Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants, members of the New Brunswick Highway Patrol, were laid off when the province decided to disband the patrol and contract its duties out to the RCMP.

The appellants sued the province for wrongful dismissal, claiming that the contracting out did not constitute a 'discontinuance of a function' under the Civil Service Act, and therefore they were entitled to reasonable notice rather than the 30 days provided by regulation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the disbandment of the patrol and the contracting out of its duties to the RCMP was a bona fide management decision that eliminated the appellants' office, thereby constituting a discontinuance of a function.

The Court further held that the 30-day notice period prescribed by regulation displaced the common law right to reasonable notice.

The appellant was hospitalized following a car accident and blood samples were taken for medical purposes.

The police obtained the blood-alcohol analysis results in violation of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misapplied s. 24(2) principles.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Quebec government referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of the Education Act (Bill 107), which proposed restructuring the province's school boards from a denominational basis (Catholic and Protestant) to a linguistic basis (French and English).

Various school boards and associations appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court held that the creation of linguistic school boards and the dissolution of existing denominational boards did not prejudicially affect the rights and privileges protected by s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provided that the right to dissent and the existence of confessional schools in Montreal and Quebec City were maintained.

The Court upheld the legislation's mechanisms for exercising dissent, allocating property, and managing school taxes.

The appellant broke into the victim's home, armed himself, and waited for the victim to return before shooting him multiple times.

At trial, the appellant claimed he did not intend to kill the victim and that money found on him came from social assistance.

The Crown adduced rebuttal evidence showing he never received social assistance.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the rebuttal evidence was admissible because it related to an essential issue (the robbery) and the Crown could not have foreseen the appellant's testimony.

The Court also found the jury was properly instructed on planning and deliberation, and that there was no air of reality to a manslaughter defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for perjury to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no merit in any of the grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for common nuisance after donating blood he knew to be HIV-contaminated to the Red Cross.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 216 of the Criminal Code imposed a duty of care on the appellant when giving blood.

The Court found this duty was breached by his failure to disclose that his blood contained HIV antibodies, which endangered the life, safety, and health of the public.

The appellant entered into a mortgage agreement that included a profit-sharing scheme.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the scheme constituted a criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that s. 347 is intra vires the Parliament of Canada and does not unconstitutionally infringe on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held there was no unreasonable delay in the proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that most of the delay was waived, caused by the appellant, or attributable to the inherent requirements of the case.

The Court found no unreasonable delay regardless of whether appellate proceedings are covered by the Charter.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed decisions finding that section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, which disqualified prisoners from voting, was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the provision contravened section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the provision was drawn too broadly and failed the minimal impairment component of the proportionality test under section 1 of the Charter.

This appeal concerned the proper sentencing approach under the Young Offenders Act for a youth convicted of multiple break, enter and theft offences and breach of probation, against a background of a significant prior record and severe family dysfunction.

The Court held that s. 3 of the Act is a substantive declaration of principle requiring a balance between accountability, protection of society, and the special needs and guidance required by young persons.

It held that home circumstances may properly inform disposition, proportionality has a different and less dominant role than in adult sentencing, and general deterrence remains relevant but diminished.

The Court also held that the annual review procedure under s. 28 is an integral part of the youth disposition and may be considered as a factor.

The two-year open custody sentence was upheld as fit.

The respondent attempted to register a Mini-Uzi submachine gun as a restricted weapon.

The registrar determined it was a prohibited weapon because it could be easily converted to fully automatic, and a Provincial Court judge ordered its forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal set aside the forfeiture, holding that 'capable' meant capable in its present condition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that 'capable' in the definition of prohibited weapon includes the potential for conversion to an automatic weapon in a relatively short period of time with relative ease, given the legislative purpose of protecting the public.

The appellant, a graduate student with a mental disability, was denied a key to a university building and a rating sheet required for an internship application.

She filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination with respect to a service customarily available to the public.

The member-designate found in her favour, but the decision was overturned on judicial review on the basis that the services were not customarily available to the public.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'public' should be defined in relational terms rather than quantitative terms.

The Court found that the university and its students have a public relationship, and the provision of the key and rating sheet were incidents of that relationship.

The member-designate's finding that the denial was based on mental disability was restored.

The appellant company closed its plant and terminated group insurance benefits for retired workers following the expiration of the collective agreement.

The union grieved the termination of benefits.

The company objected to the arbitrator's jurisdiction on the basis that the collective agreement had expired.

The arbitrator found the matter arbitrable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision on jurisdiction must be correct, applying a pragmatic and functional approach.

The Court further held that retirement benefits can vest and survive the expiration of a collective agreement, allowing the grievance to proceed.

The appellant and respondent had been drinking.

The respondent allowed the impaired appellant to drive his car to attempt a rolling start on a steep gravel road.

The appellant lost control, crashed, and suffered head injuries.

The trial judge found the respondent 75% liable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, applying the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio to bar the appellant's claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the ex turpi causa defence does not apply to bar recovery for personal injuries in tort, as compensation does not allow the plaintiff to profit from illegal conduct.

Liability was reapportioned equally between the parties.

The appellant, serving a 12-year sentence for manslaughter, was originally entitled to release on mandatory supervision after serving two-thirds of his sentence.

Prior to his release, the Parole Act was amended to allow the Commissioner of Corrections to refer inmates to the National Parole Board if there were reasonable grounds to believe they would commit an offence causing death or serious harm.

The Commissioner referred the appellant's case, and the Board ordered his continued detention.

The appellant challenged the amendment under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the amendment deprived the appellant of a liberty interest, it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice, as it struck a fair balance between the prisoner's interests and the protection of society.

The patient underwent a cerebral angiogram to locate a suspected aneurism.

During the procedure, she experienced discomfort, hyperventilated, and asked the doctors to stop.

After calming down, she was asked if she wished the test completed and she consented.

Following the final injection, she suffered a rare reaction rendering her a quadriplegic.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a patient may withdraw consent during a procedure, the patient here had validly consented to its continuation.

The doctors were not required to repeat the full disclosure of risks because there had been no material change in circumstances.

The appellants were investigated for income tax evasion and search warrants were issued under s. 231.3 of the Income Tax Act.

After the initial warrants were quashed, a second warrant was issued.

The appellants challenged the second warrant and the constitutionality of s. 231.3 by way of an originating petition for a declaration.

The British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the matter was criminal in nature.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an action for a declaration, and that s. 231.3 of the Income Tax Act violates s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant, the directing mind of a residential construction company, took deposits from potential home purchasers on the false representation that the deposits were insured.

The company became insolvent, the project was not completed, and most depositors lost their money.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of fraud, noting that while he sincerely believed the project would be completed, he deliberately lied about the insurance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of subjective knowledge of the prohibited act and subjective knowledge that the act could result in deprivation.

An honest belief that the project would be completed and no one would ultimately be harmed does not negate the mens rea of fraud.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada arguing that their right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated due to delays in the provision of legal aid.

The Court applied the principles from Askov and Morin, considering the special circumstances, complexity, and length of the cases.

The Court agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no unreasonable delay and dismissed the appeals.

The respondent, a recipient of social assistance in Manitoba, challenged the province's practice of making deductions from his monthly allowance to recover past overpayments, arguing it violated the federal Canada Assistance Plan (CAP).

He also challenged Manitoba's practice of allowing municipalities to set their own social assistance rates.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that CAP requires provinces to provide assistance in an amount compatible with an individual's basic requirements, but does not prohibit the recovery of overpayments, provided such deductions do not cause undue hardship.

The Court also held that CAP permits municipalities to set assistance rates, provided the province establishes the criteria for determining persons in need.

The appeal by the federal government was allowed.