Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.

He was referred to a secondary examination by an immigration officer, during which he omitted important factual details about his claim.

He was not advised of his right to counsel until the conclusion of this examination.

The appellant argued that the secondary examination constituted a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter and that his s. 7 rights were violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a secondary examination at a port of entry is a routine part of the screening process and does not constitute a detention within the meaning of s. 10(b).

Furthermore, the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 do not require the provision of counsel during routine information gathering at a port of entry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondent lived in a common law relationship for 12 years, during which the appellant provided unpaid domestic services and maintained the respondent's property.

After separation, the appellant claimed an interest in the property based on unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision of unpaid domestic services can give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment and that a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy where a monetary award is inadequate.

The Court restored the trial judge's decision awarding the appellant the property.

The appellants, representing individuals injured by asbestos exposure, commenced an action in Texas against various asbestos companies.

The respondent companies obtained an anti-suit injunction in British Columbia to restrain the Texas proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, establishing the Canadian test for anti-suit injunctions.

The Court held that an anti-suit injunction should only be granted if the foreign court assumed jurisdiction on a basis inconsistent with Canadian rules of forum non conveniens and if allowing the foreign action to proceed would result in an injustice.

The appellant taxpayer incurred travel and entertainment expenses by hosting customers and employees at a fishing lodge and sought to deduct these expenses.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Federal Court of Appeal that the expenses were clearly precluded from deduction by section 18(1)(l)(i) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant was driving an overloaded dump truck and entered an intersection on a red light, striking and killing a motorist.

He was convicted of dangerous driving causing death.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the issue was whether the mens rea for dangerous driving requires a subjective or objective standard.

The Court held that the mens rea for dangerous driving should be assessed objectively, but in the context of all the events surrounding the incident (the modified objective test).

The appeal was dismissed.

The Lieutenant Governor in Council of Manitoba referred constitutional questions to the Court of Appeal regarding the validity of provisions in the Public Schools Act under section 23 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to minority language educational facilities includes the right to a distinct physical setting.

Applying the sliding scale approach from Mahe, the Court found that the number of potential French language students in Manitoba warranted the establishment of an independent French language school board under the exclusive management and control of the linguistic minority.

The existing provisions of the Public Schools Act failed to meet these constitutional obligations.

The appellant appealed her conviction for sexual assault, arguing the defence of duress.

The appellant's common law spouse had ordered her pre-teen son to have intercourse with her, and she was a co-perpetrator of the assaults.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the defence of duress was not applicable because it is only relevant where an accused is liable as a party, not as a co-perpetrator.

The police entered the respondent's house to enforce a noise by-law after being invited in by her guests.

The respondent subsequently requested that the police leave, revoking the invitation.

The police refused to leave and arrested the respondent for obstructing a police officer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the revocation of the invitation made the police's continued presence and the subsequent arrest unlawful.

The accused fled from police after committing a provincial traffic offence and entered an apartment.

The pursuing officer entered the apartment without a warrant, arrested the accused, and subsequently charged him with impaired driving and other offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law hot pursuit exception to the sanctity of the home extends to provincial offences, provided there is a statutory power of arrest without a warrant.

The Court also found no violation of the accused's Charter rights under sections 7 and 9, as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when fleeing police to escape arrest.

Appeal from a Federal Court of Appeal judgment setting aside a Human Rights Tribunal decision that had found discrimination in the denial of bereavement leave to a federal employee seeking leave to attend the funeral of his same-sex partner's father.

The Supreme Court majority held that the interpretation of 'family status' under the Canadian Human Rights Act was a question of law reviewable for correctness under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act.

On the merits, the majority concluded that, at the material time, 'family status' did not include same-sex relationships and that reading it otherwise would indirectly introduce protection for sexual orientation that Parliament had not then enacted.

The dissent would have deferred to the Tribunal's broad and purposive interpretation and would have reinstated the finding of discrimination.

On a labour grievance arbitration appeal, the Court considered whether exclusion of evidence by a grievance arbitrator is reviewable notwithstanding deference owed under a privative regime.

The Court held that an arbitrator has broad authority to define the scope of the case and manage evidence, and mere evidentiary error is not automatically jurisdictional.

However, where refusal to hear relevant and admissible evidence undermines the fairness of the hearing and breaches audi alteram partem, judicial review is available as an excess of jurisdiction.

Because the excluded evidence went directly to the asserted lack of funds and the employees' alleged responsibility for that shortage, the new arbitration order before another arbitrator was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully exposing goods on a municipal road allowance without lawful authority after selling T-shirts on a street corner.

The municipality had delegated licensing authority to the city, which only permitted owners or occupiers of abutting property to apply for a licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the by-law was ultra vires the municipality because it was not specifically authorized by the provincial enabling legislation.

The Court found that the by-law's broad prohibition on exposing articles on sidewalks was not authorized by provisions relating to retail sales, public nuisances, or highway obstructions.

The appellant, a street flower vendor, was charged with exposing goods for sale without a licence contrary to a municipal by-law and with obstructing a peace officer after refusing to obey an order to move.

The by-law scheme permitted only owners or occupants of abutting property to apply for a sidewalk use licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling provincial legislation did not authorize the municipality to discriminate between free-standing street vendors and owner/occupant vendors, rendering the by-law ultra vires.

Consequently, the conviction for obstructing a peace officer was also set aside, as the officer had no authority to arrest the appellant for failing to comply with an order enforcing an invalid by-law.

The appellant's tug, the Ohio, was leading a flotilla towing a barge when navigational errors by the Ohio's master caused the barge to collide with a moored ship.

The appellant sought to limit its liability under s. 647(2) of the Canada Shipping Act.

The lower courts held the appellant could not limit its liability because the master was a 'directing mind' of the corporation, making his negligence the 'actual fault or privity' of the company.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the master was not a directing mind as he did not have governing executive authority over corporate policy.

The Court further held that the appellant was entitled to limit its liability based solely on the tonnage of the tug Ohio, rather than the aggregate tonnage of all its vessels in the flotilla.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into a three-year-old child's capacity to testify before admitting the mother's hearsay evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

Assuming without deciding that the trial judge erred, the Court held that the evidence was such that it was a proper case to apply the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal orally, finding that the dissent in the court below was not on a question of law within the meaning of s. 691(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada, raising the issue of whether self-induced intoxication resulting in automatism is a defence.

The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's finding of fact that the case was merely one of intoxication, rendering the automatism issue moot.

The appeal concerned a media challenge to the Nova Scotia House of Assembly's refusal to permit television cameras in the public gallery to film legislative proceedings.

The central issue was whether the exercise of parliamentary privilege by a provincial legislative assembly is subject to Charter review, particularly under ss. 2(b) and 32(1)(b).

A majority held that the impugned privilege to exclude strangers and control internal proceedings enjoyed constitutional status or otherwise fell outside Charter scrutiny, and therefore the Charter did not invalidate the Assembly's decision.

The appeal was allowed and the declaration granting media access was set aside, with separate majority reasons differing on the route to immunity and a dissent finding an unjustified infringement of freedom of expression.

The appellants appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision quashing search warrants issued under section 231.3 of the Income Tax Act.

The respondents challenged the warrants, arguing that section 231.3 violated section 8 of the Charter by using the imperative word 'shall', thereby removing the authorizing judge's residual discretion to refuse a warrant even if statutory criteria were met.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a residual discretion is an indispensable requirement for a reasonable search under section 8 of the Charter.

Section 231.3(3) was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appellant suffered a back injury in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for loss of earning capacity as a self-employed bakery owner.

The trial judge assessed pecuniary damages based on the after-tax cost of replacement labour and found the appellant did not fail to mitigate her damages by refusing further medical testing, as her doctors recommended conservative treatment.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, criticizing the damages calculation and finding the refusal of testing unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the replacement labour cost was a reasonable method to assess damages in these circumstances and that the appellant's refusal of medical testing was not arbitrary or unreasonable given the medical evidence.