Gaspard Côté

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The appellant union sought a declaration that teachers working in a federal penitentiary through a private contractor were government employees and members of the existing bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes.

The majority held that, applying the pragmatic and functional approach, Parliament did not intend to confer jurisdiction on the labour board to determine that persons not appointed within the statutory public service scheme were employees of the Public Service.

The statutory regime created distinct labour relations structures for public servants and other federal workers, leaving no room for a de facto category of public servant.

The board therefore committed reviewable jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have held the issue fell within the board's labour relations expertise and that its decision was not patently unreasonable.

The respondent brought an action in the Federal Court alleging the appellants formed an agreement violating the Combines Investigation Act and claiming damages under both the Act and the Civil Code of Lower Canada.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provisions creating a private cause of action and conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court, as well as the court's competence to hear the provincial law claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions of the Combines Investigation Act are intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power.

The Court further held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim under the federal Act, but lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim based on the Civil Code.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, which affirmed an Umpire's decision under the Labour Adjustment Benefits Act regarding the deductibility of pension benefits paid into an R.R.S.P. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that neither the Board of referees nor the Umpire had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The appellant, an agent of the Crown in right of Quebec, purchased over 10 per cent of the shares of a company governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act, becoming an insider.

It refused to submit an insider report, claiming Crown immunity under s. 16 of the federal Interpretation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insider reporting provisions applied to the appellant.

By purchasing shares, the appellant implicitly accepted the benefits of the statutory regime and could not accept the benefit of the law without also incurring its burdens.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he obtained employment, shortly after which he sustained a serious injury and received temporary total disability benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board.

When he was fit to return to work, his previous job no longer existed, and he requested an extension of his initial benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The request was denied pursuant to s. 36 of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to an extension of his benefit period, following its concurrent decision in Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) v. Gagnon.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he was hospitalized for a work-related injury during his extended benefit period.

He received temporary total workmen's compensation payments, suspending his unemployment benefits.

After recovering, he applied for an extension of his benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The application was dismissed on the basis that s. 36 disentitled him to extended benefits because he was not capable of and available for work.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 20(7) is intended to apply to an extension of a benefit period in respect of extended benefit, and the claimant is entitled to an extension despite being disentitled under s. 36 during his incapacity.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits to which he was not entitled, resulting in a debt to the respondent Commission.

The appellant subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy.

During the bankruptcy, the respondent reimbursed itself for the overpayment by deducting the amount from subsequent unemployment insurance benefits payable to the appellant.

The appellant sought a declaration that this deduction was unlawful.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the deduction contravened the stay of proceedings under section 49(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, as the provision broadly covers any kind of recovery, judicial or extrajudicial, and is not limited to property divisible among creditors.

The appellant, a trustee in bankruptcy, acquired the right to sell goods purchased by the bankrupt company.

He argued that the company incurred liability to pay excise tax on the goods at the time of purchase, making it a claim provable in bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the Court of Appeal's reasons, finding no obligation arose prior to bankruptcy as the goods were not sold or retained for use.

The trustee was held liable to pay the tax upon selling the goods, deductible as an administration expense.

The Department of National Defence established schools on a military base for the children of service members and civilian employees.

The teachers formed an association and applied for certification under the Quebec Labour Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec Labour Code does not apply to these teachers because they are employees of the federal government.

Parliament has exclusive authority over the labour relations of all federal government employees, regardless of whether their activities (such as education) would ordinarily fall within provincial jurisdiction.

The appellants challenged a Quebec Court of Appeal judgment that authorized a writ of evocation against the Canada Labour Relations Board.

The Board had found that two subsidiaries of a television broadcaster were federal undertakings subject to the Canada Labour Code.

The Supreme Court held that s. 18 of the Federal Court Act did not strip the Superior Court of its superintending power when the Board's decision concerned constitutional division of powers rather than administration of federal law.

On the merits, the Court found that selling sponsored air time and producing programs and commercials did not constitute broadcasting activities, and the subsidiaries' operations were not vitally or integrally related to the parent broadcaster's federal undertaking.

The Commission des droits de la personne investigated the dismissal of two employees following an unfavourable RCMP report.

The Commission ordered an RCMP officer to produce documents, but the Solicitor General of Canada filed an affidavit objecting on national security grounds under s. 41(2) of the Federal Court Act.

The Commission dismissed the objection, prompting the Attorney General of Canada to seek a writ of evocation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Commission's appeal, holding that the Commission is a court within the meaning of s. 41(2), the affidavit was sufficient, and the absolute Crown privilege created by the provision is constitutionally valid and not barred by the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The employer successfully applied for unemployment insurance premium reductions for 1974, 1975, and 1976.

In 1977, an officer of the Unemployment Insurance Commission rejected the application for that year and retroactively revoked the reductions granted for the previous three years.

The employer sought review of the revocation.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the officer exercised a quasi-judicial function and lacked the express power to revoke previous decisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Commission's appeal, confirming that the statutory scheme and regulations did not permit the Commission or its officers to retroactively and suo motu revoke premium reductions previously granted.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal affirming a deportation order.

The notice of appeal was filed in October 1976 but the appeal was not brought for hearing within the one-year period required by Rule 59 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appeal was abandoned by virtue of Rule 59 and declined to order otherwise.