the trial judge's errors on corroboration, the subjective test for indecent assault, and the exclusion of a psychologist's evidence.

The Court noted that at the new trial, the Crown would need to qualify the psychologist as an expert witness for her testimony to be admissible.

The applicants, two major tobacco companies, sought an interlocutory stay to suspend the enforcement of new packaging regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act pending their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the Act's constitutionality.

The Court established the three-part test for interlocutory relief in Charter cases: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

While the applicants demonstrated a serious question and irreparable financial harm, the Court held that the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the public interest in health, which the regulations aimed to protect.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for his role in a conspiracy to import cocaine, despite the respondent never having been in the United States during the relevant times.

The extradition judge dismissed the application for committal, finding that the United States had no jurisdiction to prosecute the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether the evidence would justify committal for trial under Canadian law if the crime had been committed in Canada.

The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the requesting state is a matter for the executive, not the extradition judge, and that in any event, there was a real and substantial link to the United States.

The City of Vancouver passed resolutions declaring it would not do business with Shell Canada until its parent company withdrew from South Africa, in protest of apartheid.

Shell challenged the resolutions as ultra vires the municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the resolutions were invalid because they were passed for an extraterritorial purpose rather than a municipal purpose.

The Court found that the city's statutory powers to engage in commercial undertakings and provide for good government did not authorize boycotts based on matters external to the interests of the citizens of the municipality, nor did they authorize discrimination for non-commercial reasons relating to foreign political policy.

The appellant oil companies applied to the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board for a significant discovery declaration (SDD) based on an offshore well that had already been the subject of an earlier SDD.

The Board's Chairman summarily rejected the application, stating that a new SDD required the drilling of a fresh well.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Chairman breached the duty of fairness by rejecting the novel legal argument without affording the appellants a hearing, the statutory scheme clearly required a fresh well for a new SDD.

Because remitting the matter to the Board would be futile given this legal conclusion, the Court declined to grant the requested discretionary remedies of certiorari and mandamus.

The National Energy Board granted Hydro-Québec licences to export electricity to the United States, subject to conditions requiring environmental assessments of future generating facilities.

The appellants challenged the licences on grounds of inadequate cost-benefit analysis, procedural fairness, breach of fiduciary duty, and infringement of aboriginal rights.

The respondents cross-appealed the imposition of the environmental conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board properly conducted its review, owed no fiduciary duty in its quasi-judicial capacity, and did not infringe aboriginal rights.

Furthermore, the Court found that the Board acted within its jurisdiction under the National Energy Board Act and the EARP Guidelines Order by considering the environmental effects of future facilities and imposing the conditions.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his action for negligence and occupiers' liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supportable by the evidence and that no failure on the part of the respondents caused the appellant's injury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's charge to the jury was flawed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was open to criticism and the judge erred in treating s. 231(3) of the Criminal Code as an independent offence, the error was of no consequence.

The Court concluded that the jury was adequately instructed on the law, facts, and theories of both parties, ensuring a fair trial.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Ports Operations Act, 1986, arguing that the back-to-work legislation violated their freedom of association under section 2(d) and their right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that earlier jurisprudence limiting the scope of freedom of association regarding the right to strike also applied to the right to liberty under section 7.

The Court further held that the penalty attached to the refusal to return to work was a strict liability offence intended to enforce the regulatory scheme.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appropriateness of a Vetrovec warning does not raise a question of law, meaning there was no appeal as of right.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that even if it had jurisdiction, the failure to give the warning did not result in a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case.

The appeal was dismissed.