Gérard V. La Forest

The infant appellant suffered severe disabilities due to oxygen deprivation during birth.

The respondents admitted liability, leaving only the assessment of damages at issue.

The trial judge awarded damages based on a 25-year life expectancy.

The Court of Appeal reduced the life expectancy estimate and deducted 50 per cent for living expenses during the 'lost years' from the future income loss award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, restoring the trial judge's life expectancy assessment because the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with findings of fact absent a palpable or overriding error.

However, the Supreme Court upheld the 50 per cent deduction for personal living expenses during the 'lost years' to avoid overcompensation.

The appellant public utility negligently underbilled the respondent dairy co-operative for electricity over a seven-year period due to a multiplier error.

When the utility sued to recover the arrears on a quantum meruit basis, the respondent raised the defence of equitable estoppel, having relied on the bills to set its own prices.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that unlike the legislation in Maritime Electric, the Ontario Power Corporation Act does not impose a positive statutory duty to collect arrears that would preclude the defence of estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal based on an undertaking made by the respondent.

The respondent was directed to deposit a signed undertaking with the Registrar.

Reasons and a determination as to costs were to follow.

The appellant was involved in two motor vehicle accidents, the second resulting in a fatality.

At the hospital, blood and urine samples were taken for medical purposes with the appellant's consent.

A coroner subsequently seized the samples under the Coroners Act and turned them over to the police for analysis.

The results were used to convict the appellant of impaired driving causing death and other offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the police's appropriation of the samples constituted an unreasonable seizure violating s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the samples existed independently of the breach, the authorities acted in good faith, and the evidence would have been discovered anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after shooting two men involved in drug trafficking who had repeatedly threatened her.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on self-defence but, in answering a jury question, limited the relevance of previous threats to determining whether an assault occurred on the night of the shooting.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that previous threats were also highly relevant to the accused's reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and her belief that she could not otherwise preserve herself.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, sought to deduct nanny wages as business expenses rather than under the capped child care deduction in the Income Tax Act.

The majority held that, although child care expenses raise difficult questions under general business-expense principles, s. 63 specifically and comprehensively addresses child care costs incurred to enable a taxpayer to carry on a business, and therefore precludes deduction under ss. 9 and 18.

The majority further held that the appellant failed to prove that s. 63 drew a distinction based on sex for the purposes of s. 15(1) of the Charter, because the evidentiary record established disproportionate social burdens of child care on women but not disproportionate payment of child care expenses.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on both statutory interpretation and equality analysis.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and kidnapping after carrying the complainant from a trailer without her clothes, transporting her 40 miles to a remote cabin, tying her to a bed and having sexual intercourse with her.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority (5-4) held that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination on the complainant's medical records for the purpose of determining whether there was evidence supporting a defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent or an allegation of fabrication.

All nine justices agreed that s. 265(4) of the Criminal Code, which imposes the air of reality test for the defence of mistaken belief in consent, does not violate ss. 11(d) or 11(f) of the Charter.

The Court extensively discussed the principles governing cross-examination of sexual assault complainants on medical records, the privacy interests at stake, and the proper scope of the air of reality threshold applicable to all criminal defences.

The Crown appealed from an order directing a new trial after a second degree murder conviction arising from a co-accused homicide and robbery scenario.

The Court held that a secondary party may be convicted of manslaughter under both s. 21(1) and s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code even where the principal is guilty of murder, provided the accused lacked the mens rea for murder but met the objective fault standard for manslaughter.

The Court further held that the jury charge was inadequate because it failed to clearly explain that the respondent could be guilty of manslaughter although the principal was guilty of murder.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and elected trial by judge alone.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge found insufficient evidence for the original charge and committed the accused to stand trial on the lesser included offence of common assault.

The prosecutor nevertheless preferred an indictment on the original charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prosecutor had no power to prefer an indictment under section 574 of the Criminal Code for an offence in respect of which the accused had been discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

The appeal was allowed and the indictment quashed.

The appellant, a young offender, was convicted of second-degree murder based on a second statement made to police after an initial statement was ruled inadmissible.

The first statement was excluded because the appellant was not advised of the possibility of being transferred to adult court, vitiating his waiver of the right to counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the second statement was also inadmissible.

It was causally connected to the first statement, as the first statement was a substantial factor leading to the making of the second, and the taint of the initial Charter and Young Offenders Act breaches was not cured by a subsequent consultation with counsel.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial based on the non-disclosure of a victim impact statement and its admission as fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that defence counsel failed to bring the non-disclosure to the trial judge's attention at the earliest opportunity, making a tactical decision instead.

Furthermore, the proposed fresh evidence failed the due diligence criterion of the Palmer test.

The Court of Appeal's judgment was set aside and the matter remitted.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, which was set aside by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that section 465(3) of the Criminal Code does not preclude the application of the Libman real and substantial connection test.

Finding evidence that the alleged trafficking offences had a real and substantial connection to Canada, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the order for a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had quashed the respondent's committal for extradition on a continuing criminal enterprise count.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the matter was governed by its recent decision in Re McVey.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the warrant of committal was restored.

The accused was charged with touching a child for a sexual purpose.

At trial, the Crown successfully requested that the 12-year-old complainant testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 486(2.1) does not infringe the Charter, as the use of a screen to protect young complainants facilitates the truth-seeking process without depriving the accused of the ability to cross-examine or the presumption of innocence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his nine-year-old granddaughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced a videotaped interview of the complainant pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his rights to a fair trial and fundamental justice under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of s. 715.1, finding that it does not offend the rules against hearsay or prior consistent statements, nor does it violate the right to cross-examine, as the complainant must adopt the video contents while testifying.

The Court emphasized the need to accommodate child witnesses in the justice system and reinstated the accused's conviction.

The appellant gravel pit operators challenged municipal by-laws that imposed a volumetric fee for soil and gravel removal permits.

They argued the fees constituted indirect taxation ultra vires the province and that the by-laws were discriminatory.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the volumetric fees, while indirect in their general tendency, were supportable under the provincial licensing power as they were ancillary to a valid regulatory scheme intended to cover the costs of road repair and regulation.

The Court also found that any discrimination between commercial and non-commercial extractors was implicitly authorized by the enabling provincial legislation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a physician, was charged with 14 counts of sexual assault against seven female patients.

Prior to trial, a chambers judge ordered the counts severed and divided based on the part of the body involved in the alleged assault.

At trial, the trial judge excluded evidence relating to the severed counts and the testimony of the respondent's ranking medical officer, and subsequently granted a motion for a non-suit.

The Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial severance order was subject to review despite the rule against collateral attack, and that it was jurisdictionally and substantively flawed.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence and in granting the non-suit by improperly weighing the evidence and applying the wrong standard.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant sued Quebec asbestos companies in British Columbia for damages related to asbestos exposure.

He sought discovery of documents.

The respondents refused, citing the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, which prohibits removing business documents from Quebec pursuant to foreign judicial orders.

The BC courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Quebec statute and dismissed the application to compel production.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the BC courts and the SCC had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Quebec statute.

Applying the principles from Morguard, the Court held that the Quebec blocking statute was constitutionally inapplicable to proceedings in other provinces because it offended the principles of order and fairness inherent in the Canadian federation.

The appellant mortgage company agreed to lend money to a client of the respondent lawyers, on the condition that the mortgage would be a first charge.

The respondents acted for both the borrower and the appellant but failed to advise the appellant of outstanding judgments against the borrower or to obtain postponements.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial judge's finding that the respondents were retained by the appellant, owed a duty of care, and were negligent in failing to secure a first charge or advise the appellant of the risks.

The respondents were held liable for damages, including the costs of lawsuits brought by the appellant to maintain priority.

The accused, a gravedigger, was convicted at trial of offering indignities to human remains after damaging coffins while refilling graves.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and overturned the conviction.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, finding no error in the trial judge's decision and concluding there was evidence to reasonably support the conviction.

The conviction was restored.