Gérard V. La Forest

The insured subscribed to a group life insurance policy and named his wife as beneficiary under the Husbands and Parents Life Insurance Act.

Years later, after the Civil Code was amended to allow gifts between spouses and the insurance policy was renewed, the insured attempted to revoke his wife as beneficiary and name a third party.

Following the insured's death, the wife sought a declaration that she was entitled to the proceeds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the revocation was invalid because the special Act, which restricted revocation to preferred beneficiaries, continued to apply with peremptory force despite the Civil Code amendments and the renewal of the policies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment authorizing the respondent, a Director appointed under the Canada Business Corporations Act, to summon witnesses for an examination on discovery in the context of an oppression remedy settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the interlocutory judgment was not appealable as of right.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 249 of the Act only permits appeals as of right for orders made pursuant to powers expressly conferred by the Act, not for interlocutory judgments rendered under suppletive provincial rules of civil procedure.

The appellants were members of a Hutterite colony who were expelled following a dispute over a hog feeder patent and subsequent disobedience to the colony's leadership.

The colony sought a court order to enforce the expulsion and require the appellants to vacate the colony lands.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while courts are slow to intervene in the internal affairs of voluntary religious associations, they will do so when property or civil rights are at stake.

The Court found that the expulsion was invalid because the colony failed to provide the appellants with adequate notice of the meetings where their expulsion was considered, thereby violating the principles of natural justice.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant pharmaceutical laboratory brought passing-off actions against two generic drug manufacturers, alleging their metoprolol tablets had the same size, shape, and colour as the appellant's product.

The lower courts, relying on previous jurisprudence, held that in a passing-off action for prescription drugs, the plaintiff must establish confusion among physicians and pharmacists, excluding patients.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the clientele of pharmaceutical laboratories includes the patients who consume the drugs, and there is no reason in law to deprive pharmaceutical laboratories of the means of proof available to other industries.

A husband and wife purchased a joint life insurance policy naming the survivor as the beneficiary.

The husband subsequently murdered his wife and claimed the insurance proceeds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that public policy prevented the husband from recovering the proceeds as a wrongdoer cannot profit from his crime.

The Court further held that the contract could not be interpreted to require payment to the wife's estate, nor could a constructive trust be imposed, as the insurer was simply complying with the express terms of the contract and there was no unjust enrichment.

The appellant, a victim of childhood incest by her father, brought an action for damages for assault and battery and breach of fiduciary duty when she was 28 years old.

The trial judge held the action was barred by the Limitations Act, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the tort claim was subject to the reasonable discoverability rule, and the limitation period did not begin to run until the appellant entered therapy and realized the causal connection between her injuries and the abuse.

The Court also held that a parent owes a fiduciary duty to their child, and incest constitutes a breach of that duty, which is not subject to the statutory limitation period.

The applicants sought leave to appeal and cross-appeal, as well as an order to expedite the hearing to take place immediately prior to a national referendum.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal, waiving ordinary rules of procedure.

However, the Court refused the request for an expedited hearing on one day's notice, noting the constitutional importance of the issues, the right of Attorneys General and potential interveners to be heard, and the impossibility of adequately deliberating before the referendum.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissenting opinion in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had set aside the accused's conviction for attempted murder.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, agreeing with the dissenting judge that the majority of the Court of Appeal had merely disagreed with the trial judge on the weight of evidence, which did not constitute an error of law.

The appellant, a Seventh-day Adventist, was unable to work his scheduled Friday evening shift due to his religious beliefs.

The employer and the appellant found a workable accommodation that required an exception to the collective agreement, but the union refused to consent and threatened a policy grievance.

The employer subsequently terminated the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the employer and the union have a duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs short of undue hardship.

The union's refusal to cooperate in a reasonable accommodation made it jointly liable with the employer for the adverse effect discrimination.

The appeal was allowed and the member designate's decision in favour of the appellant was restored.

Following a judgment awarding aggravated and punitive damages for sexual assaults, the appellant applied for a re-hearing on the issue of interest.

On consent of the parties, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered that $15,017.48 in interest be awarded on the aggravated damages from the mid-point of the assaults to the date of judgment, with no interest on the punitive damages.

The appellant challenged a university policy requiring retirement at age 65 as age discrimination contrary to provincial human rights legislation.

The majority held that, although the policy was prima facie discriminatory, the employer established that the practice was reasonable and justifiable under the statutory defence because it furthered tenure, academic renewal, planning, and retirement objectives, and no obvious less impairing alternative would achieve the same results in the university context.

The Court also held that the statutory appeal scheme permitted appellate courts to reassess the factual record without the usual curial deference to the board of inquiry or reviewing judge.

The dissent would have applied a stricter human rights standard, given deference to the board's factual findings, and held the policy unjustified.

The appellants obtained a permanent injunction ordering the respondents to cease distributing decoders that descrambled pay television signals.

The appellants subsequently filed an application alleging the respondents committed contempt of court by failing to comply with the injunction.

At the hearing, the appellants called one of the respondents to testify, but he objected on the ground that he was not compellable in a proceeding where he was cited for contempt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a person cited for contempt under the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be compelled to testify, as contempt of court is quasi-penal in nature and compelling testimony would violate the fundamental principle against self-incrimination.

The accused was charged under the Young Offenders Act with theft committed when he was 17.

At age 18, he made an inculpatory statement to police without being advised of his right to have an adult present, as required for young persons under s. 56(2) of the Act.

The trial judge excluded the statement and acquitted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the special protections in s. 56(2) do not apply to statements made by an accused who is 18 years of age or older, as the context of the provision requires the term 'young person' to be limited to those under 18.

The appellant Bank financed the purchase of a company by the respondents, who guaranteed the loans.

The Bank, concerned about the company's finances, deceitfully obtained the respondents' consent to appoint a receiver by misrepresenting its intentions.

The company was placed in receivership and the Bank sued the respondents on their guarantees.

The trial judge found the Bank deceitful but held the guarantors liable as the company was insolvent and the receivership actually reduced their liability.

The Court of Appeal discharged the guarantors due to the Bank's deceit.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Bank's appeal, holding that a guarantor is not discharged by a creditor's misrepresentations or irregular conduct unless it materially alters the risk assumed or causes prejudice to the guarantor.

The accused was charged with murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on hearsay evidence of telephone calls made by the deceased to her mother on the night of her death, as well as character evidence suggesting the accused was a drug smuggler.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the hearsay and character evidence inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court held that while the first two telephone calls were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay based on necessity and reliability, the third call lacked a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.

Furthermore, the character evidence was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the murder charge, warranting a new trial.

The respondent attacked his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, killing his mother-in-law and seriously injuring his father-in-law.

At trial, he presented a defence of non-insane automatism, supported by uncontradicted expert medical evidence that sleepwalking is a sleep disorder, not a neurological or psychiatric illness.

The trial judge left only the defence of non-insane automatism with the jury, which acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that on the evidence and policy considerations, sleepwalking in this case did not stem from a 'disease of the mind' and was properly classified as non-insane automatism, entitling the accused to an absolute acquittal.

The appellant was originally charged with sexual assault for acts committed before the offence of sexual assault was enacted.

After a preliminary inquiry and committal for trial, the error was discovered.

The Crown immediately preferred a new indictment for indecent assault, which was the correct charge at the time of the offences.

The appellant argued the new indictment required the Attorney General's personal consent under s. 577 of the Criminal Code because the preliminary inquiry on the non-existent charge was a nullity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the error in the original indictment was voidable, not void, and the preliminary inquiry provided a valid foundation for the new indictment under s. 574(1).

The appellant challenged his conviction for spreading false news arising from publication of a pamphlet denying the Holocaust.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that s. 181 of the Criminal Code infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter because it criminalized a broad range of expression, including false statements, and that the provision could not be justified under s. 1.

The majority found the provision lacked a pressing and substantial objective demonstrably tied to Parliament's intent and was overly broad and disproportionate in its reach.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered, and the dissent would have upheld the provision as a justified limit aimed at preventing serious harm caused by deliberate injurious lies.

The respondent, a natural father, was denied parental benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, which provided such benefits only to adoptive parents.

The trial judge found this violated s. 15 of the Charter and used s. 24(1) to read natural parents into the legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while reading in is a permissible remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it was inappropriate in this case due to the budgetary implications and the lack of a clear legislative mandate.

The Court concluded that the proper remedy was to declare the provision invalid but suspend the declaration to allow Parliament to amend the legislation.

The accused was involved in a single-vehicle accident and taken to the hospital.

More than two hours after the accident, a police officer formed the belief that the accused was impaired and demanded a blood sample, which the accused refused.

The trial judge and the Court of Appeal acquitted the accused on the basis that the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code must be made within two hours of the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 254(3) only requires the police officer to form the belief within two hours of the offence, and the demand itself must follow forthwith or as soon as practicable, even if outside the two-hour limit.