Gérard V. La Forest

The accused was charged with unlawful cultivation of marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

Police conducted warrantless perimeter searches of the accused's property, relying on s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act, and subsequently obtained a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the searches violated s. 8, and acquitted the accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act violates s. 8 of the Charter to the extent it authorizes warrantless searches outside exigent circumstances.

However, the Court found the search warrant was validly issued under the Criminal Code and that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the officers acted in good faith and the evidence was real.

The appellant contractor successfully bid on a road building contract and entered into a contract with the province.

The contractor alleged it lost money due to errors in the specifications and construction drawings prepared by the respondent engineering firm.

The contractor sued the engineering firm and the individual engineers for negligent misrepresentation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the engineering firm owed a duty of care to the contractor, as the firm knew contractors would rely on its tender documents.

The contract between the contractor and the province did not negate this duty.

However, the Court dismissed the claim against the individual engineers, finding that merely affixing a professional seal to the documents was insufficient to establish a duty of care.

The respondent contractor successfully tendered for a dredging project using a suction method, but later incurred losses when it could not obtain the necessary permits.

The contractor sued the engineering firm that prepared the tender documents and the conservation authority, alleging negligent misrepresentation for failing to warn about the permit requirements.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an engineer preparing tender documents owes no duty of care to advise prospective contractors about the need for permits or the viability of their chosen construction methods.

The accused was convicted by a jury of engaging in anal intercourse with his step-son.

While the accused's appeal was reserved, the trial judge submitted an unsolicited report to the Court of Appeal stating he would not have convicted the accused and considered the verdict unsafe.

The Court of Appeal relied on this report to quash the conviction and order a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a Court of Appeal should not routinely request a report from a trial judge under s. 682(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the unsolicited report in this case was unauthorized and should not have been considered.

Without the report, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant and her common law husband were charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to their infant son.

At trial, the appellant did not testify, and counsel for the co-accused commented on this failure.

The trial judge instructed the jury on an objective standard for failure to provide necessaries.

During deliberations, the jury asked if they had to agree on guilty or not guilty, and the judge answered they must be unanimous one way or the other.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the judge's answer to the jury's question improperly suggested they did not have the right to disagree, necessitating a new trial.

The Court also held that the objective standard of fault for failure to provide necessaries under s. 215 of the Criminal Code does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant, a police officer, shot and killed a fleeing suspect and was charged with manslaughter.

The Crown argued that the appellant's careless use of a firearm contrary to s. 86(2) of the Criminal Code constituted the predicate unlawful act.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a 'criminal state of mind' was required for a conviction under s. 86(2), and the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the fault requirement under s. 86(2) is an objective standard requiring a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, and that the trial judge's misdirection necessitated a new trial.

The appellant injected the deceased with cocaine, resulting in her death from cardiac arrest and asphyxiation.

He was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the common law definition of unlawful act manslaughter, which requires only objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm rather than death, violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm is the appropriate mens rea for manslaughter and accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal arose from a federal constitutional referendum held everywhere in Canada except Quebec, where a separate provincial referendum proceeded under different residency rules.

The appellants had recently moved from Ontario to Quebec and, because of the interaction of the federal and provincial residency requirements, could vote in neither process.

The majority held that the federal referendum legislation did not extend voting rights to persons ordinarily resident in Quebec on the federal enumeration date, and that the Chief Electoral Officer lacked authority to adapt the scheme to do so.

The Court further held that s. 3 of the Charter does not guarantee a right to vote in a referendum, that s. 2(b) did not require the state to provide this expressive platform, and that s. 15(1) was not infringed.

Appeal dismissed, with dissent on the s. 2(b) issue.

The respondent was charged under a municipal by-law that prohibited all postering on public property after he affixed posters to hydro poles to advertise his band's performances.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that postering conveys a meaning and is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b).

The Court found that the absolute ban on postering on public property infringed freedom of expression.

While the by-law's objectives of preventing litter, aesthetic blight, and safety hazards were pressing and substantial, the complete ban did not minimally impair the right and could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellants, who were minors at the time of their respective motor vehicle accidents, commenced actions for damages more than two years after the accidents but within two years of reaching the age of majority.

The central issue was whether the two-year limitation period in section 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act excluded the operation of section 47 of the Limitations Act, which postpones the running of limitation periods for persons under legal disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are not inconsistent and that section 47 applies to postpone the limitation period for minors.

The appeals of the minor plaintiffs were allowed.

However, the adult plaintiff's claim, which was commenced after the limitation period expired, was held to be incurably out of time and was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the purpose of the practice of indecent acts.

Nude dancers performed in individual cubicles for clients, who were permitted to undress and masturbate during the performance, subject to a strict 'no touching' rule.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the acts did not exceed the community standard of tolerance.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittals and entered convictions after allowing the Crown to amend the charge to include prostitution.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the late amendment caused irreparable prejudice and that the acts, performed in a relatively private setting between consenting adults with no physical contact, did not exceed the contemporary community standard of tolerance.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, tape recorded conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer were admitted into evidence without objection.

Shortly after the trial, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Hebert, which held that statements elicited by undercover officers violate the right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction on this basis.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial solely on the ground of the alleged violation of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death.

After a series of pre-trial delays, the trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, finding the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, raising issues of both pre-trial and appellate delay.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial delay was not unreasonable and that s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, which must instead be addressed under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant, a male prison inmate, challenged the constitutionality of cross-gender frisk searches and unannounced cell patrols conducted by female guards under sections 7, 8, and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that inmates have a substantially reduced expectation of privacy, meaning sections 7 and 8 are not violated by these security practices.

Furthermore, the Court found no violation of section 15 equality rights, noting that the historical, biological, and sociological differences between men and women mean that cross-gender searches do not have the same threatening effect on men as they do on women.

Even if a section 15 breach existed, it would be saved under section 1 due to the important goals of inmate rehabilitation, institutional security, and employment equity.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving causing death.

After a 22-month pre-trial delay, the trial judge stayed the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay after a 15-month appellate delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-trial delay was not unreasonable given the accommodations made for both parties.

The Court further held that s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, and the appellate delay in this case did not violate s. 7 of the Charter as it was not unreasonable and caused no real prejudice.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault on a child and committed for trial 21 months later.

He successfully applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay 14 months later.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that neither the pre-trial delay nor the appellate delay was unreasonable or caused real prejudice to the appellant.

The appeal concerned whether the exemption in s. 65(1) of the Act respecting Municipal Taxation for machines, apparatus and accessories used mainly for industrial production excludes all buildings within the meaning of the Civil Code.

The Court held that the provision must be interpreted in its own legislative context and that industrial production, not traditional civil law categories of immoveables, is the controlling consideration.

The introductory wording of s. 65 does not distinguish between immoveables by nature and moveable objects placed for permanency, and the terms land and building must be read through the statutory framework rather than rigid civil law classifications.

The Court restored the administrative decision that had excluded certain plant components from the assessment roll and allowed the appeal with costs throughout.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his three-year-old son after grabbing the child's genitals for disciplinary purposes.

The appellant argued that the absence of intent for sexual gratification meant the act was not a sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that viewed objectively in all the circumstances, the assault was of a sexual nature and violated the sexual integrity of the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that had granted evocation to overturn a workers' compensation tribunal ruling.

The CALP had interpreted s. 60 of the Act respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases as requiring the employer to pay the injured worker 90% of his net wages for the first 14 days of disability regardless of a plant closure.

The Court held that this interpretation was not patently unreasonable and fell within the CALP's jurisdiction.

The Court further held that conflicting decisions between administrative tribunals do not constitute an independent basis for judicial review, as curial deference and decision-making autonomy must prevail over consistency objectives where decisions are not patently unreasonable.

The appellant, a dual citizen of Ireland and the United Kingdom, was a former member of the INLA who was sentenced to death by the organization after he released hostages for reasons of conscience.

He fled to Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that state complicity is not a prerequisite for persecution under the refugee definition; a state's inability to protect its citizens is sufficient.

The Court also ruled that while the INLA is not a 'particular social group', the appellant's actions constituted an expression of political opinion for which he feared persecution.

However, because the appellant held dual nationality, the Court remitted the matter to the Board to determine whether he could be afforded protection in Great Britain.