Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant Crown authority appealed a decision quashing a search warrant executed at a broadcaster's premises for videotapes of a labour-related vandalism incident that had already been aired.

The majority held that a search warrant for media premises may issue where the statutory requirements are met and the issuing justice balances law-enforcement needs against the media's privacy and news-gathering role, but disclosure of alternative sources, while ordinarily desirable, is not a constitutional precondition.

On the facts, the prior broadcast of the footage, the absence of interference with broadcasting operations, and the reasonableness of the search justified the warrant.

The dissent would have held that searches of press premises infringe freedom of the press and require proof of necessity, proportionality, and minimal impairment under s. 1.

The respondent was convicted of driving while prohibited under the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act and sentenced to the mandatory minimum of seven days' imprisonment and a $300 fine.

The trial judge upheld the sentence, but the summary conviction appeal court and the Court of Appeal found the mandatory minimum violated the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment in s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the mandatory minimum sentence does not infringe s. 12 when the prohibition from driving is based on an unsatisfactory driving record, as the punishment is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

The appellant, a statutory corporation created to encourage economic development in remote and isolated communities, made a loan to a company located near Winnipeg.

The loan was guaranteed by the respondent, a director and shareholder of the company.

The company defaulted, and the appellant sued the guarantors.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the loan was ultra vires the appellant because it contravened its statutory objects.

Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent was not liable on the guarantee because the principal debt was a nullity and the respondent had not personally received any of the funds.

The appellant owned an auto body shop in the respondent municipality.

The municipality adopted a resolution to expropriate the appellant's property for the purpose of creating a land reserve, after attempts to purchase it failed.

The appellant challenged the expropriation, arguing the municipality lacked the power to expropriate solely for a land reserve and that the notice lacked precision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Cities and Towns Act permits municipalities to expropriate for land reserves, as it constitutes a valid municipal purpose.

The Court also found that stating the expropriation was 'for purposes of a land reserve' satisfied the Expropriation Act's requirement for a precise statement of purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with breach of trust, theft, and fraud.

A former secretary gave evidence favourable to the defence at the preliminary inquiry.

The Crown subsequently interviewed her, obtained statements, decided not to call her at trial, and refused to disclose the statements to the defence.

The trial judge dismissed the defence's application for disclosure, and the accused was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, establishing that the Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence, subject to reviewable discretion regarding privilege, relevance, and timing.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a new trial and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years under transitional provisions.

He appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus, arguing he was sentenced under the wrong law, relying on R. v. Gamble.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention was lawful under a transitional provision whose constitutionality could not be attacked without a retrospective application of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for rape, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting prior statements by the complainant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Alberta Court of Appeal that the statements were admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed his conviction for abduction, arguing that the trial judge erred in excluding a proposed line of cross-examination.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal on the first two points and finding that the proposed cross-examination related to a collateral matter with extremely tenuous relevance.

The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in excluding it.

The corporate accused challenged misleading advertising provisions under the Competition Act on the basis that the strict liability structure, modified due diligence defence, and reverse onus infringed Charter ss. 7 and 11(d).

The Court held that a corporation charged with an offence could raise the constitutional challenge and benefit from a finding of invalidity.

A unanimous Court held that the timely retraction requirements in the statutory defence infringed s. 7 because they could permit conviction without fault and were not justified under s. 1.

A majority held that the reverse onus requiring the accused to establish due diligence on a balance of probabilities infringed s. 11(d), but a different majority held that infringement justified under s. 1 in the regulatory context.

The accused's appeal was dismissed, the Crown's appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to trial on the basis that the timely retraction provisions were unconstitutional but the reverse onus remained operative.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of communications the appellant made to her church pastor and a lay counsellor, in which she admitted her involvement in the murder.

The appellant argued these communications were privileged under common law and s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that there is no prima facie common law privilege for religious communications.

Instead, claims of privilege for such communications must be determined on a case-by-case basis using the Wigmore criteria, informed by the Charter.

Applying the Wigmore criteria, the Court found the communications were not privileged because they did not originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision allowing the respondents' motion for relief from their failure to contest the right of expropriation within the 30-day time limit.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents were misled regarding the existence and nature of their rights through the fault of the appellant, which suspended the start of the time limit.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision regarding the constitutionality of provincial legislation amalgamating the cities of Rouyn and Noranda.

The respondents challenged the legislation on various grounds under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, including the right to vote, fundamental justice, freedom of association, and equality rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment from the bench, answering the constitutional questions in the negative and finding the arguments without merit.

The appellants appealed a decision allowing the respondent to pursue claims for disability benefits under insurance contracts.

In a prior tort action regarding a motor vehicle accident, the respondent's damages for lost income were reduced for failure to mitigate.

The appellants argued the present actions were barred by issue estoppel or abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the prior tort action involved a factual finding on ability to work for assessing damages, whereas the present cases involved the legal interpretation of disability under the insurance policies and the Insurance Act.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge instructed the jury that he could be found guilty as a party to murder under the combined operation of ss. 21(2) and 213(c) of the Criminal Code, even without subjective foresight of death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction using the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 213(c) and s. 21(2) violate ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting a murder conviction without subjective foresight of death, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a federally incorporated board, appealed a decision finding it subject to the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the board is not operating under the Peace, Order and Good Government clause or the trade and commerce power, and is therefore subject to provincial human rights legislation.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that res judicata deprived the Commission of jurisdiction, as the human rights complaints were not the same cause of action as earlier proceedings before the Federal Court.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

On consent of both parties, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Crown's appeal.

The order of the Court of Appeal was quashed and the stay of proceedings was restored.

The appellant challenged his extradition to the United States after a murder conviction and exposure to the death penalty, arguing that surrender without assurances under Article 6 of the Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that s. 12 did not directly apply to extradition because any punishment would be imposed by the foreign state, and that the proper inquiry under s. 7 was whether surrender would sufficiently shock the Canadian conscience or be fundamentally unacceptable.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded that extradition to a U.S. jurisdiction with substantial procedural protections for brutal murder offences did not violate fundamental justice, and that s. 25 of the Extradition Act validly left the matter to ministerial discretion.

The Court also held that natural justice did not require an oral hearing before the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order confirmed.

The Governor in Council referred questions to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding whether the Minister of Justice's decision to extradite a fugitive to the United States without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed violated sections 7 or 12 of the Charter.

The fugitive was facing multiple murder charges in California.

The Court held that the extradition without such assurances did not violate the Charter, answering both reference questions in the negative.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a consensual fist fight outside a bar.

The victim was knocked unconscious but the accused continued to strike him, resulting in the victim's death.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the victim had consented to a fair fight.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and substituted a manslaughter conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that public policy and common law principles limit the legal effectiveness of consent to assault.

Consent is vitiated between adults who intentionally apply force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm to each other in the course of a fist fight or brawl.

The appellants, Chief and Councillor of the Shawanaga First Nation, were convicted of unlawfully conducting a bingo contrary to the Criminal Code.

They argued that the lottery provisions of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional and that they had a defence of colour of right, mistakenly believing the laws did not apply to their activities on an Indian reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional questions were resolved in the companion case of R. v. Furtney, and that the defence of colour of right was unavailable because their mistake was one of law, not fact.