Jacques Larochelle

A journalist was subpoenaed to testify in support of an accused's motion for a stay of proceedings on the ground of abuse of process, seeking to identify government sources responsible for leaking confidential information.

The Court considered the new federal statutory scheme for the protection of journalistic sources in s. 39.1 of the Canada Evidence Act, enacted by the Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c. 22.

The majority held that the new scheme shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking disclosure, establishes reasonable necessity as a threshold requirement, and requires a balancing of the public interest in the administration of justice against the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of journalistic sources.

The appeal against the Quebec Court of Appeal's finding that it lacked jurisdiction was dismissed.

The appeal against the Superior Court's authorization of disclosure was allowed in part due to the Crown's change of position, with the case remanded to the court of original jurisdiction for reconsideration once new evidence from a government investigation is disclosed.

The dissent would have set aside the disclosure authorization outright, finding fundamental legal errors in the Superior Court's application of the new statutory scheme.

The appellant sought recognition in Quebec of an Ontario judgment certifying a national class proceeding and approving a settlement regarding a discontinued lifetime Internet service.

A parallel class action had already been authorized in Quebec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ontario judgment could not be recognized in Quebec.

Although the Ontario court had jurisdiction, the notice provided to Quebec class members was confusing and contravened fundamental principles of procedure.

Furthermore, the prior commencement of the Quebec proceeding created a situation of lis pendens, which also precluded recognition under the Civil Code of Québec.

The appellant operated a cement plant that caused excessive dust, noise, and odours for neighbouring residents.

The respondents brought a class action for damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under article 976 of the Civil Code of Québec, a no-fault liability regime exists for neighbourhood disturbances where the annoyances suffered are abnormal or excessive.

The Court found the appellant liable despite its compliance with environmental regulations and lack of wrongful conduct.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's use of average amounts to assess damages for the class members.

The respondent was imprisoned for failing to pay fines under the Quebec Highway Safety Code.

He sought authorization to bring a class action against the government for damages, alleging the sentencing provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court denied authorization, finding no serious colour of right, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter generally cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Superior Court judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny authorization.

The Quebec government referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of the Education Act (Bill 107), which proposed restructuring the province's school boards from a denominational basis (Catholic and Protestant) to a linguistic basis (French and English).

Various school boards and associations appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court held that the creation of linguistic school boards and the dissolution of existing denominational boards did not prejudicially affect the rights and privileges protected by s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provided that the right to dissent and the existence of confessional schools in Montreal and Quebec City were maintained.

The Court upheld the legislation's mechanisms for exercising dissent, allocating property, and managing school taxes.

Members of a Huron band were prosecuted for cutting trees, camping, and making fires in a provincial park while carrying out ancestral customs and religious rites.

The Court held that a 1760 document signed by General Murray was a treaty within s. 88 of the Indian Act, remained in force, and protected the exercise of the respondents' customs and religion on territory frequented by the Hurons in 1760, so long as the activity was not incompatible with Crown occupancy.

The Court adopted a broad and liberal approach to treaty interpretation, capacity, and extinguishment, and found that provincial park regulation could not be enforced against the respondents in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants' mother, acting as their tutrix, sold immoveables in which her minor children owned an undivided two-thirds share to her own mother, who shortly thereafter gifted the property back to the tutrix.

The property was later sold to bona fide third party purchasers and subsequently expropriated by the province.

The appellants brought a direct action in nullity to annul the initial sale, the gift, and subsequent deeds, arguing the tutrix's purchase through an interposed party violated the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the sale was irremediably vitiated and that the apparent defect in title could be opposed to the bona fide third party purchasers.

A prior judgment authorizing confirmation of the voidable deeds was also annulled because it unlawfully authorized a confirmation during the minority of the pupils.

Following a bus drivers' strike, the appellant sought authorization to bring a class action against the transit commission for a refund of bus passes and damages.

The Superior Court authorized the action, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that under art. 1003(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the facts alleged need only show a 'colour of right' to justify the conclusions sought, rather than requiring a determination on the merits in law.

The Court also found that the transit commission had a legal obligation of conveyance to users under art. 1673 of the Civil Code, and that commencing the suit constituted putting the respondent in default.