Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the appellant's conversation with a police constable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter was not violated and that the excluded evidence might have reasonably affected the verdict.

The appellant union went on strike contrary to directives of the provincial Labour Relations Board that had been filed with the Court of Queen's Bench.

The union was found in criminal contempt of the orders and fined $400,000.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the union argued it lacked status to be found in criminal contempt, that the common law offence of criminal contempt violated the Charter, and that a provincial board directive could not give rise to criminal contempt.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that unions have status to be found in criminal contempt, the offence does not violate the Charter as the distinction between civil and criminal contempt rests on the concept of public defiance, and the provincial legislation validly made the board's directive enforceable as an order of the court.

The appellant, an Indian residing on a reserve, received regular and enhanced unemployment insurance benefits based on qualifying employment located on the reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed these benefits as taxable income.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the situs of the benefits should be determined by evaluating various connecting factors in light of the purpose of the Indian Act tax exemption.

Because the qualifying employment was located on the reserve, the benefits were also situated on the reserve and thus exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act.

The respondent appealed a refusal for reimbursement of medical equipment to the Commission des affaires sociales.

Two commissioners heard the appeal and drafted a favourable decision, but the Commission's president reviewed it and disagreed.

A compulsory plenary meeting was held, leading one commissioner to change her mind, and the president then decided the matter against the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission's institutionalized consultation process violated the rules of natural justice by creating systemic pressure and an appearance of bias, and dismissed the Commission's appeal.

The appellant corporation was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a fatal industrial accident.

Due to a lack of court facilities, the trial was delayed for 19 months.

The appellant moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing its right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a corporate accused can rely on s. 11(b), it cannot rely on the presumption of prejudice that applies to individual accused.

Since the appellant did not establish actual prejudice to its ability to make full answer and defence, the delay was not unreasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had struck down a reverse onus provision in the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its recent decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. The Court held that while the requirement for the accused to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities restricts the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is a justifiable limit under s. 1.

The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal to dispose of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on charges under the Export and Import Permits Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the legislation was properly construed as creating a strict liability offence.

Applying R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., the Court held that the restriction on the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter was justifiable under s. 1.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and related offences.

His trial was delayed for 13 months, during which he was subject to bail conditions prohibiting him from driving.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the framework from R. v. Morin.

The Court found that the delay was not unreasonable given the inherent time requirements of the case, the actions of the accused, the institutional delay guidelines, and the minimal prejudice suffered.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

Her trial was held 14.5 months after her arrest, with the delay caused solely by limits on institutional resources.

The trial judge dismissed her motion for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal and entered a stay, but the Court of Appeal restored the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was not unreasonable given the strain on institutional resources and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellant.

The Court established guidelines for acceptable institutional delay in Provincial Courts.

The accused, a 14-year-old living in a group home, was charged with mischief, assault, and uttering threats after an altercation with an employee.

The youth court judge found the accused guilty on all counts, feeling bound by precedent despite believing the charges should not have been laid.

The Court of Appeal set aside the finding of guilt for uttering threats, holding that a youth court judge could dismiss a charge if it ought never to have been laid.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Young Offenders Act does not confer jurisdiction on a youth court judge to dismiss a charge simply because they disagree with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to lay it.

The respondent, a permanent resident, was ordered deported after being convicted of an offence punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

The Minister and Solicitor General filed a report indicating the respondent was likely to engage in organized crime, triggering an investigation by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

The Committee held a partially in camera hearing and recommended a certificate be issued, which barred the respondent from appealing his deportation on compassionate grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory deportation provisions did not violate sections 7, 12, or 15 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the removal of the compassionate appeal and the procedures followed by the Review Committee did not violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7.

The appellant insurer issued a life insurance policy to the respondent's son, which included a supplementary indemnity for accidental death but excluded suicide.

The insured signed an authorization allowing the insurer access to his medical records for risk assessment and loss analysis.

After the insured was found drowned, the insurer suspected suicide and sought access to his medical records from the hospital, which refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the authorization constituted a valid waiver of confidentiality, entitling the insurer to the complete medical records to investigate the cause of death.

The Court ordered the hospital to release the records pursuant to article 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The appellant utility company was regulated by the respondent Board.

Prior to and during a hearing regarding the appellant's executive compensation, a board member made strong public statements indicating he felt the compensation was unjustified and should not be borne by ratepayers.

The appellant objected to the member's participation, but the Board proceeded.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the member's statements raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and indicated a closed mind.

The Court concluded that a decision made in circumstances where a reasonable apprehension of bias exists is void ab initio, not merely voidable, as it constitutes a denial of the right to a fair hearing.

Counsel for the appellants failed to appear at the scheduled hearing of the appeal, and the Court proceeded to hear oral argument from the respondent only.

The appellants subsequently brought a motion for a re-hearing, claiming they were not notified of the hearing date.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is counsel's duty to ascertain inscribed hearing dates, not the Court's duty to inform them.

However, as a matter of indulgence and noting the unusual circumstances, the Court granted the re-hearing, ordering costs of the missed hearing and the motion to be paid personally by the appellants' counsel.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision upholding the respondent's acquittal for violating the Highway Safety Code by carrying an excess load.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal for the reasons set out by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, set aside the lower court judgments, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to quash an order committing him to stand trial for unlawful confinement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a judge presiding at a preliminary inquiry does not have jurisdiction to decide whether a provision of the Criminal Code violates the Charter.

The Court also found there was some evidence upon which the appellant could be committed for trial.

The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

A police officer made a demand for blood samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, but failed to include the assurances from section 254(4) that the samples would only be taken by or under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner and would not endanger the accused's life or health.

The accused refused the demand and was charged with failing to comply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a valid demand must incorporate these medical assurances.

Because the demand was invalid, the accused could not be convicted of refusing it, and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision declaring that various instruments amalgamating the cities of Rouyn and Noranda were unconstitutional for failing to comply with s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the entire legislative process, including the ministerial orders and letters patent, was subject to the mandatory bilingualism requirements of s. 133.

The Court declared the instruments nullities but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow the National Assembly to remedy the defects.

The police installed an unauthorized electronic tracking device (a 'beeper') in the appellant's vehicle after a search warrant had expired.

They used the device to monitor his movements, which eventually led to evidence connecting him to the destruction of a communications tower.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the installation and monitoring constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the majority concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the police acted in good faith out of urgency to protect the public from a suspected serial killer, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code obscenity provisions after being charged in connection with the sale, possession, and display of sexually explicit videotapes, magazines, and sexual devices.

The Court held that s. 163(8) infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, but upheld the provision under s. 1 on the basis that its true objective was preventing harm to society, particularly harm associated with degrading or dehumanizing sexual material.

The Court reformulated the obscenity analysis around harm, community tolerance, degradation or dehumanization, and internal necessities or artistic merit.

Because the courts below had applied materially different approaches, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed on all charges.