Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant obtained a hypothecary loan guaranteed by her husband, accompanied by a disability insurance policy.

After an injury, the insurer paid benefits but later ceased payments when the appellant refused to provide a medical certificate.

The lender sued for default, and the appellant brought an action in warranty against the insurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the insured has a contractual obligation to provide evidence of continuing disability, the legal burden of proof rests on the insurer to establish that the disability has ceased once the obligation to pay has arisen.

However, the insurer may interrupt payments if the insured fails to provide satisfactory evidence.

The appeal was dismissed because the trial judge's factual finding that the disability had ceased was supported by overwhelming medical evidence, rendering the error on the burden of proof immaterial.

The appellant insurer issued a hybrid 'claims-made' liability policy to the respondent engineering firm.

The respondent admitted negligence regarding a sewer project and was indemnified for initial remedial work.

After the policy expired, further damage from the same negligence was discovered, and the appellant refused coverage, arguing it was a new claim made outside the policy period.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the subsequent damages formed part of the original claim made during the policy period, and alternatively, that the substance of the new claim was communicated to the respondent before the policy expired.

The accused was acquitted of three counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them to reject the accused's out-of-court confession if his trial testimony raised a reasonable doubt about it.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not improperly instruct the jury to evaluate the evidence in a piecemeal or two-stage fashion.

The appellant loaned money to limited-dividend housing companies to build low-rental housing, secured by first mortgages and operating agreements prohibiting sale or encumbrance without consent.

The companies granted second mortgages and later sold the properties without consent.

The second mortgagee sought a judicial sale in a foreclosure action, and the purchasers sought a declaration that they were not bound by the operating agreements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transactions were not illegal under the National Housing Act, nor were they ultra vires the companies' powers.

The equitable 'clean hands' doctrine did not bar relief.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the purchasers were not entitled to prepay the mortgages because the unauthorized sales constituted a default under the mortgages.

The appellant, a chartered accountant, was interviewed for a management position with the respondent software company.

During the interview, the respondent's representative negligently misrepresented the nature and existence of the project the appellant was to work on, failing to disclose that funding was not guaranteed.

Relying on these representations, the appellant left a secure job and relocated his family.

He signed an employment contract allowing termination without cause on one month's notice.

Shortly after starting, the project's funding was denied and the appellant was eventually terminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent owed a duty of care during the pre-employment interview, which was breached by the negligent misrepresentations.

The Court further held that the subsequent employment contract did not bar the independent tort claim, restoring the trial judge's award of damages.

Hydro called for tenders to erect transmission towers and string lines.

The tender documents stated the right-of-way would be cleared by others.

Checo's representative inspected the site and assumed further clearing would occur.

The parties entered into a contract incorporating the tender documents.

No further clearing occurred, causing Checo difficulties.

Checo sued for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a plaintiff may sue concurrently in tort and contract unless the contract limits or negates the right to sue in tort.

The contract did not exclude Hydro's liability for negligent misrepresentation, nor did it negate its contractual duty to clear the right-of-way.

The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed in part, with damages remitted to the trial division for reassessment.

The parties separated after a traditional marriage where the wife was primarily responsible for child care and domestic duties while also working part-time.

Years later, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, arguing the wife should have achieved economic self-sufficiency.

The trial judge terminated support, but the Court of Appeal reinstated it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the husband's appeal, holding that the Divorce Act requires a fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the economic consequences of marriage or its breakdown.

The Court rejected the strict self-sufficiency model, finding that all four objectives in section 17(7) of the Act must be considered, including compensation for economic disadvantages arising from the marriage.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had allowed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding cross-examination of the complainant on a collateral matter tendered solely for credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion.

The Court found that the relevance of the proposed evidence was tenuous and its potential for prejudice and misleading the jury was significant.

The appellants, who used explosives as stonemasons and rifles as seasonal hunting guides, appealed their sentences which included a mandatory prohibition against possessing firearms or ammunition under s. 100 of the Criminal Code.

They argued the prohibition constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 100 does not offend s. 12 of the Charter and declining to grant a constitutional exemption.

The Crown appealed from a decision upholding a stay of proceedings granted after the accused's dismissal from employment.

The central issue was whether the circumstances amounted to a violation of the accused's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or an abuse of process justifying a stay.

The Court held that the governing authority was Vermette and found no Charter breach and no abuse of process on the facts.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with major narcotics offences while awaiting trial for another indictable offence.

He was denied bail initially but released on review.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the constitutionality of the bail provisions.

The Court held that the 'public safety' component of s. 515(10)(b) and the reverse onus provisions in ss. 515(6)(a) and (d) are constitutionally valid.

However, the Court struck down the 'public interest' component of s. 515(10)(b) as unconstitutionally vague, violating the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal ruling declaring unconstitutional a reverse-onus bail provision applicable to certain narcotics offences.

The Supreme Court held that habeas corpus was available in the narrow circumstances of a constitutional challenge seeking both a declaration under s. 52 and a remedial order under s. 24(1), but reaffirmed that bail review under the Criminal Code is ordinarily the proper route.

On the merits, the majority held that the reverse-onus provision did not infringe ss. 7, 9, 11(d), or 11(e) of the Charter because it operated in a narrow class of offences and was justified by the functioning of the bail system in relation to drug trafficking and flight risk.

The appeal was allowed and the habeas corpus application dismissed, subject only to the contemporaneous modification arising from Morales.

The United States sought to extradite the appellant for fraud-related charges.

After a warrant of committal was issued, the Minister of Justice signed a warrant of surrender.

The appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Minister violated section 7 of the Charter by relying on a confidential internal memorandum not disclosed to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus for impending secondary detention like a warrant of surrender.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional or actual bias in the Minister's decision-making process, and concluding that the internal memorandum was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) faced a solvency crisis and received a $255 million advance from a support group consisting of governments and major banks.

When CCB was subsequently ordered to be wound up, the liquidator sought advice on whether the support group's claim for the advance should rank pari passu with other unsecured creditors or be postponed as a capital investment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the advance was in substance a loan, not a capital investment, despite having some equity features like warrants.

The Court also held that the loan did not fall within the postponement provision of the Partnerships Act because the lenders were not receiving a share of the profits, but rather repayment of a fixed debt out of profits.

Finally, the Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable subordination, finding no inequitable conduct by the support group.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for conspiracy to export high-technology equipment to the U.S.S.R. and for a scheme to defraud a computer corporation.

The extradition judges committed the respondent, but the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted habeas corpus, holding that the offences must be listed in the extradition treaty according to both Canadian and U.S. law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether a prima facie case exists that the conduct constitutes an extradition crime according to Canadian law, and does not require proof of foreign law.

The appellant municipality sought restitution from the federal and provincial governments for monies paid to support juvenile delinquents placed in group homes under an ultra vires provision of the Juvenile Delinquents Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the municipality failed to establish that its payments conferred an 'incontrovertible benefit' on either level of government.

Neither government was under a legal obligation to pay for the juveniles' care, and the payments did not discharge a liability or save them an inevitable expense.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of first degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that a new trial should be held, but agreeing with the trial judge that the accused's statement was properly excluded due to a violation of the right to counsel.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from an order staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the complexity of the case was an important factor justifying the delay, and ordered an expedited trial.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings and remitted the matter to trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, applying the principles from R. v. Morin.

The Court held that there was no unreasonable delay within the meaning of s. 11(b) of the Charter and ordered that the trial be expedited.

The appellant sought full tort recovery against employees who negligently damaged a transformer while performing warehousing services under a storage contract containing a $40 limitation of liability clause.

The Court held that the employees owed a duty of care to the customer, but also held that the doctrine of privity should be relaxed to permit employees to rely on their employer's contractual limitation clause where the clause expressly or impliedly extends to them and they were acting in the course of employment while performing the contracted services.

Applying that framework, the employees' liability was limited to $40.

The appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed, with one judge dissenting on the cross-appeal and concluding no duty of care existed.